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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL IMTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) that was passed into law in 1996 has 
revived interest in issues of pesticide regulation. It mandates a different approach to the 
regulatory management of risks posed by pesticide use in that it requires a consistent 
assessment of risks from pesticides with a similar mode of toxic action and it explicitly 
reqxiires the regulatory agency to address risks posed to infants and children. In particular, 
FQPA draws critical attention to the use and safety of organophosphates, a group of 
insecticides that are widely used in apple production. 
This dissertation addresses issues in the economic analysis of pesticide regulation in 
apple production. The U.S. apple industry is a highly pesticide-intensive industry: 96% of 
the bearing apple acreage is treated with insecticides, 90% with fungicides, and 60% with 
herbicides. This amounts to 44 lb. of active ingredient applied per acre (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture). 
Several particularities of apple production systems require a careful consideration of 
the methods that are used to estimate regulatory impacts. Growing conditions are very 
heterogeneous across the United States due to differences in climate and pest pressure and 
regional redistribution impacts need to be estimated. Quality aspects are important to 
recognize as growers receive considerable premia when producing fruit that qualifies for the 
high-value fresh market In addition, dynamic analysis is required in production systems 
where trees once planted bear fruit for several years or even decades. Besides addressing 
these aspects that are specific to pesticide regulation in production systems of fiiiit and 
perennial crops, this dissertation proposes a method to acknowledge the uncertainty in ex-
ante assessments of regulatory actions. 
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The study begins by formulating a partial-equilibrium model of the U.S. apple 
industry, where apple orchards are modeled as multiproduct firms producing apples for fresh 
and processed utilization. The model is structured to facilitate the estimation of 
disaggregated welfare impacts on consumers and different groups of producers in the two 
markets. An econometric model of U.S. apple supply and demand that incorporates net 
imports and that acknowledges the strong links between the markets for fresh and processed 
apples is estimated on a regional basis and elasticity estimates are obtained. Using expert 
opinion data on production impacts, the model is employed to estimate the economic effects 
of hypothetical bans on seven different fungicides and seven different herbicides. 
The dissertation then turns to the issue of incorporating experts' uncertainty into ex-
ante welfare assessments. Because of a lack of historical and experimental data, economic 
assessments of regulatory actions are frequently based on expert opinion. Although this is in 
many cases the best or only data available, experts themselves are often uncertain about 
possible impacts. Such imcertainty has nontrivial consequences for welfare analysis. A 
method based on Bayesian updating is proposed to combine dispersed expert opinion arising 
as a collection of probability estimates over a finite number of events. The methods are 
implemented using as an example a hypothetical ban on one organophosphate, azinphos-
methyl, and the whole group of organophosphates in U.S. apple production. Production 
impact distributions are estimated and distributions of economic welfare changes are 
obtained for different policy scenarios. A nonparametric test is used to order the outcome 
distributions in their welfare properties. 
The final part of this dissertation analyzes the question of how pesticide regulation 
impacts the long-term decision to replant an orchard. The topic is addressed imder the 
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particular consideratioii of antibiotic use in apple production. Antibiotics are used in fruit 
production to control &e blight, a bacterial disease of apple and pear trees that can 
considerably lower yields for several years and eventually lead to tree death. The use of 
antibiotic agents in agriculture is a subject of growing concern to scientists and public health 
officials because of fear of widespread resistance development that would make the use of 
antibiotics ineffective in human health care. Furthermore, resistance development in the fire 
blight bacteria itself threatens the availability of effective means for fire blight control. 
Existing economic models of pesticide regulation do not consider such long-term 
impacts on the survival probability of a perennial crop. A Faustmaim-type model of orchard 
replanting is proposed as a framework that can incorporate the changes in survival 
probability of an orchard. The optimal replanting time is derived and the replanting decision 
of a single grower is embedded in an industry equilibrium to facilitate a welfare analysis of 
changes in the production environment. The model is smdied using analj^cal and numerical 
tools and estimates of welfare impacts are obtained for a hypothetical ban on antibiotics use 
in apple production. 
Dissertation Organization 
In addition to this introduction, the dissertation consists of three independent papers, 
and although the p^)ers are thematically closely related, each is fvilly self-contained with an 
introduction stating and motivating the research question, a model section, and an empirical 
application. Given the wide spread of topics used in this research, an independent survey of 
the literature at the beginning of the dissertation seemed to be unsatisfactory. For this reason, 
the literature is reviewed in each paper as needed to put the work into context The 
dissertation concludes with a general summary of the results. 
References 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. NASS/ERS- Agricultural Chemical Usage: Fruits 
Summary. Washington, DC, 1998. 
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CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICAL USE 
RESTRICTIONS IN U.S. APPLE PRODUCTION 
A paper to be published as part of the report 
"Benefits of Pesticide Use in Apple Production" 




A partial-equilibrium model of U.S. apple supply and demand is developed in order to 
estimate the welfare impacts of pesticide use cancellations. Apple orchards are described as 
multiproduct firms, producing apples for fresh and processed utilization. This setting allows 
us to acknowledge the market links that exist between the market for fresh and processed 
apples and to incorporate quality impacts of the regulation into the assessment. Welfare 
impacts for seven fimgicides and seven herbicides are assessed. The most important impacts 
are implied by a cancellation of the herbicides glyphosate ($9.6 mill.) and simazine ($8.0 
mill.) and the fimgicides Egosterol-Biosynthesis Inhibitors ($5.8 mill.), captan ($2.6 mill.), 
and mancozeb ($1.6 mill.). 
Introduction 
The U.S. apple industry is a highly pesticide-intensive industry. In 1995, the USDA 
NASS/ERS Agricultural Chemical Usage: Fruit Simunary estimated that 114 different active 
ingredients of pesticides or growth reg:ulators were applied in apple production. * Overall, 
98% of the bearing apple acreage is treated with insecticides, 93% with fungicides, and 63% 
with herbicides. This amounts to 46 lb. of active ingredient (a.i.) ^plied per acre. 
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The indiistry has a $1.7 bill. «"""«! value of production at the farm level (1996). The 
major apple producing state is Washington where about 50% of the 10 bill. lb. national crop 
and 66% of U.S. fresh apples are produced (data are 1994-96 averages). Other major apple 
producing states are New York (1,080 mill. lb. total production, of which 45% are consumed 
fresh), Michigan (990 mill, lb., of which 32% are consimied fresh), California (930 mill, lb., 
of which 35% are consumed fresh), Pennsylvania (430 mill, lb., of which 31% are consiraied 
fresh), Virginia (320 mill- lb., of which 31% are consumed fresh). North Carolina (240 mill, 
lb., of which 30% are consumed fresh), and Oregon (160 mill, lb., of which 74% are 
consimied fresh). 
Production conditions for apples are very heterogeneous across the United States and, 
due to climatic differences, production systems vary widely. This is particularly true with 
respect to disease pressure where western production regions benefit from their arid climate. 
These disparate pest pressxire situations become apparent in the study of cost of production 
estimates. While insect management costs are relatively invariant at about $180/acre across 
the United States, disease control cost (mainly fungal) vary widely from $130/acre in the 
western states through to $260/acre in the central states and to $320/acres in the eastem states 
(Clark and Burkhart; Fimt et al.; Hinman et al.; Kelsey and Schwallier; Parker et al.; 
Peimsylvania Agricultural Extension Service; Vossen et al.).^ These large differences in 
costs of disease control suggest that pesticide regulation will have strong distribution impacts 
for apple producers in the different production regions and that this will in particular be true 
for flmgicides. 
7 
O'Rourke states that "Government intervention [in the apple industry] has tended to 
be most intrusive in the control of chemical use by orchardists." (p. 177) The Food Quality 
Protection Act (FQPA) that passed into law in 1996 has brought new attention to issues of 
pesticide relation, because it mandates a dififerent approach to the regulatory management 
of risks posed by pesticide use. It requires a consistent assessment of risks from pesticides 
with a similar mode of toxic action and it is expected that in particular the availability of 
insecticides and fimgicides will be affected once they have been reviewed under the new 
statute. Despite the fact that the FQPA requires a risk assessment for classes of pesticides 
instead of for single pesticides, an economic assessment of the value of single pesticides is 
still needed in order to make economically sound decisions when deciding which pesticide 
uses to keep and which to cancel. The use of such information enables the regulatory agency 
to achieve a desirable risk reduction while minimizing the regulatory costs. 
The goal of this paper is to estimate the production and welfare distribution impacts 
of pesticide regulation at a regionally disaggregated level. To this end, a regional 
econometric model of apple siq)ply and demand is estimated and applied to the ex-ante 
estimation of welfare changes caused by pesticide regulation. Scenarios are based on 
hypothetical bans of single pesticides where production impact estimates are obtained from 
an expert opinion study. The assessment is conducted for the seven fungicides and the seven 
herbicides that are considered being the most important ones in apple production. 
The paper continues with a description of the economic model of a pesticide ban. 
Starting from a partial-market equilibrium model, changes in supply and demand in different 
market segments are derived. Issues of welfare analysis in horizontally related markets are 
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addressed and the interaction of supply shifts between the market segments is illustrated in a 
diagrammatic exposition. We discuss the that enter the ex-ante estimation of welfare 
changes due to pesticide bans and explain the computational techniques employed. The 
section is accompanied by a discussion of preliminary simulations that aid us in 
understanding the model behavior. We report results on estimated welfare changes due to 
pesticide cancellations, focusing on the regional distribution effects and the reallocation 
effects between the markets for apples allocated to fresh and processed utilization. The paper 
concludes with a simunary of the findings. 
Economic Model of a Pesticide Ban in Apple Production 
In apple production pesticides are mainly used to preserve quality and protection against 
yield losses is generally a secondary consideration. We model apple production orchards as 
joint-product firms producing apples for the fresh and processing market The fresh market 
pays a considerable premium and a deterioration of quality is modeled as a decrease in the 
share of fruit allocated to the fresh market The marginal welfare analysis suggested by 
Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman is extended to this multiproduct analysis. In this 
framework, supply and/or demand fimctions are assimied to imdergo parallel shifts given 
changes of the production technology, and flexibility estimates are used to calculate price and 
quantity changes. 
The model is one of partial equilibrium, and growers are arranged into j=l,..., J 
groups according to how their marginal-cost flmction is impacted by the loss of a pesticide. 
The cancellation of a pesticide presents a change in the technology available to growers, and 
the shift in technology is parameterized by A. If growers do not use the pesticide, their 
technology is independent of Z. 
Specifically, producers are grouped into sets of users and non-users of a pesticide in 
different geographical production regions: West, Midwest, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and 
Southeast We order the groups such that j=l,..k identify the producers who are affected 
by a change inA, i.e. in our case the users of a pesticide to be banned, and j=k+I,..., J, 
denote the producers groups that are not affected by a ban. Denoting prices by P and 
quantities by Q, with subscript j identifying regions and superscript F and P signifying firesh 
and processed, respectively, the partial equilibrium can be described as: 
SupplyUser: Pj = MC'(Q^,  ,  A) ,  i  = F,P;j  (1.1) 
Supply Non-User: Pj = MC'^( jQ^,  Q^) ,  i  = F,P- , j  = k  + l . . . ,J  (1.2) 
Regional Pricing: P ' j = h ) { P ' ) ,  i  =  F , P - j  =  (1.3) 
Demand: D'iQii) = P', i = F,P (1.4) 
Netlmports: QL = Ad\P' ,Zj  Qj) ,  i  = F,P (1.5) 
Market Clearing: Z' = (1-6) 
Equation (1.1) is the supply function for pesticide users and equation (1.2) is the supply 
function for non-users. The marginal-cost fimctions (MC) depend on production to the fresh 
and processing sector to capture the joint-product character of the technology. Users and 
non-users produce at a level such that their marginal costs equals price both in the fresh and 
processing market Equation (1.4) presents the inverse demand function (D) for fresh or 
processing apples. Demand is modeled at the U.S. level and P' is the U.S. level price and 
depends on the quantity consumed, Q'^ . The regional supply fimctions are linked to the U.S. 
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demand via regional pricing equations presented by A] (P') in equation (1.3). Equation (1.5) 
models net imports (Q^,) and the last equation (1.6) poses the market clearing conditions. 
Totally differentiating this system, one can derive the equilibrium impacts of a change 
in technology (the loss of a pesticide) which is parameterized as a shift in A. 
fr dO'  ^ fr -dPf =- dji J = (2.1a) 
P'' P"" 3dC'' f r  ^  f r  - d P f  = -  d X  j  = 1,...,^ (2.1b) 
f r  ^  d Q j  + f r ^ d Q ^ - d P f = 0  J  =  k  +  l,...,y (2.2a) 
ff ^ dQ^ J = k*(2.2b) 
dP;-^dP'  = 0 i  = F,P;j  = l . . . ,J  (2.3) 
/ ;  ^  0 i=F.P (2.4) 
Qd 
dQl,-e'^ ^<W-e'^ -^^d\%Q]Yo i=F.P (2.5) 
dQl + • • + dQ:, + dQ'^  - dQi, =0 i = F.P (2.6) 
Expression ff^ denotes the flexibility of the price of good K with respect to the quantity of 
good L, where j indexes the region. The flexibility is a demand flexibility if j = d. For net 
imports e'^  and e'^  indicate the elasticities of net imports with respect to U.S. price level 
and U.S. production for the respective market i. System (2) is linear in the endogenoias 
quantity and price changes and, given the exogenous shocks to the marginal-cost functions, 
can be solved by inversioiL It is equivalent to system (2) in Lichtenberg, Parker, and 
r J 
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Zilberman, but for the cross-price flexibilities that are included here to model value losses 
arising from reallocation of fruit from the fresh to the processing market.® 
Welfare Analysis 
Using the solutions for changes in quantities and prices according to system (2), consumer 
and producer surpluses can be calculated assuming, as in Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman, 
that shifts in supply cxirves are linear. This assimiption is suitable if shifts are small which is 
an adeqiiate assumption for our case, because we consider only single pesticide use 
restrictions in this study. In most cases, orchard managers can replace the lost pesticide by 
more or less suitable substitutes and impacts on cost of production, yield, and quality are 
small. 
To derive the welfare implications for producers we start from the profit 
maximization problem of the grower who chooses the optimal quantities and 
according to 
^ * pfQ" -  c(e;> e;; (3) 
The first-order conditions define the market supply flmctions and can be stated according to 
(1.1) or (1.2) for users and non-users of the pesticide, respectively. The profit-maximizing 
solutions of Qj and Qj are denoted as Qj and Qj . Abstracting from fixed costs, producer 
surplus is defined as Rj = Pf Qj  + PfQj -  ^(Qj  ^ Qj  l  ^ ) -  Assuming that output i  is a 
necessary output, the change in producer surplus for the non-users of a pesticide is defined as 
ARj = j je;  + [Pj  -  MC'j i  •  )]  ^  + [/>- '  -  MC-' i  •  )]  dP;  
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where P^j denotes the original price level and signifies the price level after the change in 
X. Here, the superscript / can here denote either F or P, implying that -i indicates the other. 
Employing the envelope theorem, the last two terms of the integrand simi to zero and 
The equilibrium supply Q'j responds thereby to price changes in both markets, i.e. /V ' is not 
held fixed. Welfare impacts in hori^ntally related markets can thus be assessed using the 
equilibrium supply curve in any of the affected market (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, pp. 337-
For the users of the pesticide, the change in producer surplus can be derived as the 
analogue to (4), but it now acknowledges the shift in the cost fimction due to the change in ?. 
for j = . 
Equivalent to (4) and (5), the changes in producer surplus can be calculated in each 
market separately employing the partial-equilibrium supply curves Q] {Pj;  Q~') ,  i  = F,P.  
Using the latter approach changes in both markets have to be considered, because the surplus 
changes in one market are not calciilated in the other. Since reallocation of production and 
surplus between the markets is an important aspect of this study, the latter approach was 
chosen.' 
= /e;< y = A: + l,...,y. (4) 
48). 
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In this analysis, changes in demand result exclusively &om changes in prices, and we 
ignore any possible changes in consumers' preferences for apples that could result from a 
change in the production method. Therefore the demand fimctions do not shift and the 
change in consumer surplus can be described by the difference in the consumer siurplus 
before and after a change in pesticide availability and is calculated as - dP' {Q'j + dO'j / 2) in 
each market 
Calculating Marginal-Cost Changes 
To solve (2), an estimate of the marginal-cost change for producer group j is needed. A 
grower chooses the profit-maximizing level of production for the fresh and processed market 
using her technology described by the cost function Cj (jQj, According to the 
profit-maximization problem (3), she will choose the level of production that equates the 
marginal cost of producing for the fresh and processed market with the respective price, as 
described in (1.1) and (1.2). The problem is isomorphic to selecting the optimal level of 
jdeld, Yj, and the optimal share of fruit going to the fresh market, Oj, according to 
max aj;X)  = (ojPf  + ( l -  a,W!)  Y,  -  a/ ,  A)  
a,.Y, 
where (•) is the alternative cost fimction specification that arises from the same 
technology as Cj (Qj, Qj; A). It is assumed to be convex in Yj and Uj. The first-order 
conditions can be stated as 
f jAYi .  " j -= "jP/  + 0 - aj)Pf  
=  ( ? /  - p f y r j  
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where second subscripts on 4^^ denote first derivatives. This system of equations can be 
solved for 
Pj" = Q% 2.) = -H (1 - <z,) T,,, / Y, 
Pf  = Q^,  X)  = T, . ,  -  / r .  
Following Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman, we approximate locally marginai costs of 
yield and fresh share by their average costs, i.e., =.W./Yj and ^~ » 
where the parameter Wj denotes the per acre cost of production. Then totally differentiating 
the marginal-cost flmctions with respect to changes in cost of production, Wj, jdeld, Yj, and 
fresh share, Uj, the change in marginal costs of fresh and processing production in the j-th 
region are derived as 
[dlVJY,-{ajP;  +{l-a,)Pf)dY^IY,  -  (Pf  -  Pf)  daj] / ( l+0.5 dYj /Y,)  (6) 
A cautionary remark on equation (6) is in place. The loss of a particular pesticide 
might have other negative impacts on orchard management that are not easily captured as 
changes in cost of production, yield, or quality. Apple production systems and pest systems 
are very complex and changes in pesticide availability can lead to changes in the overall 
system performance, even if direct effects on jdeld or fresh market allocation might be 
negligible. Because of such effects growers might decide to use one pesticide over another 
despite the fact that marginal cost of production according to (6) increases. Hubbel and 
Carlson have shown that this can be the case with regard to insecticide choices where apple 
producers incorporate variables such as worker safety or environmental soundness into their 
insecticide choice. 
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A Diagrammatic Exposition 
The effect of a pesticide ban on the interlinked markets for fresh and processed apples is 
somewhat involved and we illustrate the working of system (2) in a set of diagrams. We start 
with figure 1, where we first assume that the markets for fi«sh and processed apples can be 
analyzed separately. This strong assimiption is relaxed in the discussion of figure 2, where 
the interrelationships between the markets are included in the maimer modeled in the 
analytical and empirical analysis. This stepwise procedure helps to clarify the concepts of 
our analysis, and to distinguish between different forces that will jointly determine the final 
welfare impact of a pesticide use restriction. 
The upper three diagrams in figure 1 show a model of the market for fresh apples and 
the lower three diagrams show the same for processed apples. The leftmost diagrams depict 
the market equilibrium; S° is the original (before regulation) supply curve, and D the demand 
curve for the fresh market (1 A) and processing market (ID), respectively. The prevailing 
market price is PF® (PP°). In figures IB (IE) and IC (IF), the market supply fimction is split 
into the supply for the users of the pesticide (center diagrams) and non-users (right 
diagrams). For both, users and non-users, the market price PF® (PP°) will be the relevant 
price at which their product is sold. 
A technology shift due to a pesticide ban is represented by an upward shift of the 
supply curves for the users of the pesticide. At the same time, the supply fimction for non-
users remains unchanged. Summing horizontally, total market supply for fresh (processed) 
apples will shift upwards, from S° to S' in diagram lA (ID). 
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At the new market price PF' (PP'), previous users will supply fewer apples given their 
new supply function S' (IB, IE), and non-users supply more (IC, 1F)> because they receive a 
higher price while their technology is unaffected. In our graphs, non-users clearly benefit 
&om an increase in the market price, a result that holds true as long as we ignore the 
interdependence of the supply fimctions for fresh and processed apples. The total quantity of 
fresh and processed apples supplied decreases (left pointing arrow on the QF-axis (QP-axis)). 
Introducing the dependence between the markets of fresh and processing apples, the 
supply functions in the fresh market shift in response to changes in the market for processed 
apples and vice versa. From elasticity estimates obtained from an econometric model that is 
presented in appendix 2A, we know that the production of fresh apples decreases in the price 
of processed apples and the production of processing increases in the price of fresh apples. In 
figure 1, we saw that the pure technological effect of a pesticide-use restriction resiilts in an 
increase of prices (PF'>PF*' and PP'>PP°). Therefore, the supply fimctions of fresh apples 
from users and non-users shift upward, whereas the supply fimctions of processed apples 
from users and non-user shift downwards. The new supply fimctions are denoted by 
superscript "2" and the new prevailing market prices are denoted by PF^and PP^ (figure 2). 
We turn now to the welfare assessment of the changes in the market for fresh and 
processed apples and as explained in the previous section, we employ the partial-equilibrium 
supply curves. Evaluating the overall impact and acknowledging the changes in the market 
environment, we compare situation "0", the market equilibritim before change, to situation 
**2", the new market equilibriimi. The change in producer surplus is defined as the difference 
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in the areas behind the siipply curves as illustrated in figure 3. Figure 4 illustrates the 
concept of a change in consumer surplus. 
In this assessment we will not only divide producers into users and non-users, but also 
distinguish users and non-users by region. The diagrammatic analysis would have to be 
extended to model additional producer groups, but the general procedure would remain the 
same. 
Data 
Apple production systems differ widely across production areas, and for this reason we assess 
impacts of pesticide regulation by region. We distinguish five major apple-producing 
regions: West, Midwest, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Southeast. The states composing each 
region are listed in table 1 together with production and revenue data for each region. The 
West is the most important production region and receives annual revenue of $ 1.1 bill, fi-om 
apple production. Midwest, Northeast, and Mid-Atlantic are relatively similar in their 
importance, each with annual revenue of about $150 mill., and the Southeast is the smallest 
production region with $39 mill, revenue coming from apple production. Figure 5 maps the 
five regions and the bars indicate the revenue from apple production in the respective states.^ 
Change in Cost of Production, Yield, and Quality 
The biological sections of the project report to the USDA-NAPIAP assessment of pesticide 
use in apple production present data obtained in expert opinion surveys. It includes data on 
current pesticide use patterns and on pesticide use scenarios in the case of single pesticide 
cancellations. In detail, estimates of the acreage that is currently treated by a pesticide and 
the ctirrent use rates are given for the states listed in table 1. For the cancellation scenarios. 
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they estimate the proportion of currently treated acreage on which the canceled pesticide 
would be replaced by each alternative, the use rates of each substitute pesticide, and how 
yield and production share allocated to fresh consimiption would be affected by such a 
replacement. Estimates are given for the year following a hypothetical pesticide ban.' 
These data allow us to calculate changes in the cost of production using a partial-
budgeting approach. Pesticide prices are taken from USDA NASS agriciiltural prices 
statistics (1996 for herbicides, 1997 for ftmgicides). If a price for a particular pesticide is not 
published, chemical suppliers in different geographical regions were contacted by phone and 
asked for the price at which the product would typically be sold to apple orchards. Averages 
were formed for our analysis. We crosschecked prices published by USDA/NASS with 
prices elicited from chemical suppliers and found only minor differences. 
The application costs are estimated using updated estimates from enterprise budgets 
(Clark and Burkhart; Funt et al.; Hinman et al.; Kelsey and Schwallier; Parker et al.; 
Pennsylvania Agricultural Extension Service; Vossen et al.) and cost of applying 
herbicides/fungicides is appraised at $6.40/$ 10.84 per acre. Mowing is an often suggested 
replacement strategy for the application of herbicides and its cost is estimated at $11.83/acre. 
Using the estimates for cost of production, yield, and quality changes, marginal-cost 
changes are estimated via equation (6). In some instances the marginal costs are lower imder 
the replacement scenarios than under current use patterns and this poses a problem for our 
analysis. Such results can occur when growers choose a pesticide for indirect benefits that 
are not acknowledged in (6). In these cases, the change in marginal cost is set to zero. We 
motivate this by the assumption that the nonquantifiable benefits, on e.g. worker safety. 
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integrated pest management (IPM) programs, or resistance management, are at least as large 
as the extra cost of using the currently used pesticide.'" 
Elasticity Estimates and Market Data 
Regional supply elasticities are estimated together with demand elasticities and import 
responses in an econometric modeling effort that is presented in appendix 2A. The model 
arranges U.S. apple production into four apple-producing regions. Northwest, Southwest, 
Midwest, and East, for each of which a production and allocation component is estimated. 
The demand component of the model describes demand for fresh and processed apples at the 
U.S. level, and regional price levels are allowed to differ by linking the demand and the 
supply components via regional pricing equations. Short-run (year 1) and long-run (year 5) 
elasticities are numerically estimated by shocking the model at the means of the data. 
Because experts report production technology changes for the year after a hypothetical 
pesticide ban and because the project requires us to estimate first-year impacts, short-run 
elasticities are inverted to yield flexibility estimates that are used in the estimation of market 
impacts." 
Data on current prices and quantities were obtained from USDA publications, and 
market quantities and prices for ftesh and processed apples were calculated using an average 
of 1994-96 data. They are listed in table 1. A three-year average was used because prices 
and qxiantities in the apples market can be quite volatile depending on weather, pest, and 
(foreign) market conditions. By averaging prices and quantities we obtain impact estimates 
for an "average year". 
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Computational Issues 
Changes in quantities and prices are calculated by inversion of system (2), while employing 
the flexibility estimates from the appendix. The regional units of analysis when emplo3dng 
system (2) are the states listed in table 1 For the result section, impacts by states are then 
summed within a region to yield regional impacts. 
Preliminary Simulation 
States are treated very heterogeneously because they differ in marginal costs and prices 
according to market data. Furthermore, transfers of price shocks and supply response 
elasticities vary by region. We conduct a preliminary simulation to improve our 
understanding of the model and we shock the marginal-cost fimction by 1 0/lb. on 50% of the 
acreage in all regions. The changes in economic surplus for producers and consumers are 
shown in table 2. The first column shows the sum of impacts in the markets for fresh and 
processed apples. The changes in the market for fresh apples are listed in columns 2-5 of the 
table and colimms 6-9 described the changes in the market for processed apples. 
The shift in the marginal-cost function reduces supply, and quantities sold decrease 
and prices increase in both markets. Consequently non-users benefit, while users and 
consumers suffer losses in economic surplus. The change in net imports caused by the 
changes in production and prices can be read as the difference in quantity produced and 
quantity consumed. In table 2, net imports increase by 5.1 mill. lb. in the fresh market and by 
12.2 mill. lb. in the processed market 
In appendix 2A, elasticity estimates show that the demand for fresh apples is less 
elastic than the one for processed apples, and that imports respond more elastically to 
quantity and price changes in the processed market than they do in the firesh market. 
Accordingly consumers bear a larger part of marginal-cost increases in the fresh market than 
in the market for processed apples. Specifically, in the fresh market consxmier bear 97% of 
the $4.7 mill, total economic surplus loss, while in the processed market, producers bear the 
larger share of 68% of the $2.8 mill, loss. In terms of producer siurplus, price increases 
almost compensate for cost increases and supply reductions shock in the firesh market, 
because the demand is sufficiently inelastic (Babcock; Lave). 
Turning to the regional distribution of producer impacts, we see that of all regions the 
West experiences the largest loss. Given that the West also produces by far the largest share 
of total supply, it is instructive to analyze the losses relative to the anmifll revenue in the 
region. In relative terms, the Northeast loses the most and the first-year loss amounts to 0.2% 
of annual revenue. For the Southeast, Mid-Atlantic, West, and Midwest the drop has a size 
of 0.16%, 0.14%, 0.13%, and 0.02%. Users lose overall $3.3 mill and non-users gain $1.8 
mill, in surplus. In general, the relative size of economic surplus losses appears small; 
however, they compare to results that Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman found for similar 
scenarios in plum, almond, and prune production. 
Because of the long-time horizon of investments into apple production, we repeat the 
estimation using the long-term (year 5) flexibilities. In year 5, the annual surplus impact will 
be much stronger and total losses amount to $62.2 mill, (table 3). Losses increase because 




We begin our policy study with the analysis of fungicide cancellations. Fungicides are used 
to manage a very complex system of diseases and the implications of fungicide regulation are 
complicated by two factors. On the one hand, a fungicide can be used to combat several 
diseases at the same time. But on the other hand, fungicides are often applied in combination 
to increase their efficacy in combating one disease or several diseases. 
The application of fungicides occurs during two principal growth periods, one being 
the early part of the season during bloom and fruit setting and the other being the sxmmier. It 
is often thought that a larger share of consimier risks from pesticide exposure stems from 
pesticide use close to harvest time, and therefore it is sometimes considered to cancel 
pesticide use only during this season in order to limit the economic cost of the regulation. 
This motivated us to estimate the cost of elongating the preharvest interval by canceling the 
use of specific fimgicides during the summer. In addition, we estimate the welfare impacts of 
banning the fungicide for the entire season. 
We analyze removal scenarios for seven fungicides: C^tan, mancozeb, dodine, 
ziram, benomyl, egosterol-biosynthesis inhibitors (EBI), and thiophanate-methyl. 
Rosenberger collects and sunmiarizes expert opinion data on current fungicide use patterns 
and replacement scenarios. Information about the treated acreage and the proportion of 
fungicide use in the early season is given in table 4 together with expert estimates of cost, 
yield, and quality changes given a cancellation of summer use or a cancellation for the entire 
season.'^  Asterisks mark occasions in which the change in marginal cost is set to zeros 
23 
because the marginal cost of the replacement technology is lower than that of the currently 
used technology. 
Captan 
Captan is a contact fungicide that is widely used to control many diseases especially in the 
central and eastern United States. It is a multi-site inhibitor of most fimgi, and therefore no 
apple diseases have developed resistance to this fungicide. Growers dislike using it during 
the summer because it has a four-day reentry period which limits the time available for 
pruning and other orchard tasks. In many states, it is therefore mostly used in the early 
season. Often suggested alternatives are thiram, ziram, mancozeb, and EBI fungicides. 
Because of a large increase in the mmiber of applications, the replacement technology 
would be very expensive in Michigan and sizable quantity impacts are in addition expected in 
the southeastem states. Most of the losses would therefore accrue in the Midwest and 
Southeast (table 5). Captan is not widely applied in the western states and no cost impacts 
are expected. Western growers would therefore benefit from a use restriction and from the 
reduced supply of apples in the U.S. market Overall, producers will gain in terms of 
producer surplus, but consumers suffer a surplus loss of $2.2 mill, if captan is canceled 
during the summer. When captan is banned for the whole season, welfare losses increase 
only slightly (table 6), mostly for growers in the Northeast and consumers. Total stirplus 
losses amount to S2.6 mill. 
Mancozeb 
Mancozeb like captan is a contact fimgicide. 7.iram captan, and EBI are often mentioned 
substitutes. Since mancozeb is used almost exclusively in the early season with the exception 
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of the Southeast, a ban on mancozeb during the summer would have only small impacts 
(table 7). Because of relatively large marginal-cost impacts in the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic, growers in this region would be most impacted. 
The situation is different for an outright ban on mancozeb (table 8). For Michigan 
replacement cost would be particularly high, allocation to fresh market decreases by 9.2% 
and yield decreases by 2.3%. Because of this, losses arise in the Midwest although it 
experiences a slight welfare gain if mancozeb is banned for simuner use only. Growers in the 
Northeast would also incur largely increased losses. Total losses amount to $1.6 mill. 
Dodine 
Dodine is no longer widely used because resistance has developed in many eastern states. A 
loss of dodine for summer sprays would have small impacts in terms of welfare changes 
(table 9). In the scenario of banning dodine for the entire season most losses are incurred in 
the West (table 10), where larger cost of production impacts are expected together with 
decreases in quality. Overall impacts remain at $360,400 relatively small. 
Ziram 
Ziram is a simimer fungicide that is commonly used in arid regions and often suggested 
alternatives are captan and mancozeb. Marginal costs increase only little and so producer 
surplus losses by users are relatively small as are quantity impacts (tables 11 and 12). 
Consimiers are only slightly affected and total losses amount to $603,400 if Tiram use is 
canceled during the entire growiag season. 
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Benomyl 
Benomyl is a broad-spectrum pesticide that is mostly used east of the Mississippi. A large 
share of its use occurs during the summer, but it has lost much of its initial effectiveness due 
to resistance development. The largest impacts due to a cancellation of benomyl use are 
expected in New York and Virginia/West Virginia and so most of the economic surplus 
losses occur in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic (table 13). A complete ban on benomyl has 
negligible additional impacts in comparison to a ban on summer use only (table 14). 
Egosterol-Biosynthesis Inhibitors (EST) 
EBI fimgicides are a group comprised of fenamirol, myclobutanil, and trifliraiazole. They are 
important management tools against scab, rust, and mildew. With scab being the 
economically most important disease in the East and mildew being the economically most 
important disease in the West, EBI are important for disease control in all regions. All 
fungicides within this group have a very similar mode of action and are usually used in tank 
mixes with a contact fungicide such as captan or mancozeb to control resistance development 
and to increase the effectiveness of the treatment. Often suggested alternatives for the 
scenario of a ban on EBI are increased use rates and increased numbers of application for 
these contact fimgicides. 
EBI are mostly used during the early season and hence losses due to banning EBI use 
in the summer are small compared to an outright ban. Total losses would m this case amount 
to $1.7 mill (table 15) of which $1.1 mill, are losses in consumer surplus. Most of the 
decrease in surplus on the producer side would occur in the West, where a loss of these 
fungicides would result in signijScant cost increases, yield losses, and quality impacts. 
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Because of the availability of effective alternatives in the Southeast, the Midwest, and Mid-
Atlantic, producers here would gain form price changes caused by decreased supply from 
western states. 
The situation is different in the case of a ban on EBI for the whole season. Losses 
increase significantly and producers in the West, Mid-Atlantic, and Northeast would suffer 
negative impacts (table 16). Total losses would amount to $5.8 mill, and most the producer 
losses are incurred in the West ($740,300) and Midwest ($261,000). The Northeast would 
zdso suffer considerable losses of $160,000. 
Thiophanate-Methyl 
Thiophanate-Methyl is a fimgicide similar to benomyl with slightly less activity against some 
summer diseases. It is not used in the western states, and in the other regions it is mostly 
used in the sxmmier. A loss of thiophanate-methyl would have relatively limited cost of 
production impacts, no jaeld impacts, and few quality impacts. 
Most losses after a ban on summer use of Thiophanate-Methyl would occur in the 
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic (table 17) where it is most widely used, and an outright ban on 
Thiophanate-Methyl substantially worsens impacts in the Northeast because of additional 
cost and quality impacts (table 18). Since the fungicide is not used in the West, growers 
there would benefit from the price increases due to the reduced supply from other regions. 
Herbicides Analysis 
In the economic analysis of hypothetical herbicide cancellations, we assess the cancellation 
impacts for seven herbicides: 2,4-D, diuron, glyphosate, norfiurazon, oryzalin, paraquat, and 
simazine. Derr collects and summarizes expert opinion data on current use patterns and 
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replacement scenarios. In many instances, herbicides are critical in the management of non-
bearing orchards where they are used to control weed competition with young apple trees. 
Another important role of herbicide use is the control of weed blooms during apple 
pollination, so that fruit trees do not compete for bees with other flowering plants. Despite 
the fact that this competition tor bees is very important, only a few studies have attempted to 
quantify the impact (one is Southwick and Southwick) and those impacts are largely ignored 
in the data that has been provided to us. Impacts on non-bearing acreage are also mostly 
ignored in this analysis. For this reason, our analysis will likely underestimate the economic 
impact of herbicide cancellations. 
Studying table 19 which, similar to table 4, reports cost, yield, and quality impacts for 
herbicide cancellations reveals that in some states, acreage is treated by herbicides at a higher 
cost than their replacement chemicals, although the replacement would not lead to a 
reduction in yield or quality. This is the case because not all pesticide characteristics can be 
captured in tenns of our marginal-cost function specification as it ignores aspects such as bee 
safety or impacts on IPM programs. Again we use the rule to set marginal-cost changes equal 
to zero in those instances and mark those cases by asterisks. 
2,4-D 
2,4-D is a herbicide used for post-emergence control of broadleaf weeds. There is currently 
no alternative available and this has implications especially for the control of dandelions 
during tree bloom. Still, impacts of a 2,4-D loss are relatively small and the welfare costs are 
estimated at $138,200 (table 20). Most of the losses are incurred by growers in the West. 
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Divron 
Diuron is a preemergence herbicide that is used for control of broadleaf weeds, and the most 
important alternative is simazine. The largely increased use of simazine predicted for the 
scenario of a ban on diuron would prompt an accelerated development of resistance to 
simazine. 
A loss of diuron would increase costs of production in all regions and a significant 
yield loss is expected in North Carolina. Because of these heterogeneous impacts, growers in 
all regions but the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic would gain, and users in the Midwest would 
be compensated by price increases in the firesh market (table 21). Overall, quantifiable losses 
are at $284,200 relatively small, but it has to be kept in mind that these do not include 
possible long-term costs of increased resistance development 
Glyphosate 
Glyphosate is used for the control of annuals and perennials, and in the West and Southeast it 
is applied to a large share of the acreage. Most alternatives are less effective, and the often-
suggested alternative paraquat is problematic from a worker-safety perspective because of its 
higher acute toxicity. A loss of glyphosate would cause significant quality impacts in the 
Pacific Northwest and would lower jdelds in California, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. 
Hence the western states suffer substantial losses of $4.5 mill., most of which occur in 
the market for processed apples (table 22). Impacts in other regions are compensated for by 
changes in the market environment, i.e. by price increases. Consumers would suffer large 
losses especially in the fresh market Total losses amount to $9.6 mill. 
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Norflurazon 
Norflurazon is most important for weed control in non-bearing orchards. Replacement costs 
are often lower than current treatment costs and there are no yield and quality changes 
expected if norflurazon is banned. As a result no marginal-cost impacts are expected for 
most regions and the estimate of economic surplus losses is relatively meaningless because 
most benefits of norflurazon that accrue in non-bearing orchards are not quantified. For the 
quantifiable losses, the West is the only region that is notably affected with a $43,700 
reduction of producer surplus (table 23). 
Oryzalin 
Oryzalin is a preemergence herbicide used to control annual grasses and small seeded 
broadleaf weeds. Its loss would be felt severely in weed control programs of non-bearing 
orchards. Although some alternative herbicides exist, they are not labeled for use in non-
bearing orchards. Oryzalin is used on small parts of acre^e, but losses of $431,300 are 
expected in the West (table 24) in addition to a loss of consumer surplus of $553,800. 
Growers in other regions would gain because of increases in prices, and the total welfare loss 
amounts to $909,200. 
Paraquat 
The contact herbicide paraquat is applied in spring for rapid control of existing foliage. It is 
used on about 40% of the acreage, and a loss of paraqiiat would have no yield or quality 
impacts and only small cost of production impacts. Economic losses of banning paraquat are 
at $151,500 rather small (table 25). 
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Simazine 
Simazine is the preemergence herbicide that is often rotated with diuron, and baiming 
simazine will lead to increased use of diuron. As a result, diuron resistance could become a 
concern when simazine is banned. Major quality losses due to a loss of simazine are 
expected in the West where growers suffer significant losses of $3.8 mill, (table 26). 
Consumers would also be severely affected by the reduction of apples available for fresh 
consumption and total first-year welfare impacts amount to $8.0 mill. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed a methodology for assessing welfare impacts of pesticide 
use cancellations in apple production. Our framework provides a means of assessment when 
complex relationships between different marketing channels are important. We implement 
the model to estimate welfare changes due to flmgicide and herbicide cancellations in apple 
production. 
Otjr simulations show that consumers bear a large share of the overall welfare losses 
in the fresh market because of the relatively inelastic demand, whereas producers bear the 
larger share in the processing market. Furthermore, changes in net imports are significant, 
especially for processed apples, and it is important to acknowledge them in the assessment. 
The results highlight the importance of considering impacts by region and 
distinguishing between seasonal and outright cancellations. In several scenarios, growers in 
some regions would gain from a pesticide ban because losses by users of pesticides in those 
regions are out-weighted by gains accruing to non-tisers. In particular, a reduction in the 
supply from westem states can have large impacts on prices and hence benefit growers in 
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other regions (simazine and oryzaiin). This is not surprising since the West produces 61% of 
all ^ples produced in the United States. 
The economically most important herbicides are glyphosate and simazine a 
hypothetical ban of which implies welfare losses of $9.6 mill, and $8.0 mill., respectively. 
For flmgicides, EBI flmgicides are most important and a loss of these induces an estimated 
welfare loss of $5.8 mill. Captan and mancozeb are also very important with surplus losses 
of $2.6 mill, and $1.6 mill., respectively. In many instances, the states east of the Mississippi 
will be most affected from a fimgicide use cancellation. Western states carry a larger share of 
the losses only in the case of a hypothetical ban on EBI. Overall, this confirms our 
impression from the study of production systems, which suggested that disease problems are 
less important in the arid western growing regions. 
It is shown that an increase of the preharvest interval for fxmgicides can lead to a 
significant reduction of the cost of regulation (mancozeb, dodine, ziram, and EBI). However, 
for these cases it is also true that most of the current use occurs during the early season. An 
assessment of consumer risk reduction from elongated preharvest intervals and an analysis of 
pesticide perseverance would be needed to conclude if such a cancellation at lower cost 
would achieve the desired reduction in consumer and environmental risk. 
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Notes 
' The report will consist of five chapters discussing the importance of insecticides, 
herbicides, fimgicides and postharvest chemicals used in apple production. This chapter 
will be the fifth chapter of the report assessing the economic importance of the pesticides 
discussed in earlier chapters, thereby drawing on data provided in those chapters. The 
report will be published through Washington State University and can be obtained through 
Washington State University or the USD A Office of Pesticide Management. Project 
Team Leaders: Catherine Daniels (Washington State University) and David Rosenberger 
(Cornell University). Biological Sections: Jay Brunner (insects, Washington State 
University), JefiBrey Derr (weeds, Virginia Tech), Anne Morell (postharvest chemicals, 
Washington State University), David Rosenberger (diseases and postharvest chemicals, 
Cornell University). Economic Section: David Hennessy (Iowa State University), Vickie 
McCracken (Washington State University), Jutta Roosen (Iowa State University). 
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I would like to thank David Hennessy, Vickie McCracken, Dave Rosenberger, Bruce 
Babcock, Alicia Carriquiry, Joe Heiriges, Cathy BCling, Jay Brunner, Catherine Daniels, 
Jeff Derr, Anne Morell, and Kent Smith for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. 
The 1995 sxirvey covered California, Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington. 
The cost data should be interpreted very cautiously. Comparisons of costs of production 
estimates and the generalization of vedues as published in extension material are very 
problematic. Nonetheless, the data suggests very strongly that there are negligible 
differences in insect control cost and large differences in disease control cost across 
regions. 
With regard to the impacts of pesticide regulation on imports and exports, it should be 
noted that this model only includes market responses. However, non-tariff barriers exist 
that restrict the trade of apples with certain pesticide treatment histories. These have been 
acknowledged to some extent in the prediction of replacement shares of substitute 
pesticides, but the economic analysis itself does not further acknowledge any restrictions 
on foreign market accessibility. 
As discussed in Just, Hueth, and Schmitz the two approaches are in general not eqiiivalent 
in empirical applications. The ^proach chosen has the advantage that the assumption of 
necessi^ of the output is not made. In addition, for the empirical application the supply 
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ciirve is shifted in both market and in tliis instance the approach chosen is easier to 
implement. 
The states included in the following analysis account for 97.6% of U.S. total production. 
Impacts in remaining states are negligible in the overall impacts and can safely be ignored 
in this analysis. 
No survey responses are obtained from experts in California for the case of fungicide 
cancellations and from experts in Ohio for the case of herbicide cancellations. Since 
current use data is available for these states, we estimate the replacement scenario data 
using estimates for Washington in the case of fungicides in California and estimates for 
Michigan in the case of herbicides in Ohio. These extrapolations seem suitable, as 
production systems are very similar in Washington and California, and Ohio and 
Michigan. The similarity is reflected in current pesticide use patterns (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. NASS/ERS). 
The problem with this ^proach is that such benefits might in fact be larger or might also 
accrue to pesticides for that we can show a marginal-cost increase. It seems, however, to 
be the best feasible solution to the problem of nonquantifiable benefits. As a result, we 
might not completely capture the welfare costs of a pesticide cancellation, and so it is 
acknowledged that our estimates would underestimate the true cost. 
Flexibilities could not be estimated directly because of the dynamic structure of the model 
on the supply side. 
For the fungicides the entire Southeast, Virginia and West Virginia, and New England 
have each been treated as "one state", i.e. biological unpacts have been calculated for the 
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respective region and enter as such into the analysis. For the herbicide analysis the same 
holds true for the Northeast and the Southeast 
The organization of the NAPIAP project resulted in different regional organization of the 
biological impact data for herbicides and fimgicides. To make our economic results for 
flmgicides and herbicides comparable, we extrapolate the data and form the same regions 
for both sections of the study. The fungicide survey obtains data for CA, WA, OR, MI, 
OH, New England, NY, VA, WV, PA, NC, and SC. The herbicide survey includes data 
from CA, WA, OR, MI, OH, NY, VA, WV, PA, and NC. In the herbicide section we 
therefore use marginal-cost impact estimates of NY also for the New England states, and 
the estimates for NC for the entire Southeast region. Again, this extrapolation seems 
appropriate because production systems in the respective regions are very similar. 
The total cost of canceling the use of a fimgicide for the whole season is calculated as the 
siun of impacts of canceling it for the early season and for the simamer season. 
Lichtenberg, Spear, and Zilberman have shown that an increase of the preharvest interval 
might lead to an increase in preventive pesticide applications earlier in the season. We 
ignore such possible effects in our analysis because of difBculties in collecting the 
necessary data. 











Proc. Prod. Fresh Share Fresh Price Proc. Price 
mill. lb. % $/lb. $/lb. 
WA 938.2 152.7 35.4 5400.0 3900.0 1500.0 0.72 0.212 0.074 
CA 149.1 35.2 26.5 933.3 326.7 606.7 0.35 0.325 0.071 
OR 18.5 8.6 18.6 159.7 118.3 41.3 0.74 0.131 0.074 
West 1105.9 196.5 33.0 6493.0 4345.0 2148.0 0.67 0.218 0.073 
MI 100.2 54.3 18.2 988.3 315.0 673.3 0.32 0.148 0.080 
OH 21.4 7.7 13.0 100.0 78.3 21.7 0.78 0.255 0.068 
Midwest 121.7 62.0 17.6 1088.3 393.3 695.0 0.36 0.170 0.079 
NY 134.7 57.3 18.8 1080.0 490.0 590.0 0.45 0.181 0.078 
New England 46.4 20.5 11.4 233.2 163.5 69.7 0.70 0.253 0.073 
North-East 181.1 77.8 16.9 1313.2 653.5 659.7 0.50 0.199 0.077 
PA 46.8 22.0 19.6 430.3 131.7 298.7 0.31 0.179 0,078 
VA 32.4 18.8 16.9 317.0 98.3 218.7 0.31 0.152 0.080 
WV 14.6 9.7 13.7 133.3 31.7 101.7 0.24 0.212 0.077 
Mid-Atlantic 140.8 79.0 16.8 1331.0 391.7 939.3 0.29 0.171 0.079 
NC 23.3 9.3 25.8 240.0 72.0 168.0 0.30 0.158 0.071 
SC 6.6 3.6 14.4 51.7 21.3 30.4 0.41 0.209 0.070 
KY 3.1 2.4 5.4 13.0 8.6 4.4 0.66 0.294 0.139 
GA" 2.9 2.4 10.8 26.0 9.3 16.7 0.36 b h 
TN" 2.6 1.6 7.7 12.3 9.6 2.7 0.78 0.248 b 
South-East 38.5 19.3 17.8 343.0 120.8 222.2 0.35 0.186 0.072 
" Regional averages are employed if a price is not available. 
^ Prices received for fresh or processed apples are not recorded in these states. 
Table 2. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes, dMC = $0.01 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -1,397.0 626.0 -437.0 1,063.1 -5.4 -2,023.1 -2,402.0 378.9 -34.4 
Midwest -28.0 -72.2 -103.8 31.6 -1.9 44.2 -15.2 59.4 -0,8 
Northeast -349.3 -381.2 -491.2 109.9 -2.5 32.0 -15.0 47.0 -0.7 
M-Atlantic -194.7 -222.0 -267.5 45.5 -1.5 27.3 -17.0 44.3 -0.7 
Southeast -62.5 -73.9 -94.3 20.4 -0.5 11.4 -4.4 15.8 -0.3 
Prod. -2,031.6 -123.3 -1,393.8 1,270.5 -11.8 -1,908.3 -2,453.6 545.3 -36.9 
Cons. -5,462.9 -4,581.8 -6.7 -881.1 -14.7 
Total -7,494.5 -4,705.1 -2,789.3 
Table 3. Fifth-Year Economic Surplus Changes, dMC = $0.01 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -24,061,0 -11,280,3 -11,282.3 2.1 -86.0 -12,780.7 -12,781.4 0.7 -203.8 
Midwest 337.1 261.1 261.0 0.1 2.5 76.0 75.9 0.1 -6.8 
Northeast -424.3 -88.8 -88.9 0.2 -0.7 -335.5 -335.6 0.1 -10.6 
M-Atlantic -111.8 11.8 11.7 0.1 0.1 -123.5 -123.6 0.1 -7.4 
Southeast -13.7 35.3 35.2 0.0 0.2 -49.0 -49.0 0.0 -2.9 
Prod. -24,273.6 -11,060.9 -11,063.4 2.4 -83.9 -13,212.7 -13,213.7 1.0 -231.6 
Cons. -37,877.6 -32,388.3 -47.7 -5,489.2 -92.1 
Total -62,151.2 -43,449.3 -18,702.0 
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Table 4. Cost, Yield and Quality Changes after Fungicide Losses* 
Summer Whole Season 
Acreage Use in Change Change Change Change Change Change 
Treated Early 
Season 
in Cost in Yield in Fresh 
Share 
in Cost in Yield in Fresh 
Share 
% % $/acre % % S/acre % % 
Captan 
CA 26.5 97.5 -0.6 0.0 0.0 * 13.8 0.0 0.0 
WA 7.5 97.5 -0.1 0.0 0-0 * 17.8 0.0 0.0 
OR 9.5 97.5 -0.8 0.0 0.0 * 14.0 0.0 0.0 
MI 91.0 20.0 272.4 0.0 0.0 287.8 0.0 0.0 
OH 91.0 50.0 -6.1 0.0 0.0 * -14.6 0.0 0.0 * 
N-Engl. 99.0 30.0 10.1 0.0 0.0 11.6 0.0 -0.5 
NY 77.5 45.0 36.6 0.0 -0.3 69.5 0.0 -0.6 
PA 77.0 20.0 -2.5 0.0 -1.4 -2.5 0.0 -1.4 
VA/WV 90.0 20.0 -7.6 0.0 -0.8 -8.4 0.0 -1.2 
SE 95.3 15.0 79.5 -2.5 -4.3 76.0 -2.5 -6.0 
Mancozeb 
CA 28.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.5 0.0 0.0 
WA 17.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.2 0.0 0.0 
OR 9.5 99.0 25.2 0.0 0.0 37.6 0.0 -4.0 
MI 22.5 95.0 -1.9 0.0 0.0 * 219.2 -2.3 -9.2 
OH 22.5 95.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 * -2.3 0.0 0.0 * 
N-Engl. 95.0 95.0 31.5 0.0 0.0 29.4 -0.3 -0.8 
NY 82.0 94.0 20.4 0.0 0.0 85.2 -1.0 0.0 
PA 32.5 90.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 * 2.2 0.0 -1.1 
VA/WV 90.0 85.0 -0.5 -0.9 -1.9 -0.5 -0.9 -2.1 
SE 39.3 50.0 18.5 0.6 0.0 6.2 0.5 -0.9 
Dodine 
CA 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
WA 4.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.2 0.0 -3.2 
OR 33.0 97.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 * -15.6 0.0 0.0 * 
MI 9.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 
OH 9.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -28.5 0.0 0.0 * 
N-Engl. 30.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.7 2.0 2.0 * 
NY 9.5 97.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 55.7 0.0 0.5 
PA 31.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 
VA/WV 5.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 -0.2 
SE 8.0 90.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.4 0.0 0.0 
" Asterisks mark instances m which marginal cost changes calciilated according to equation 
(6) are negative and are hence set to zeros. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Summer Whole Season 
Acreage Use in Change Change Change Change Change Change 
Treated Early 
Season 
in Cost in Yield in Fresh 
Share 
in Cost in Yield in Fresh 
Share 
% % $/acre % % $/acre % % 
Ziram • 
CA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
WA 36.0 60.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 
OR 13.5 25.0 -6.0 0.0 0.0 * -4.4 0.0 0.0 * 
MI 17.0 50.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 
OH 17.0 50.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 
N-Engl. 25.0 0.0 -11.7 0.0 0.0 * -11.7 0.0 0.0 * 
NY 13.5 7.5 53.9 -0.5 -0.7 57.2 -0.5 -0.7 
PA 46.5 10.0 3.9 0.0 1.8 * 4.2 0.0 2.0 * 
VA/WV 80.0 60.0 -7.0 -0.1 -0.7 -7.0 -0.1 -1.2 
SE 64.0 5-0 28.0 0-9 -3.5 28.0 0.9 -3.5 
Benomyl 
CA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
WA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
OR 6.0 100.0 0.0 0-0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MI 25.0 10.0 8.1 0-0 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 
OH 25.0 10.0 -0.6 0-0 0.0 * -0.4 0.0 0.0 * 
N-Engl. 45.0 25.0 6.4 -0-1 -0.1 6.4 -0.1 -0.1 
NY 38.5 10.0 57.0 0-0 -1.3 62.0 0.0 -1.0 
PA 23.5 30.0 -3.9 0.0 0.0 * -5.5 0.0 0.0 * 
VA/WV 30.0 10.0 41.1 0.0 -0.5 43.3 0.0 -0.5 
SE 51.5 0.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 
EBI 
CA 5.5 82.5 23.5 -1.3 -1.3 57.9 -3.3 -4.0 
WA 25.5 82.5 23.9 -1.3 -1.3 59.9 -3-3 -4.0 
OR 55.5 75.0 31.9 0.0 -10.0 51.6 0.0 -20.0 
MI 50.5 95.0 0.0 0-0 0.0 309.9 0.0 0.0 
OH 50.5 95.0 -3.0 0.0 0.0 * 30.1 0.0 0.0 
N-Engl. 47.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -16.9 0.0 0.0 * 
NY 45.0 95.0 10.9 0.0 -0.9 113.4 0.0 -1-9 
PA 42.5 90.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 * 10.7 -1.4 -3-3 
VA/WV 21.9 85.0 -5.9 0.0 0.0 * 4.7 -2.2 -2-0 
SE 57.8 85.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -12.7 -1.4 -1.3 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Slimmer Whole Season 
Acreage Use in Change Change Change Change Change Change 
Treated Early in Cost in Yield in Fresh in Cost in Yield in Fresh 
Season Share Share 
% % $/acre % % $/acre % % 
Thiophanate-Methyl 
CA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 0-0 0.0 
WA 0.0 0.0 0-0 0.0 0.0 0-0 0-0 0.0 
OR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 0.0 0-0 0.0 0.0 
MI 12.5 10.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 2-3 0.0 0.0 • 
OH 12.5 10.0 -3.7 0.0 0.0 » -3-7 0-0 0.0 * 
N-Engl. 50.0 32.5 -1.3 0-0 0.0 • -3-7 0.0 0.0 * 
NY 20.0 17.5 34.8 0.0 0.5 44.4 0.0 -0.8 
PA 56.0 30.0 11.9 0-0 0.0 11.9 0-0 0.0 
VA/WV 20.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.5 0-3 0-0 -0.5 
SE 31.5 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4-0 0-0 0.0 
Table 5, First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Captan for Summer Applications 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 1,609.7 1,453.9 126.4 1,327.5 2.9 155.7 14.2 141.5 1.9 
Midwest -577.4 -388.5 -392.9 4.4 -8.7 -188.9 -189.8 0.9 -2.4 
Northeast -53.3 -39.2 -67.4 28.2 -0.3 -14.1 -15.5 1.4 -0.2 
M-Atlantic 29.4 29.7 18.8 10.9 0.2 -0.3 -1.4 1.1 0.0 
Southeast -279.9 -235.4 -236.8 1.4 -1.5 -44.5 -44.6 0.1 -0.6 
Prod. 728.5 820.5 -552.0 1,372.5 -7.4 -92.0 -237.0 145.1 -1.5 
Cons. -2,901.9 -2,866.3 -4.2 -35.5 -0.6 
Total -2,173.4 -2,045.8 -127.5 
Table 6. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Captan for the Entire Season 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 1,842.3 1,690.8 157.5 1,533.3 3.4 151.5 -17.7 169.2 1.7 
Midwest -602.8 -405.5 -410.5 5.0 -9.1 -197.3 -198.5 1.2 -2.6 
Northeast -224.7 -194.2 -226.8 32.6 -1.3 -30.5 -32.4 1.8 -0.5 
M-Atlantic 30.7 30.7 18.1 12,6 0.2 -0.1 -1.5 1.4 -0.1 
Southeast -320.6 -269.9 -271.5 1.7 -1.7 -50.7 -50.8 0.1 -0.7 
Prod. 724.9 852.0 -733.2 1,585.2 -8.6 -127.1 -300.8 173.7 -2.1 
Cons. -3,366.5 -3,315.2 -4.9 -51.3 -0.9 
Total -2,641.5 -2,463.2 -178.3 
Table 7. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Mancozeb for Summer Applications 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 162.0 147.5 23.3 124.2 0.3 14.5 0.9 13.6 0.2 
Midwest 6.1 5.0 1.1 3.9 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.9 0.0 
N-East -121.8 -109.6 -112.2 2.5 -0.7 -12.1 -12.3 0.1 -0.2 
M-Atlantic -83.8 -69.5 -72.2 2.7 -0.5 -14.3 -14.6 0.3 -0.2 
S-East 0.0 0.2 -1.7 1.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.0 
Prod. -37.4 -26.4 -161.7 135.2 -0.8 -11.0 -26.1 15.1 -0.2 
Cons. -301.5 -297.2 -0.4 -4.4 -0.1 
Total -339.0 -323.6 -15.4 
Table 8. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Mancozeb for the Entire Season 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 896.9 870.4 156.5 713.9 1.6 26.5 -60.1 86.6 0.0 
Midwest -181.1 -121.0 -143.2 22.2 -2.8 -60.2 -66.7 6.6 -0.8 
N-East -515.5 -463.9 -478.3 14.4 -3.0 -51.6 -52.6 I.O -0.7 
M-Atlantic -68.0 -55.4 -70.6 15.2 -0.4 -12.6 -14.8 2.2 -0.2 
S-East 11.1 10.4 -0.6 10.9 0.1 0.7 -0.5 1.2 0.0 
Prod. 143.3 240.5 -536.2 776.7 -4.4 -97.2 -194.9 97.7 -1.7 
Cons. -1,756.1 -1,714.8 -2.5 -41.3 -0.7 
Total -1,612.8 -1,474.3 -138.5 
Table 9. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Dodine for Summer Applications 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Midwest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Northeast -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 0.1 0.0 -O.l -0.1 0.0 0.0 
M-Atlantic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Southeast 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Prod. -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
Cons. -1.1 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total -1.2 -1.2 0.0 
Table 10. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Dodine for the Entire Season 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -111.4 -35.4 -127.8 92.4 -0.4 -75.9 -103.8 27.8 -1.3 
Midwest 7.0 2.8 0.1 2.7 0.1 4.3 0.3 4.0 0.0 
Northeast -14.4 -15.2 -24.0 8.8 -0.1 0.8 -2.2 3.0 0.0 
M-Atlantic -1.3 -3.1 -6.6 3.5 0.0 1.8 -0.8 2.7 0.0 
Southeast -3.0 -3.2 -5.0 1.8 0.0 0.3 -0.8 l.I 0.0 
Prod. -123.0 -54.2 -163.3 109.1 -0.5 -68.8 -107.4 38.5 -1.3 
Cons. -237.4 -205.7 -0.3 -31.7 -0.5 
Total -360.4 -259.9 -100.5 
Table 11. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Ziram for Summer Applications 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 53.1 73.8 -10.8 84.7 0.0 -20.7 -35.7 15.0 -0.4 
Midwest 4.1 2.5 -1.0 3.4 0.0 1.6 -0.4 2.0 0.0 
N-East -51.0 -46.6 -58.4 11.8 -0.3 -4.4 -6.0 1.6 -0.1 
M-Atlantic 1.8 0.9 -1.1 2.1 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.0 
S-East -75.3 -64.2 -65.2 0.9 -0.4 -11.1 -11.3 0.2 -0.2 
Prod. -67.3 -33.6 -136.5 102.9 -0.7 -33.7 -53.2 19.5 -0.6 
Cons. -272.1 -256.6 -0.4 -15.5 -0.3 
Total -339.4 -290.2 -49.2 
Table 12. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Ziram for the Entire Season 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -37.0 42.6 -89.2 131.7 -0.4 -79.6 -110.5 30.9 -1.4 
Midwest 6.2 2.3 -2.9 5.2 0.0 3.9 -0.9 4.8 0.0 
N-East -43.8 -41.7 -59.8 18.1 -0.3 -2.0 -5.9 3.8 -0.1 
M-Atlantic -8.0 -8.8 -12.0 3.2 -0.1 0.8 -0.7 1.5 0.0 
S-East -73.0 -62.8 -64.3 1.4 -0.4 -10.2 -10.7 0.5 -0.2 
Prod. -155.6 -68.5 -228.2 159.7 -1.1 -87.1 -128.7 41.6 -1.7 
Cons. -447.8 -407.8 -0.6 -40.0 -0.7 
Total -603.4 -476.2 -127.2 
Table 13. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Benomyl for Summer Applications 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 189.3 171.8 0.3 171.5 0.3 17.5 0.0 17.5 0.2 
Midwest 1.6 2.2 -2.1 4.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.3 0.8 0.0 
Northeast -188.6 -169.8 -181.5 11.7 -1.1 -18.8 -19.3 0.4 -0.2 
M-Atlantic -27.6 -22.3 -28.1 5.7 -0.2 -5.3 -5.8 0.5 -0.1 
Southeast -0.7 -0.3 -2.0 1.7 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 0.1 0.0 
Prod. -26.0 -18.4 -213.3 194.9 -0.9 -7.6 -26.9 19.2 -0.1 
Cons. -340.8 -338.0 -0.5 -2.8 0.0 
Total -366.9 -356.4 -10.5 
Table 14. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Benomyl for the Entire Season 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 190.5 172.8 0.3 172.6 0.3 17.6 0.0 17.6 0.2 
Midwest 1.7 2.2 -2.1 4.3 0.0 -0.6 -1.3 0.8 0.0 
Northeast -188.5 -169.7 -181.4 11.7 -1.1 -18.8 -19.3 0.4 -0.2 
M-Atlantic -29.2 -23.7 -29.4 5.8 -0.2 -5.5 -6.0 0.5 -0.1 
Southeast -0.7 -0.2 -2.0 1.8 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 0.1 0.0 
Prod. -26.2 -18.5 -214.6 196.1 -0.9 -7.7 -27.1 19.4 -0.1 
Cons. -343.0 -340.2 -0.5 -2.9 0.0 
Total -369.3 -358.6 -10.6 
Table IS. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on EBI Fungicides for Summer Applications 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -632.2 -196.8 -511.8 315.0 -2.6 -435.4 -552.1 fl6.7 -7.3 
Midwest 36.1 12.6 6.4 6.2 0.3 23.5 11.9 11.6 0.0 
N-East -19.8 -30.7 -54.6 23.8 -0.2 10.9 0.7 10.2 -0.1 
M-Atlantic 35.6 18.1 5.8 12.3 0.1 17.5 5.6 12.0 0.0 
S-East 14.4 8.1 4.7 3.4 0.1 6.2 3.6 2.6 0.0 
Prod. -565.9 -188.7 -549.5 360.7 -2.4 -377.2 -530,3 153.1 -7.3 
Cons. -1,087.1 -912.5 -1.3 -174.6 -2.9 
Total -1,653.1 -1,101.3 -551.8 
Table 16. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on EBI Fungicides for the Entire Season 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -740.3 362.7 -1,153.8 1,516.5 -4.9 -1,103.0 -1,494.3 391.3 -18.8 
Midwest -261.0 -205.7 -237.2 31.5 -4.8 -55.3 -90.3 35.0 -1.5 
N-East -160.0 -174.6 -293.7 119.1 -1.2 14.6 -15.7 30.3 -0.5 
M-Atlantic 21.0 -11.7 -72.2 60.6 -0.1 32.7 -3.0 35.7 -0.2 
S-East 23.2 10.0 -7.1 17.1 0.1 13.2 5.4 7.8 0.0 
Prod. -1,117.1 -19.3 -1,764.2 1,744.8 -10.9 -1,097.8 -1,597.9 500.1 -21.0 
Cons. -4,724.0 -4,222.2 -6.2 -501.7 -8.3 
Total -5,841.0 -4,241.6 -1,599.5 
Table 17. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Thiophanate-Methyl for Summer Applications 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 36.3 32.8 0.0 32.8 0.1 3.5 0.0 3.5 0.0 
Midwest 0.6 0.6 -0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.0 
Northeast -27.7 -24.9 -27.6 2.7 -0.2 -2.8 -2.9 0.1 0.0 
M-Atlantic -14.1 -11.7 -12.6 0.9 -0.1 -2.4 -2.5 0.1 0.0 
Southeast -1.2 -1.0 -1.4 0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0 
Prod. -6.0 -4.1 -41.9 37.9 -0.2 -1.9 -5.9 3.9 0.0 
Cons. -65.5 -64.7 -0.1 -0.8 0.0 
Total -71.5 -68.8 -2.7 
Table 18. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Thiophanate-Methyl for the Entire Season 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 68.8 62.4 0.0 62.4 0.1 6.4 0.0 6.4 0.1 
Midwest 1.8 1.6 -0.2 1.8 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.0 
Northeast -69.2 -62.3 -67.4 5.1 -0.4 -6.9 -7.1 0.2 -0.1 
M-Atlantic -12.6 -10.3 -12.1 1.8 -0.1 -2.3 -2.5 0.2 0.0 
Southeast -0.5 -0.3 -1.2 0.9 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.0 
Prod. -11.8 -8.9 -80.9 72.0 -0.3 -2.9 -10.0 7.1 0.0 
Cons. -123.9 -122.8 -0.2 -1.1 0.0 
Total -135.6 -131.7 -3.9 
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Table 19. Cost, Yield and Quality Changes after Herbicide Losses* 
Acreage Change in Cost Change in Change in 
Treated Yield Fresh Share 
% ($/acre) % % 
2,4 D 
CA 4 -9.00 0 0 * 
WA 16 17.36 0 0 
OR 30 21.01 0 0 
MI 12 6.04 0 0 
OH 13 17.93 0 0 
NY^ 12 -11.23 0 0 * 
PA 45 10.74 0.0135 0 
VA 20 0.40 0 0 
WV 42 -11.95 0 0 * 
50 13.04 0 0 
Diuron 
CA 3 3.95 0 0 
WA 20 15.11 0 0 
OR 27 16.08 0 0 
MI 5 4.17 0 0 
OH 10 21.38 0 0 
NY" 10 1.96 0 0 
PA 26 14.80 0 0 
VA 20 3.35 0 0 
WV 25 3.78 0 0 
NC^ 40 10.87 -8.5 0 
Glyphosate 
CA 61 -2.77 -6 0 * 
WA 66 7.20 0 -9.3 
OR 58 10.14 0 -9.3 
MI 35 1.65 0 0 
OH 31 -5.43 0 0 * 
NY" 40 -2.36 0 0 * 
PA 6 16.76 -1.44 0 
VA 25 -2.03 0 0 * 
WV 27 -8.10 0 0 * 
NC^ 85 9.45 -3 0 
" An asterisk marks instances in which marginal cost changes calculated according to 
equation (6) are negative and are hence set to zeros. 
^ The impact data for NY is also applied to the entire region Northeast 
The impact data for NC is also applied to the entire region Southeast. 
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CA 9 -0.37 0 0 * 
WA 40 6.88 0 0 
OR 9 13.65 0 0 
MI 9 -7.51 0 0 * 
OH 5 -21.98 0 0 
NY" 15 -4.14 0 0 
PA 8 -6.40 0 0 * 
VA 10 -3.06 0 0 * 
WV 6 0.35 0 0 
NC*= 5 -7.02 0 0 * 
Oryzalin 
CA 12 -17.09 0 0 
WA 20 16.04 0 -2.5 
OR 3 7.47 0 -2.5 
MI 9 -0.90 0 0 * 
OH 3 -1.66 0 0 
NY" 5 -21.58 0 0 
PA 0 0.00 0 0 
VA 3 2.18 0 0 
WV 7 4.30 0 0 
NC^ 5 2.76 0 0 
Paraquat 
CA 38 -8.48 0 0 * 
WA 33 9.81 0 0 
OR 33 9.71 0 0 
MI 40 1.01 0 0 
OH 20 2.10 0 0 
NY" 25 2.36 0 0 
PA 32 4.45 0 0 
VA 63 2.99 0 0 
WV 40 2.79 0 0 
NC^ 60 11.77 0 0 
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Table 19 (continaed) 
Acreage Change in Cost Change in Change 
Treated Yield Fresh Sh 
% ($/acre) % % 
Simazine 
CA 14 3.11 0 0 
WA 50 7.70 0 -9.7 
OR 13 8.79 0 -9.7 
MI 35 6.72 0 0 
OH 18 20.90 0 0 
NY^ 40 7.25 0 0 
PA 30 5.90 0 0 
VA 40 2.92 0 0 
WV 38 4.68 0 0 
NC^ 40 0.43 0 0 
Table 20. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on 2,4-D 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -33.3 -7.2 -42.1 34.8 -0.2 -26.1 -35.6 9.6 -0.4 
Midwest 1.8 0.9 -0.3 1.1 0.0 1.0 -0.4 1.4 0.0 
N-East 5.7 4.4 0.5 3.9 0.0 1.2 0.1 1.1 0.0 
M-Atlantic -5.8 -5.6 -6.7 1.2 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 0.8 0.0 
S-East -8.6 -7.6 -8.0 0.4 0.0 -1.1 -1.3 0.2 0.0 
Prod. -40.2 -15.1 -56.5 41.4 -0.2 -25.1 -38.2 13.0 -0.5 
Cons. -98.0 -86.5 -0.1 -11.5 -0.2 
Total -138.2 -101.6 -36.6 
Table 21. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Piuron 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West 33.2 53.2 -29.0 82.1 0.0 -20.0 -35.6 15.6 -0.4 
Midwest 5.8 3.7 0.6 3.1 0.1 2.1 -0.1 2.2 0.0 
N-East 11.4 9.8 -0.3 10.1 0.1 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 
M-Atlantic -2.6 -2.9 -6.3 3.5 0.0 0.2 -1.0 1.3 0.0 
S-East -110.4 -94.0 -95.2 1.2 -0.6 -16.4 -16.7 0.4 -0.2 
Prod. -62.6 -30.2 -130.2 100.0 -0.5 -32.5 -53.4 21.0 -0.6 
Cons. -221.6 -206.5 -0.3 -15.1 -0.3 
Total -284.2 -236.7 -47.5 
Table 22. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Glyphosate 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -4,538.4 -1,188.8 -1,862.0 673.2 -14.0 -3,349.6 -3,710.9 361.3 -55.3 
Midwest 225.3 52.6 17.4 35.2 1.1 172.7 59.9 112.8 0.1 
Northeast 327.9 190.4 76.1 114.2 1.1 137.6 55.0 82.5 0.1 
M-Atlantic 204.9 75.9 8.2 67.7 0.5 129.0 20.2 108.9 0.1 
Southeast -8.6 -41.4 -46.7 5.3 -0.3 32.8 25.9 7.0 -0.2 
Prod. -3,788.8 -911.3 -1,806.9 895.6 -11.5 -2,877.5 -3,549.9 672.4 -55.2 
Cons. -5,777.6 -4,459.6 -6.5 -1,318.0 -21.9 
Total -9,566.4 -5,370.9 -4,195.5 
Table 23. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Norflurazon 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -43.7 -19.3 -33.2 13.8 -0.2 -24.4 -29.9 5.5 -0.4 
Midwest 1.9 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.0 1.3 0.1 1.2 0.0 
Northeast 3.3 2.3 0.3 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.9 0.0 
M-Atlantic 1.9 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.0 
Southeast 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Prod. -35.8 -15.0 -32.7 17.7 -0.1 -20.8 -29.5 8.7 -0.4 
Cons. -57.8 -48.2 -0.1 -9.5 -0.2 
Total -93.6 -63.2 -30.4 
Table 24. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Oryzalin 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -431.3 -192.2 -364.0 171.8 -1.5 -239.1 -304.0 64.9 -3.9 
Midwest 18.8 6.3 0.5 5.8 0.1 12.5 1.1 11.4 0.0 
Northeast 31.7 21.9 1.1 20.8 0.1 9.9 0.5 9.4 0.0 
M-Atlantic 18.1 8.8 0.0 8.9 0.1 9.3 O.l 9.1 0.0 
Southeast 7.2 3.9 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.3 0.1 3.2 0.0 
Prod. -355.5 -151.4 -362.4 211.1 -1.2 -204.1 -302.1 98.0 -3.9 
Cons. -553.8 -460.4 -0.7 -93.3 -1.6 
Total -909.2 -611.8 -297.5 
Table 25. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Paraquat 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -33.4 -5.5 -36.1 30.6 -0.2 -27.9 -35.8 7.9 -0.5 
Midwest 2.2 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.4 0.3 1.0 0.0 
Northeast 1.5 0.6 -3.1 3.7 0.0 0.9 -0.1 1.0 0.0 
M-Atlantic -14.0 -12.6 -13.6 1.1 -0.1 -1.4 -2.1 0.7 0.0 
Southeast -0.3 -0.5 -1.1 0.5 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.0 
Prod. -44.0 -17.2 -54.0 36.8 -0.2 -26.8 -37.6 10.9 -0.5 
Cons. -107.5 -95.4 -0.1 -12.2 -0.2 
Total -151.5 -112.6 -38.9 
Table 26. First-Year Economic Surplus Changes after a Ban on Simazine 
Total Fresh Apples Processed Apples 
Total User Non-User Quantity Total User Non-User Quantity 
000$ 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 000$ 000$ 000$ mill. lb. 
West -3,756.9 -1,662.0 -2,646.0 984.0 -13.3 -2,094.9 -2,499.3 404.4 -34.3 
Midwest 160.5 52.9 15.1 37.8 1.1 107.6 35.8 71.8 0.1 
Northeast 257.1 172.7 56.3 116.4 1.0 84.3 32.5 51.8 0.0 
M-Atlantic 155.6 74.9 22.5 52.3 0.5 80.7 27.4 53.3 0.1 
Southeast 64.7 35.6 14.1 21.5 0.2 29.1 11.6 17.5 0.0 
Prod. -3,119.1 -1,325.9 -2,537.9 1,212.0 -10.5 -1,793.2 -2,392.0 598.7 -34.1 
Cons. -4,883.2 -4,068.3 -6.0 -815.0 -13.6 
Total -8,002.3 -5,394.2 -2,608.2 
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Figure 1. Analysis of a Pesticide Ban: Ignoring Joint Production 
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Figure 4. Welfare Analysis of a Pesticide Use Restriction: Consumer Side 
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Figure 5. Apple Growing Regions and Revenue from Apple Production by State 
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Appendix 2A: A Regional Econometric Model of U.S. Apple Supply and Demand 
Introduction 
Estimation of consumer and producer surplus changes that are caused by technology shifts 
requires knowledge of demand and supply elasticities in the markets in questions. Because 
apple production systems are very heterogeneous across the United States, growers' abilities 
to respond to technology changes and market forces differ widely. To capture the dispersion 
of responses, estimates of elasticities are needed for the different grower groups. To this end, 
a model of U.S. apple production was estimated at a regional level. 
Several econometric models of the U.S. apple industry exist in the literature, but none 
of them provides regional elasticity estimates that are suitable for our modeling effort. 
Willett (1993) estimates an econometric model of the apple industry with a focus on the 
demand side. Supply is estimated at the aggregated U.S. level. Baumes and Conway (1984) 
also estimate a model at the aggregated U.S. level, and use their model to demonstrate the 
effects of a hypothetical pesticide ban. However, their model does not allow for the analysis 
of regional effects. 
Hossain (1993) estimates a model of U.S. apple industry for two regions, dividing the 
United States into the West/Central (excluding Michigan) and the East (incl. Michigan). The 
model is specified at the wholesale-retail level. Supply is considered to be fixed in any given 
period and the model is not useful for the estimation of short-run or long-run production 
impacts because growers can only adjust to price changes by reallocating fruit from fresh to 
processed consumption. Chaudhry (1988) estimates a regional model, concentrating on 
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allocation decisions to the &esh and processing market and to the month of sale within a 
given year. He models production as exogenous in any given year. 
Fuchs, Parish, and Bohall (1974) and Dunn and Garafola (1986) simulate regional 
demand and supply impacts via mathematical programming models. While these models are 
the only ones whose regional specification would allow modeling regional impacts as 
desired, mathematical models need a large amount of information and this data is hard to 
obtain when seeking long-run impacts. Miller (1976) estimates regional price response 
functions for eight regions of the U.S. in a model of regional competition. He models supply 
as given. 
In general it can be said that although several models of the apple industry exist, most 
of them are dated and interest is mosdy focused on short-term allocation decisions or 
structural changes in product demand. None of these models is appropriate for the modeling 
of regional impacts of technology shifts because supply is usually taken as given. The results 
in this appendix show that production adjustments difTer across regions and that this 
heterogeneity ought to be acknowledged in a welfare assessment of technology changes. 
The Model 
The structural model is organized into five components: supply, allocation, pricing, demand, 
and net imports. We divide the United States into four apple production regions, the 
Northwest, the Southwest, the Central, and the East, as described in table 2A. 1, and for each 
region the total supply and the allocation between markets for firesh and processed utilization 
are modeled. The demand and net import equations on the other hand are set at the 
aggregated U.S. level. To link the regional supply components with the demand component. 
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regional pricing equations are introdiiced that translate U.S. level prices into regional prices. 
In this section we describe the specification of the model component by component. 
Supply 
In each production region, supply decisions for a crop are divided into a decision about 
acreage to be planted and a decision about planned yields. Apple orchards can have a 
lifetime of several decades and acreage decisions in apple production are expected to be 
inelastic in the short run. Following French, BCing, and Minami, we model the change in 
bearing acreage in region j and year t, bABi, rather than the total bearing acreage, AB^, , 
directly and it is described as a fimction of past input and output prices, /PP3, and PAh] . 
Yield per acre, 7/, is modeled as a fimction of expected price and a time trend, T, 
that captures changes in the production technology. Specifically, price expectations are 
modeled as adaptive expectations and approximated by a three-year moving average of past 
average prices received, PAV, . 
Total production for a region, QPT/, is the product of yield and bearing acreage. 
The general form of the functions describing the supply sector for each region can be 
•summarised as: 
+ ai,PA3U / 
ABi =ABl, +MB^ 







where subscripts t signify the time index and superscripts j denote the region and IPP3, is 
the index for prices paid by fanners on the U.S. basis. Greek letters signify error terms in the 
equations to be estimated and are the parameters to be estimated. 
Allocation 
The allocation equation estimates the amount of apples sold in the market for fresh apples, 
QPF/ . Explanatory variables include the price premium paid for fresh apples, i.e. the 
difference of prices paid for fresh and process apples, PF/ — PP/, and total production in the 
current year, QPT/. The coefBcient to QPT/ indicates the share of total production above 
average total production allocated to fresh consumption, while the coefBcient to PF/ - PP/ 
measures the change of fresh utilization due to price incentives. 
Produce allocated to the processing market is defined as the difference between total 
and fresh production, so that the allocation component of the model is described by 
QPF/ = + ai, (PF/ - PP/ ) + ai, QPT/ + f3, (2A.5) 
QPP/ = QPT/ - QPF/ (2A.6) 
Demand 
Regional production of fresh and processed apples is aggregated to the U.S. level at which 
the demand system estimates apple consumption per person in the form of inverse demand 
flmctions. The per capita quantities of consumption of fresh apples, QUF,, and consumption 
of an alternative fresh fruit, e.g., fresh oranges, enters the estimation of the inverse demand 
for fresh apples, as do per capita personal food consumption expenditures, PCEDC,. A time 
trend was also included. Alternative fruits were included to measure substitution effects or 
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changes in taste parameters. The demand for processing apples is specified as a fimction of 
processed apple consumption, QUP,, consxmiption of an alternative processed fruit, e.g., 
orange juice, and personal food consumption expenditures. 
PF, QUF, QUFO, +«/,3 PCEDC, (2A.7) 
PP, = fifjo + dix QUP, + d^ QUJO, + d,j, PCEDC, tj,, (2A.8) 
where QUFO, denotes fresh orange consumption, and QUJO, the consxjmption of orange 
juice. 
Pricing 
To link the regional supply sectors of the model to the national demand sector, regional fresh 
and processing prices are modeled as a linear fimction of the average U.S. price. 
PF/ (2A.9) 
P/>/=62o+Z>2,PP,+>^,, (2A.10) 
Our modeling approach is similar to that of Miller, who estimates a demand fimction for each 
region as a fimction of U.S. supply. Using linear pricing equation jointly with the inverse 
demand equations, we restrict the differences in the regional demand equations to linear 
transformations of a common national demand fimction. 
Net Imports 
Net imports for fresh and processed apples are modeled as a fimction of the U.S. price for the 
respective product, PF, and PP,, and the quantities of U.S. fresh and processed production, 
QPF, and QPP,. In addition, the per-unit values of net imports, PIF, and PIP,, was 
included; it is calculated as the value of net imports and exports over the respective total 
quantity. The equations are of the form: 
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NIF, =e ,o +e„ PF, +e ,2 PIF, ^e^^QPF, +e^J + (2A.11) 
NIP, = ^20 + ^21 + ^ nQPP, ^1, (2A. 12) 
Data 
The model is estimated using data from 1971-91. The index of prices paid by farmers (TPPt) 
is obtained from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics and the import and 
export data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the 
United States: Annual Supplement Production and consimiption data are taken from several 
U.S. Department of Agriculture ERS/CED publications and Johnson. For the estimation all 
prices, including, IPP,, are deflated by a GDP deflator (1992=100) taken from the economic 
report of the U.S. President. 
Although apple production statistics are reported for all major production states, some 
statistics are incomplete for minor states. For the ten major apple producing states 
(Washington, Michigan, New York, California, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, West 
Virginia, Oregon, and Ohio) that produce 92% of total U.S. apple production all necessary 
data are available. For some minor states, in which not all statistics are recorded 
continuously, missing values are filled in and we describe the procedures used in the process. 
For bearing acreage, a quadratic trend curve is fitted through the available years of 
data and the predicted values are used to fill in missing values. The percentage of crop 
allocated to the firesh market is estimated using a linear regression of fresh production in the 
state with missing data on fr^sh allocation in other states of the same region in the same year. 
This method measures the average percentage going to the firesh market and captures average 
responses to market, weather, and pest conditions in the region. 
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Total production data are complete, and jdeld data are obtained by dividing total 
production by acreage. Average grower prices are also reported for all states. The price 
received for firesh apples is not available in every year for all states, and missing values are 
replaced by regional averages for the given year. The missing value for the processing price 
is calculated to ensure that the weighted average of processing and fresh prices results in the 
average price for the state.' It should be noted that, since the complete data accoimts for 
more than 90% of U.S. production, filling in the missing data should not have significantly 
changed the results significantly. 
Results 
The system is estimated using three-stage least squares. For the supply side, apple 
production in the United States is segmented into four production regions; Northwest, 
Southwest, Central, and East and table 2A.1 gives some production statistics for the four 
regions. The estimated model is presented in table 2A.2 and the numbers in parentheses 
report t-values for the parameter estimates. Variable definitions are given in table 2A.3. The 
variables IPP3, POP, T, QUFO, QUJO, QUFB, QUCPP, QUCEP, PCEDC, PIF, and PIP are 
used as instruments in the estimation. The values suggest a good fit and the Durbin-
Watson statistics either reject the presence of first-order autocorrelation or are inconclusive. 
Apple production technologies have significantly changed in the years over which the 
model is estimated. Large areas of land became available to apple production due to 
irrigation, particxilarly in the Columbia-River area in the Northwest Because of this, the 
West has replaced the East as the largest apple-producing region of the United States. New 
varieties have been adopted, and a shift to high-density orchards occurred. 
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These changes cannot be explained solely by changes in input and output prices and 
even if they could, hardly any data on input costs are available for the apple industry. To 
model these structural shifts in the data, dummy variables are employed in the estimation 
process. Next, we will describe our results and explain any adjustments that are made to the 
general model outlined in the previous section. 
Northwest 
The acreage equation includes a dummy for the years 1986-87, when Washington 
experienced an imusually large increase in bearing acreage. The allocation equation suggests 
that 66% of the increases in total production are allocated to fresh consumption and that an 
increase in the price premium paid for fresh apples increases fresh production significantly. 
Looking at the regional pricing equations, we can conclude that prices are more variable in 
the Northwest than in the other regions, as the multiplicative term is greater than one. 
Southwest 
The equation for the acreage includes a dummy variable to account for sudden increases that 
occurred in the acreage of apple production in the late 1980s in California. This increase 
might have been caused by the large increase in prices for fresh apples after 1986. California 
experienced in the 1980s an increased acreage planted to the then new variety Fuji. The alar 
crisis of the 1980s might be another factor explaining these structural shifts. 
In comparison to the Northwest, a smaller share of the above average production is 
allocated to the market for fresh apples, and increases in the premium for fresh apples causes 
a statistically significant adjustment in the allocation to the fresh market. Prices for fresh 
apples are less variable than they are in other regions. 
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Central 
A dummy variable for years after 1981 is included in the acreage equation. It marks the year 
when the trend of decreasing acreage in Michigan was reversed and when Michigan started 
planting heavily towards processing apples. At the same time we experience an increase in 
the average yield level. Industry experts indicated to us that at this time returns in the apple 
industry were quite favorable and encouraged replanting of older orchards. Many of the then 
newly planted orchards are of improved technology (higher density) and yield a larger crop. 
For the jdeld equation, the relationship between prices and yields seemed to change in 
the last two years of the data. We control for this change by including a dummy variable for 
1996-97. During these years, imports of processed apples increased substantially, where 
most of these additional imports originate in China. We experience for instance at the same 
time a sudden drop in the price for processed apples in the Northwest from 7.5 0/lb. to 
4.1 0/lb. More years of data would be needed to measure a structural adjustment or to 
establish that this is a temporary aberration. 
East 
Due to the growing competition from western states, acreage has been steadily declining in 
the East Changes in acre^e depend significantly on price developments, much more so here 
than they do in other regions. About 17% of above average total production are allocated to 
the fresh market 
General Supply Component 
In general, the estimates of the yield equation show that the Northwest has benefited more 
from technological progress in the apple industry than any other region. After accounting for 
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market changes, average jdelds increased by 698 IbVacre/year in the Northwest, compared 
with 229 Ibyacre/year in the Southwest, 250 IbVacre/year in the Central, and 113 lb./acre/year 
in the East. 
The allocation equations in all regions show that if total production increases, a 
smaller than average share of total production is allocated to fresh utilization, i.e., the average 
share of fresh production in the Northwest is 73.2% and 66% of an increase in total 
production are marketed as fresh. For the Southwest the average fresh production share is 
38.5%, for the Central it is 50.6%, and for the East it is 43.4%. 
Net Imports 
Turning to the net import equations it is found that the home price level is significant in the 
determination of net imports of both fresh and processed apples. The per-imit value of 
imports, on the other hand, is significant in the fresh market but not so in the processed 
market. Low quantities of home production increase net imports, i.e., increase imports and/or 
lower exports.^ Net imports respond more to home production in the processing sector than 
they do in the fresh sector. Both imports for fresh apples and processing apples increase over 
time but imports in the processing sector are increasing at a faster absolute rate. In fact, net 
imports are negative for firesh apples and positive for processed ^ples so that our model 
predicts a decreasing trade surplus in the fresh apple market and an increasing trade deficit in 
the processed apple markets given recent price and home production levels. 
The estimates indicate that imports of processed apples are much more responsive to 
changes in the home market than it is the case for the fresh market. Both the responsiveness 
to the U.S. price level and the responsiveness to the quantity of home production are larger. 
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Demand 
The demand equations show that demand for fresh and processed apples is decreasing in 
prices and increasing in income. The income coefficient is larger in the demand for ftesh 
apples than for processed apples. 
Fresh oranges were used as the alternative fruits in the equation for fresh demand and 
orange juice as the alternative in the equation for processed demand. Other fruits such as 
fresh bananas, canned pears, and canned peaches were tested as additional or alternative 
substitutes but failed to improve the estimation. Fresh oranges serve as substitutes for fresh 
apples. However, orange juice serves a complement of processed apples. Since increased 
apple juice consiraiption is the primary cause for the increased consumption of processed 
apples in general, we conclude that orange juice measures a change in taste towards higher 
juice consimiption, a result that is also found in Willet. 
Elasticity Estimation 
Elasticities are calculated by first evaluating the system at the means of the data. Then U.S. 
level prices for fresh apples and/or processed apples are shocked by a constant over a five-
year period. The changed quantities in the market are simulated forward separately for the 
supply and demand side and the elasticities for each year are calculated using the changed 
quantity in the specific year after the initial shock. Their value is reported for a one-year lag 
and five-year lag. Given the structure of the model, the elasticities for the first year after an 
exogenous change in output price can only include yield and allocation changes, v^^e at a 
five-year lag acreage might adjust as well. For the demand and net import equations the 
model is static, hence elasticities are the same for all years. 
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We report two tj^pes of elasticities. Table 2A1.4 gives partial elasticities that measure 
immediate quantity responses following a change in prices, for instance 
= d]nOPFNW/d]nPF where QPPNW is held constant. Table 2A1.5 gives in addition 
elasticities for the overall production component of the model where fresh and processed 
production are allowed to adjust simultaneously, e.g., EQPFSW^F QPFNW/d]nPF. 
Total supply response elasticities are not reported for the demand and net import component 
because those do not include cross terms. 
A nonparametric bootstrap method of 1000 iterations was used to determine the 
statistical significance of the elasticity estimates and asterisks mark the elasticities that are 
significant at the 0.1 level. To implement the bootstrap the system is first estimated and 
predicted values are calculated for the sample period. A matrix of residuals is formed for the 
entire system, and we randomly draw with replacement residuals from this matrix. Adding 
the series of resampled residuals to the respective series of predicted values, a new data set of 
random-error-adjusted predicted values is formed. The system is reestimated using these 
adjusted predicted values and this procedure is repeated 1000 times. Elasticities are 
calculated for each estimation and their statistical significance is determined (Efron; 
Schroeder). 
Supply responses are inelastic to price changes in the short run. The technology of 
apple production allows only for slow adjustments because newly planted orchards take 
several years to come into fiill bearing and jdelds can only be adjusted to a very limited 
extent Although technology constrains growers to a relatively inelastic response in total 
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production, they can also adjust by reallocating production between the fresh and processing 
sector if relative prices change. 
V 
Looking at the cross elasticities of supply for the combined supply responses (table 
2A.5), we can see that they are negative in all regions in the short run. The increase in 
average price due to the increase in the price for fresh or processed apples will induce an 
increase in yield and acreage. The change in relative prices will in addition cause the 
reallocation of crop to the utilization for which prices increase, and this reallocation 
outweighs the increase in total production in the short run. Turning to the long-run 
elasticities, the cross-price elasticity of processed production with respect to fresh price turns 
positive in the Northwest and Southwest, as now, given the increase in fresh price, total 
production will increase so much that both fresh and processed production increases.^ 
Own-price demand elasticities for fresh and processing apples are -0.37 and -0.70, 
respectively, and the overall demand elasticity with respect to an increase in average price is 
-0.55. The demand for apples responds relatively inelastically to changes in prices. The 
income elasticity is 1.2 for fresh apples and 2.6 for processed apples. 
Hossain reports own price demand elasticities of -0.81 and -0.94 for fresh and 
processed apples respectively. For his model, this gives a total demand elasticity of about 
— 0.86, a higher elasticity of demand than our result. His income elasticities are, on the other 
hand, much lower with values of 0.04 and 0.43 for fresh and processed apples. He calculates 
short-term supply elasticities of 0.08 and 0.12 for fresh and processed apples that are smaller 
than ours. However, his model allows only for direct reallocation effects. 
76 
Our income elasticities are more in line with results of Baumes and Conway who 
report income elasticities of 1.07 and 0.73 for fresh and processed apples, respectively. Their 
demand elasticities are -1.14 and -1.17 respectively, resulting in a total demand elasticity of 
-1.15. 
Conclusion 
Elasticity estimates are obtained for supply and demand responses to price changes in the 
markets for fresh and processed apples. The supply elasticities are estimated for four 
production regions, and differences in growers' ability to respond to market changes are 
evident in these estimates. The resulting elasticity estimates are useful in the estimation of 
regional impacts that result from changes in the technological or economic environment 
Notes 
' List of filled in data: Acreage: Arizona (1984-88), Colorado (1984-92), New Mexico 
(1988-92), Utah (1984-92), Idaho (1984-92), Georgia (1988-89), Delaware (1985-92), 
Maryland (1984-92), Coimecticut (1984-92), Maine (1984-92), Massachusetts (1984-92), 
New Hampshire (1984-92), Rhode Island (1984-92), Vermont (1984-92), Kentucky (1984-
92), Illinois (1984-92), Indiana (1984-92), Iowa (1984-92), Kansas (1984-92), Minnesota 
(1984-92), Missouri (1984-92). Percentage of Fresh Production: Arizona (1978-88), 
Colorado (1975-76), New Mexico (1969-75,1980-86), Utah (1971), Georgia (1969-1997: 
replaced by regional mean), Delaware (1973-97: replaced by regional mean), Rhode Island 
(1969-97: replaced by regional mean), Arkansas (1969-97: replaced by regional mean), 
Kentucky (1969-76,1979-81), Tennessee (1969-70,1972-1997: replaced by regional 
mean), Illinois (1975), Iowa (1969-73,1976,1978-97), Kansas (1974-76,1980,1989-97), 
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Minnesota (1971,1973-75,1979-1997). Fresh Prices: Arizona (1978-88), Colorado (1975-
76), New Mexico (1969-75,1980-86), Utah (1971), South Carolina (1969-72,1980,1982), 
Georgia (1969-1997), Delaware (1973-97), Rhode Island (1969-97), Arkansas (1969-97), 
Kentucky (1969-76), Tennessee (1969-70, 1972-1997), Illinois (1975), loAva (1969-
73,1976,1978-97), Kansas (1974-76,1980,1989-97), Minnesota (1971,1973-75,1979-
1997). 
• The United States produces 4,733 mill, metric tons or 9% of worldwide apple production 
(FAO, Production Yearbook, 1996). Exports amount to 0.6 mill, metric tons or 12% of the 
5.2 mill, metric tons exported worldwide (FAO, Trade Yearbook, 1996). 
^ One can check the supply elasticities with system (1) and (2). There we model the change 
in price resulting from a change in quantity using the flexibility, under the assumption that 
we can approximate dMC / dQ' by dP' IdQ', i, I = F, P. Employing the fact that the 
system of flexibilities equals the inverse of the system of elasticities, i.e.. 
dlnP^/d]nQ''  dlaP''ZdlnQ''  
ainP'/ain0^ dlnP''/dhiQ''  
dhiQ^/dhiP''  dlnQ''/dkiP''  
aing'/ahiP^ dlnQ''/d]nP''  
-I 
the second-order conditions of profit maximization or cost minimization require that 
dMC'' IdQ'' • dMC'' /dQ'' -dMC^ IdQ^ • dMC'' /dQ'' > 0, which is equivalent to the 
restriction 0 on the elasticities, a restriction that holds for our 
system in all regions. Hence the supply system is stable in the sense that producers 
cannot increase profit by reallocating Suit firom fresh to processed utilization. 
Table 2A.1. Production Regions, 1997 * 


















Northwest Washington, Oregon, Idaho 170.3 5270.0 3762.0 16.7 21.7 4.1 
Southwest Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Utah, New Mexico 
50.5 1091.0 440.0 16.6 32.4 6.4 
Central Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, 
Tennessee, Wisconsin 
92.6 1413.1 1050.1 13.2 20.3 7.3 
East Delaware, Georgia, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia, 
140.6 2627.0 574.9 13.5 24.9 8.3 
U.S. 454.0 10401.1 5827.1 15.4 23.0 6.4 
* Numbers might not add up due to rounding. 
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-0.124 + 20.540 PANW3..j/IPP3,.j + 11.000 D867 
(-0.059) (1.491) (8.951) 
ABNW,., + AABNW, 
7.192 -i- 0.674 PANW3,., + 0.698 T 
(2.054) (4.426) (8.805) 
QPTNW, = ABNW, • YNW, 
-2.821 + 22290 PASW3,.3 /IPP3..J + 4.834 D879 
(-1.497) (1.521) (6.782) 
ABSW,., + AABSW, 
-0.165 + 1.065 PASW3,., + 0229 T 
(-0.083) (8.818) (6J98) 
ABSW, • YSW, 
-7.926 + 37.948 PAC3,.j/IPP3,.j + 3.952 D81 
(-3.883) (2.883) (6.965) 
ABC,., + AABC, 
9.906 + 0.050 PAC3,., + 0250 T - 4.730 D967 
(3227) (0.340) (3.907) (-5.026) 
ABC. • YC. 
-11.659 + 79.046 PAE3,.3/IPP3,.3 
(-4.911) (4231) 
ABE,., + AABE, 
13.567 + 0.071 PAE3,., + 0.113 T 
(10.405) (1.081) (4.087) 
































-0.808 - 16.419 (PFNW, - PPNWJ 
(-0.007) (2.033) 
QPTNW, - QPFNW, 
0.661 QPTNW, 
(44.637) 
-128.253 + 8.251 (PFSW, - PFSWJ + 0.354 QPTSW, 
(-5.086) (5.414) (12.127) 
QPTSW, - QPFSW, 
-357.647 + 28.488 (PFQ - PPCJ + 0.493 QPTQ 
(-3.366) (6.960) (9.603) 
QPTQ-QPFC, 
242.384 + 34.544 (PFE, - PPE^ + 0.173 QPTE, 
(2J36) (7.491) (4.652) 
QPTE, - QPFE, 









-4.596 + 1.197 PF, 
(-3.125) (17.833) 
-4.923 + 1.535 PP, 
(-5J76) (15.205) 
(QPFNW, • PFNW, + QPPNW. • PPNW^/ QPTNW, 
15.260 + 0.460 PF, + 4.617 D86 
(5.809) (4.123) (5.970) 
-2.758 + 1.364 PP. 
(-2.673) (11.862) 



























1.794+ 0.916 PP. 
(0.875) (9.990) 
2.024 + 0.814 PP, 
(3.414) (12.787) 
(QPFQ • PFC, + QPPC, • PPCJ/ QPTC, 
0.670 + 1.020 PF. 
(0238) (8.077) 
2.731 -r 0.688 PP. 
(6398) (15.070) 
(QPFE, * PFE, + QPPE, • PPE^ QPTE, 
Aggregation to U.S. Production 
QPF, = QPFNW, + QPFSW, + QPFQ + QPFE, 











3024.12 - 31320 PF, - 579324 PIF, - 0.632 QPF, 
(11346) (-5.540) (-2.026) (-11.900) 
23.779 T 
(3.688) 
2855.47 - 100344 PP, - 23.190 PIP, - 0.758 QPP, + 172.664 T 
(4.803) (-2369) (-0.094) (-3.827) (9229) 
24.401 - 3202 QUF, - 0.059 QUFO, + 0.021 PCEDQ - 0.941 T 
















-8.667 - 0.540 QUP, + 0.507 QUJO, + 0.009 PCEDC, - 0316 T 









Bearing acres^e in Northwest in year t 
Bearing acreage in Southwest in year t 
Bearing acreage in Central in year t 









Change in bearing acreage in Northwest fix)m year t-1 to year t 
Change in bearing acreage in Southwest from year t-1 to year t 
Change in bearing acreage in Central from year t-1 to year t 









Yield/acre in Northwest fai year t 
Yield/acre in Southwest in year t 
Yield/acre in Central in year t 









Total production in Northwest in year t 
Total production in Southwest in year t 
Total production in Central in year t 









Quantity marketed as fresh in Northwest in year t 
Quantity mariceted as fresh in Southwest in year t 
Quantity marketed as fresh in Central in year t 









Quantity marketed as processed in Northwest in year t 
Quantity marketed as processed in Southwest in year t 
Quantity marketed as processed in Central in year t 







U.S. fresh production in year t 







Price received by growers for fresh apples in Northwest in year t 
Price received by growers for processed apples in Northwest in year t 
Average price received by growers in Northwest in year t 









Price received by growers for fresh apples in Soudiwest in year t 
Price received by growers for processed ^ples in Southwest in year t 
Average price received by growers in Soudiwest in year t 






Table 2A3 (continued) 
PFC, Price received by growers for fresh apples in Central in year t (0/lb.) 
PPC, Price received by growers for processed apples in Central in year t itnh.) 
PAC, Average price received by growers in Cent^ in year t mb.) 
PAC3, Three-year average of PAC, based on periods t-2, t-I, t (ii/lb.) 
PFE, Price received by growers for fresh apples in East in year t (0/lb.) 
PPE, Price received by growers for processed apples in East in year t (0/lb.) 
PAE, Average price received by growers in East in year t (0/lb.) 
PAE3. Three-year average of PAE,based on periods t-2, t-I, t (0/lb.) 
PF. Price received by growers for froh apples in year t (0/Ib.) 
PP. Price received by growers for processed apples in year t (0/lb.) 
IPP, Index of prices paid by Miners in year t (1977=100) 
IPP3. Three-year moving average (t,...,t-2) of IPP, 
T Time index, incremented by 1 each year (1971=1) 
D8I Dummy variable (0 before I981,0 otherwise) 
•86 Dummy variable (0 before 1986, 1 otherwise) 
D867 Dimimy variable (1 in 1986-87,0 otherwise) 
D879 Dummy variable (1 in 1987-89,0 otherwise) 
D967 Dummy variable (1 in 1996-97,0 otherwise) 
NIF, Net imports of fresh apples in year t (mill, lb.) 
NIP. Net imports of processing apples (fi«sh fhiit equivalent) in year t (mill, lb.) 
PIF. Unit value of fresh net imports in year t (0/Ib.) 
PIP, Unit value of juice net imports (fr«sh fruit equivalent) in year t (0/lb.) 
POP, U.S. Population in year t (mill.) 
QUF, Per-capita utilization of fr^sh apples with net imports in year t (IbVcapita/year) 
QUP, Per-capita utilization of processed apples with net imports in year t (lb7capita/year) 
QUFB, Per-capita consumption of fresh bananas in year t (IbVcapita/year) 
QUFO, Per-capita consumption of fresh oranges in year t (lb7capita/year) 
QUCPP, Per-capita consumption of canned peaches in year t (Ibycapita/year) 
QUCEP, Per-capita consumption of canned pears in year t (IbVcapita/year) 
QUJO, Per-capita consumption of orange juice in year t (IbVcapita/year) 
PCEDC, Private consumption expenditure per person on food in year t ($) 
(all prices, including IPP„ are deflated by the GDP deflator, 1992=100) 
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Table 2A.4. Partial Elasticities (calculated at means)* 
Short Run Long Run 
(Year 1) (Year 5) 
Northwest 
Fresh Production Sqpfnwjf 0.313 0.622 
^QPFNWJ>P -0.063 -0.025 
E*rocessed I'r9duction 
^QPPNWJ>F 0.504 1.139 
Sqppnw.pp 0.095 0.261 
Southwest 
Fresh Production Sqpfsw.pf 0.359» 0.518* 
^QPFSWJ>P -0231* -0.157 
Processed Production 
^QPPSWJT 0.110 0259 
^0ppsw.pp 0.197* 0.494* 
Central 
Fresh Production 
^QPFCPF 0.873* 1.018* 
^QPFCPP -0.288* -0281* 
Processed Production 
^QPPCPF 0.033* 0.197* 
^OPPCPP 0.004* 0.054* 
East 
Fresh Production 
^QPFE.PF 0.639* 0.717* 
^QPFEJ* -0.162* -0.159* 
Processed Production Sqppej>f 0.026* 0225* 
^OPPEPP 0.008* 0.071* 
Consumption 
^QPFJT -0.374 -0.374 
^QPPJ* -0.701 -0.701 
^QPTJA -0.554 -0.554 
^QKfCEDC 1.195 1.195 
^QPPJ'CEDC 2.591 2.591 
^OPTJiCEDC 1.961 1.961 
Import 
Snif.pf -0.609 -0.609 
^N1P.PP -0.791 -0.791 
^NIF.QPF -3.276 -3276 
^NIP.OPP -3.193 -3.193 
* The asterisk marks significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2A3. Total Supp^ Response Elasticities (calcnlated at means)* 
Short Run Long Run 
(Year 1) (Year 5) 
Northwest 
Fresh Production ^QPFNW.PF 0.306 0.623 
Eqpfnwj* -0.059 -0.006 
E*rocessed Production Eqppnwj>f -0220 0221* 
^OPPNW.PP 0J29* 0212* 
Southwest 
Fresh Production l^>FSW.PF 0.346* 0.540* 
^PFSWJIP -0225* -0.065 
Processed Production Eqppsw.pf -0.055* 0.215* 
Eoppswjp 0219* 0.452* 
Central 
Fresh Production ^PFCPF 0.868* 0.981* 
^QPFCPP -0288* -0.269* 
(Processed Production Eqppcpf -0.831 -0.668 
Eqppcpp 0291 0J295 
East 
Fresh Production ^PFEJT 0.638* 0.708* 
Eqpfepp -0.162* -0.157* 
Processed Production Eqppej* -0.467 -0288 
Eqppejv 0.133 0.180 
* The asterisks marks significance at the 10% level. 
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CHAPTER 3. CAPTURING EXPERTS' UNCERTAINTY EST WELFARE 
ANALYSIS: AN APPLICATION TO ORGANOPHOSPHATE USE 
REGULATION IN U.S. APPLE PRODUCTION 
A paper to be submitted to the American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
JuttaRoosen'" 
Abstract 
Many regulatory actions require ex-ante assessments of benefits and costs although the 
impacts of these actions are uncertain and infonnation about the statistical properties of 
impacts is needed for welfare analysis. This paper proposes a method for deriving 
distributions of welfare changes. Issues of impact uncertainty in wel&re assessments are 
explained, and it is shown how probability distributions over policy impacts can be estimated 
using a collection of dispersed expert opinions. Welfare outcomes are ordered using a 
nonparametric test for stochastic ordering of probability distributions. The methods are 
demonstrated for the case of organophosphate use regulation in U.S. apple production. 
Introduction 
Many regulatory actions require the assessment of benefits and costs of policies although the 
outcomes of those policies are uncertain. Then information about the statistical properties of 
changes in the economic environment is sought for alternative policies. Knowledge of first 
moments of imcertain supply and demand shifts is not sufGcient in welfare analysis, even if 
the goal is only to assess the expected change in economic surplus using linear shocks and 
linear supply and demand fimctions. Welfare analysis involves the study of areas in price-
quantity space and entails the integration over the distribution of shift parameters. Even if 
supply and demand curves are linear in the shocks of interest, the welfare areas they define 
are not. Hence welfare analysis requires the knowledge of second and possibly higher 
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moments. 
Because of a lack of historical or experimental data, future scenarios are frequently 
based on expert opinions. However, policy makers, regulatory agencies, and experts 
themselves are often concerned about the imcertainty that underlies these expert estimates. 
In this study, a method of dealing with experts' uncertainty is proposed. It is shown how ex-
ante welfare analysis can include uncertainty over experts' estimates and how it can 
stochastically order random outcomes of policies under consideration. The procedure is 
demonstrated using the example of regulating organophosphate insecticides in U.S. apple 
production. 
The paper proceeds with a discussion of the implications of impact uncertainty on 
welfare analysis. It is shown how expert opinion can be gathered in a partial probabilistic 
specification and how opinions from several experts can be combined. A description of the 
application and the economic model used to estimate the welfare impact of random 
technology shocks is followed by a discussion of the data. Welfare impacts are presented as 
estimated distributions of economic surplus changes, and it is demonstrated how those 
distribiitions can be ordered iising a nonparametric test for stochastic orderings. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of the proposed method. 
Impact Uncertainty in Welfare Assessments 
Throughout this paper, we use economic surplus as a welfare measure which is defined as the 
sum of consimier and producer surplus and the usual caveats regarding their appropriateness 
as welfare measures apply. Formally, welfare is specified as JT = "Z-iQ)dQ v\^ere 
Z(0) is the inverse excess demand function and where is the market-clearing quantity 
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such that ZCQ") = 0Suppose that a random shock 6 occurs to the excess demand function. 
The new market clearing occurs at Q = {Q: Z(Q) + ^ = 0} or O = Z"' (-^) and the expected 
change in welfare* is defined as 
E,[<<iri=£[jf[z(0+«]rfe]-f zceye 
To simplify the exposition, let Z(Q) = a—bQ where a and b are positive constants, so that 
Q = {a + 0) I b and the expected welfare change solves as [dW] = ^a0 + 9'\lb, 
which is clearly a fimction of the second moment of ^. If shocks or the excess demand 
function are nonlinear, higher moments will be needed for the welfare analysis. This would 
also be the case if the policy-maker's utility fimction is nonlinear in welfare changes, for 
instance if the policy-maker expresses risk aversion. 
If the objective is to compare the welfare properties of two policies that induce 
random shocks to the supply or demand curve, it can be shown that an ordering of the shocks 
in a first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) sense will suffice to order the distributions of 
welfare changes for all policy makers, as long as they seek to maximize expected utility and 
as long as their utility function increases in expected welfare changes. That is if 9^ FSD , 
then the distribution of welfare changes induced by will be preferred to the welfare 
changes induced by 02 However, since economic surplus is a convex function of any 
shock to the excess demand fimction, the result caimot be extended to the case of second-
degree stochastic dominance (SSD). 
This means that an ordering of the shocks to the excess supply curve in the FSD sense 
is sufficient for a welfare ordering but that this does not hold true if shocks can only be 
89 
ordered in the SSD sense. Then it is necessary to compare the distributions of induced 
welfare changes directly. Distributions can be ordered in the FSD or SSD sense using a 
nonparametric test for stochastic orderings (Anderson) whose implementation is illustrated 
later in this paper. 
This discussion illustrates that the knowledge of the distributional properties of 6 is 
needed for welfare analysis, and we turn next to the issue of how to obtain such information. 
Combinmg Probabilistic Expert Opinion 
Information about the unknown 6 that follows the unknown random distribution G{9) is 
sought. The goal is to find an estimate of G using expert opinion so that policies can be 
compared by using ex-ante welfare measures. G is unknown and any estimate of G will be a 
random fiinction itself. 
Experts i = 1,2,..., N are asked to give their probability assessment for 9, and we 
denote expert i's opinion over 6 by 6,. To simplify the experts' task, estimates of 
probabilities for a small number of intervals of ^ are collected rather than a complete 
estimate of Giff). For this purpose the range of 6 is partitioned into K intervals with 
endpoints - oo < a„ < ...< < «, which is equivalent to collecting information about a 
discretized version of G denoted by such that 9^ = j if The information 
obtained fi-om each expert can be described by 
=Pr(^,' =y);y=i,-,A:;z,g, =i}, 
i = 1,..., N, where g^ is expert i's estintiate of the probability that d is in the k-th interval. 
Note that is a complete partition of the range of 9 and that = 1 must hold. 
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The Bayesian approach has proven useful in problems of aggregating probabilistic 
information from different sources (Dorfrnan). We employ Bayes paradigm in a 
Suprabayesian framework, where a Suprabayesian S collects and summarizes opinions 
coming from several experts. He himself supplies an estimate of G{6) which will serve as 
the Bayesian prior and is denoted by p(0) .  
We can combine the probability estimates using Bayesian updating. Treating S's 
opinion as the prior and the expert's infomiation Hi as data, Bayes' formula yields the 
posterior 
I S ,  H , )  =  ^  P r ( ^ ,  | 6 l )  
\PT(H,^)p(e)de 
where Pr(/f, \9) is a K-dimensional probability measure. To combine the information 
coming from several experts, the assumption of conditional independence between experts is 
made, i.e., {/f, \ 0}, {H2 \ 9},..., {if ^ 19} are assumed to be independent. This assumption is 
commonly made in expert opinion analyses and means that the dependence in experts' 
opinions stems from 9 and only from 9 (Genest and Schervish). Then the full posterior can 
be calculated as 
P p(e)Yll,fKH, If). (1) 
The problem is to specify Pr(/f, |^ ), and we apply a result derived by West and also 
West and Crosse. Suppose S holds some joint prior over {9, /f,}. As it would be very 
difScult to specify this prior completely, assume that S specifies her joint prior only partially 
through her prior over 9, p{9), her expectation of the i-th expert's opinion. 
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E[Hi ] = £[(g,,,. -, )] A/c )= /^. 2nd an estimate of correlation between her 
assessment p(j9) and the expert's assessment if/. West's result (Theorem I, p. 554) applies 
and the posterior can be calculated as 
Jml 
where 7r(d \ Of = j)  = p] {9 \ g,j  = 1). Thus 7r(0 \ 0'^ = y) is the S's posterior, were he to leam 
that the expert i believed Of = j with probability 1. This conditional probability is 
calculated consistent with the information available for the joint distribution over {0, H,}, 
i.e., it shows the specij5ed correlation between the two random variables and is consistent 
with the marginals // and p{0). As a result p{0) = 7c{01 Of = j) fUj and the posterior 
results as 
p; («IS, ^ ,) = I;;r(l? 10^ = J) g, . (3) 
y-i 
The posterior according to (2) or (3) is a linear combination of the prior and a 
weighted sum of the deviations between the expert's opinion and S's expectation of the 
expert opinion. It has to be emphasized that the expert opinion over the entire partition of 
will enter the calciilation of the posterior for each point of 0. 
The weights in the sum are formed by the conditional distribution of O\0f = J • For 
a correlation close to zero, 7z{0 \ Of = j) will resemble p{0) for all Of and the posterior will 
favor the prior over the expert opinion. As the correlation increases, 7t{9 \ Of = j) will 
deviate more from the prior and the expert opinion receives a large weight at points where 
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0 is likely given the expert's assessment on 0^ and a low weight if 0's conditional 
probability is low. In this study, it is supposed that 0 and //, are positively correlated and 
higher weights are given to the deviation in probability estimates for intervals of 0^ close to 
0. If we would choose a negative correlation, more weight would be given to the expert 
opinion over 0^ far from 0. Appendix 3 A offers a more detailed discussion of how one 
could interpret 7r(0 \ 0^ = J) and the correlation structure. 
Using the rules for conditional probabilities, equation (3) can be rewritten in a more 
suitable form for the calculations as 
Combining equations (1) and (4) and applying the law of conditional probabilities the 
posterior for combining several expert opinions can be calculated as 
This is the formula used to derive the posterior from a collection of expert opinions. As we 
identically. It would be straightforward to extend equation (5) to allow for an asymmetric 
treatment of the individual experts. Computational issues of implementing (5) are explained 
together with our data subsequently to the discussion of our case study to which we turn now. 
An Application to Oi^anophosphate Regolation in U.S. Apple Prodaction 
Using the context of a possible ban on organophosphate insecticides in U.S. apple 
production, it is shown how probability distributions over shocks to a market system can be 
(4) 
(5) 
use the same // and the same ;r(^ * = j \ 0 )  for each expert i, all experts but S are treated 
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estimated using expert opinion surveys and how these distributions can be used in ex-ante 
welfare analysis. Economic impacts of banning one organophosphate, azinphos-methyl 
(APM), and of banning the whole group of organophosphates (OPs) are estimated. The 
following paragraphs explain our application, and outline the economic model used for the 
welfare analysis. 
Case Description 
OPs are a group of neuroactive insecticides that are applied to more than 98% of the apple 
growing acreage in the United States (USDA. NASS/ERS). The Food Quality Protection Act 
(FQPA) of 1996 has brought new attention to the use of OPs in the Unites States and it is 
expected that in the near future strong limitations will be imposed on the use of OPs. This is 
because FQPA mandates risk assessments of pesticides by mode of toxic action instead of on 
a pesticide by pesticide basis and because it demands a higher level of risk protection for 
infants and children. A general loss of OPs is perceived as a major problem in the $ 1.7 bill. 
U.S. apple indtistry, as growers would lose control over many key insect pests. With 86% of 
U.S. apple acreage treated, APM is the most widely used OP (USDA. NASS/ERS). APM is 
an OP of particularly high toxicity and is one of the five highest ranking OPs posing risk to 
children according to the Enviromnental Working Group report by Wiles, Davies, and 
Campbell. 
To limit the risk coming firom OPs, it has been suggested to restrict the use of 
pesticides that pose the highest risk. In this way it is hoped to leave growers with substitute 
pesticides and thereby to limit the cost of the policy. However, a consumer study has shown 
that consimiers are v^illing to pay a premium to avoid OPs but that the premium is negligible 
for avoiding APM only (Roosen et al.). Hence, we compare the welfare costs of removing 
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APM alone versus removing all OPs where a positive willingness to pay (WTP) shifts the 
demand fimction in the case of removing all OPs. Results show that depending on the size of 
the shift in the demand fimction, a cancellation of OPs could be the preferred option in terms 
of expected economic surplus changes. 
Market Model of a Pesticide Ban in Apple Production 
In apple production, pesticides are mainly used to preserve quality while protection against 
yield losses is generally a secondary consideration. Loss of quality is therefore an important 
consideration in this analysis. Apple production orchards are modeled as joint-product firms, 
producing apples for the fresh and processing market where the fresh market pays a 
considerable premium. A deterioration of quality is modeled as a decrease in the share of 
fruit allocated to the fresh market. The marginal welfare analysis suggested by Lichtenberg, 
Parker, and Zilberman is extended to this multiproduct analysis. In this framework, supply 
and/or demand flmctions are assumed to undergo parallel shifts given changes of the 
production technology, and flexibility estimates are used to calctilate price and quantity 
changes. Marginal-cost impacts can be differentiated by region, and grower groups that are 
affected by the pesticide ban can be distinguished from those that will only be affected 
through market changes. 
The market model is one of partial equilibrimn, and growers are arranged into j=l,.. 
J groups that distinguish themselves in the way that their marginal cost function is impacted 
by the loss of a pesticide. Specifically, producers are grouped into sets of users and non-
users of a pesticide in four geographical production regions; Northwest, Southwest, Central, 
and East. The cancellation of a pesticide presents a change in the technology available to 
growers, and the shift in technology is parameterized by 2. and if growers do not use the 
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pesticide, their technology is independent of A. Weorderthe groups such that j=l,...,t 
identify the producers that are affected by a change in X, i.e. in our case the users of a 
pesticide to be banned, and j=t+l,..., J, denote the producers groups that are not affected by a 
ban. Denoting prices by P and quantities by Q, with subscript j identifying regions and 
superscript F and P signifying fresh and processed, respectively, the partial equilibrium can 
be described as: 
Supply User: i = F,P-,j = \,...J (6.1) 
Supply Non-User: P; = MC'(Q^,Q^), i = F, P; J = 1 + 1,..., J (6.2) 
Regional Pricing: Pj = KiP'),  i  = F,P;J = (6.3) 
Demand: D\Qi,-X) = P',  i  = F,P (6.4) 
Net Imports: i  = F,P (6.5) 
Market Clearing: i  = F,P (6.6) 
Equation (6.1) is the supply function for pesticide users and equation (6.2) is the supply 
function for non-users. The marginal cost fiinctions (MC) depend on production to the fresh 
and processing sector to capture the joint-product character of the technology. Users and 
non-users produce at a level such that their level of marginal costs equals price both in the 
fresh and processing market. Equation (6.4) presents the inverse demand fimction (D) for 
fresh or processed apples. Demand is modeled at the U.S. level and P' is the U.S. level 
price. The demand functions depend also on X and a change in production technology can 
change consumers' preferences for the good. The regional supply functions are linked to the 
U.S. demand via regional pricing equations presented by h'j (P') in equation (6.3). Equation 
(6.5) models net imports ) and the last equation (6.6) poses the market clearing 
conditions. 
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Totally differentiating this system, we can derive the impact of a change in 
technology (the loss of a pesticide) which is parameterized as a shift in ^. 
P^ fr dQ^ dQ'j -dPf =- j = (7.1a) 
P'' P'' 
/r ^</e; //' 
/r -dpf = " -'•='+1 
/r ^ ^Qj * //' ^ 0 y = r+1,,.., / (7.2b) 
dh'. dP' dP' = Q i = F, P; j = 1,...,/ (7.3) 
' dP' 
n  ^ dQ', -dP' = -^<a i = F,P (7.4) 
Qd ^ 
= 0 i  = F,P (7.5) 
P \LjQj) ^ 
+ • • • + 0^; =0 (7-6) 
Expression ff'' denotes the flexibility of the price of good K with respect to the quantity of 
good L, where j indexes the region. The flexibility is a demand flexibility if j=d. For net 
imports and indicates the elasticity of net imports with respect to U.S. price level 
and U.S. production for the respective market i. System (7) is linear in quantity and price 
changes, and can be solved by inversion. 
Welfare Analysis 
Using these solutions, consumer and producer surpluses can be calculated assuming that the 
ban induced shifts in the supply and demand ciuves are linear. We calculate producer and 
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consumer surplus changes in the respective markets as the change in the area behind the 
supply or demand curve. 
Calculating Marginal Cost Changes 
To solve (7), an estimate of the change in marginal cost for producer group j is needed. A 
grower chooses the profit-maximizing level of production of ^}ples for the firesh and 
processed market using his technology described by the cost fimction Cj (Q^ , ; A). As 
described in (6.1) and (6.2), she will choose the level of production that equates the marginal 
cost of production for the fresh and processed market with the respective price. The problem 
is isomorphic to selecting the optimal level of jdeld, Yj, and the optimal share of fruit going 
to the fresh market,  a j, as to 
max = (a,Pf + (1 (r,, o,;/I) 
where (•) is the alternative cost fuiction specification that arises from the same 
technology as Cj (Oj It is assumed to be convex in Yj and aj. The first-order 
conditions can be stated as 
where second subscripts on denote first derivatives. This system of equations can be 
solved for 
Pf =MC'j{Q'j,Q%X) = ^ jy +a-a,)^,> lY, (8.1) 
P; =MC^(Q%Q^,X) = ^ j^ - aj^j^/Yj. (8.2) 
Following Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman, we approximate locally marginal costs of 
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yield and fresh share by their average costs, i.e., = Wj lYj and ~ •> 
where the parameter Wj denotes the per acre cost. Implementing these approximations in 
(8.1) and (8.2), the change in marginal cost for fresh and processing production in the j-th 
region can be derived by taking the total differential with respect to Wj, Yj, and a ^ , and 
results as 
[dW/Y^-{.ajP^ +(X-a^)P^)dY^IY, -  -P^) da,]/(\  + 0.5 dY,IY,) (9) 
This is the equation used to estimate the change in marginal cost in region j given experts' 
estimates of changes in cost, yield, and fresh-market share. 
Data and Computational Methods 
Data 
To estimate welfare impacts, (7) requires estimates of current prices and quantities in the 
market, flexibilities, demand shifts, and marginal cost impacts. Prices and quantities are 
obtained from USD A statistical publications and impacts were based on averages for 1994-
1996 data. Summaries are provided in table 1 along with the percentage of acres treated by 
APM or NAI in each region given in table 2. Elasticity estimates are obtained in an 
econometric estimation of the U.S. ^ple market, and have been estimated for short-term 
(year 1) and long-term (year 5) impacts (Appendix 2A). Demand shift estimates are inferred 
from a consimier study (Roosen et al.), where it is foimd that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for apples not treated by all OPs whereas the premiimi is almost negligible if only 
APM is removed. The demand fimction is shocked in the case of banning all OPs by 
dP' I dk~ A/^(r,0.004), i=F,P, where r is set to be 0%, 1.25%, or 2.5% of the market 
price for fresh and processing apples. The case r =0% was chosen to estimate the impact if 
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demand shifts are ignored, as it is often the case in studies of pesticide cancellations.'^  
Estimates of marginal cost impacts were obtained via an expert opinion survey and 
the survey instrument is included as Appendix 3B. The survey asked experts for their best 
probability estimates over intervals for changes in cost of production, yield, and fresh market 
share for the instance of a ban on APM and a ban on all OPs. The intervals are defined as in 
table 3. Experts were asked to estimate impacts for the year following a pesticide ban (short 
run) and the impact five years after the ban (long run). 
The siirvey was sent to 52 experts who are entomologists working in extension, 
research, and industry. They were identified by the Suprabayesian S who is in charge of 
conducting a U.S. Department of Agriculture supported national study of impacts resulting 
from a loss of OPs in apple production. For the purpose of the survey, the United States were 
divided into three growing regions: East, Central and West, and 12,4, and 14 valid 
questionnaires were returned for the respective regions.' The data supplied by the experts is 
shown in tables 4-15. Tables 4-6 give the short-run estimates for a ban on APM, tables 7-9 
for a ban on OPs. Tables 10-15 continue with the long-run estimates. Expert estimates for 
the East are denoted by El, E2,..., for the Central by CI, C2,..., and for the West by Wl, 
W2,.... Not all experts replied to all questions which is the reason for some rows being 
blank in these tables. 
In general, it appears that experts feel much more uncertain about the implications of 
a total ban on all OPs in the short run and in the long run, \x^e their imcertainty about 
estimates of APM cancellation impacts increases when going from short run to long nm. 
In tables 4-15, the prior is given at the top of each category. It was formed using the 
probability estimations of the Suprabayesian who supplied the prior in the same discrete form 
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as the experts for all three regions, i.e. as probabilities over intervals /?* = ^PX-,P-I, - - , PK)  
where P; = P p(j9)d0. However, for computational reasons, his prior was smoothed out 
to give a non-zero probability to every interval that received a positive probability by at least 
one expert.* 
Computation 
The posterior is set equal zero for intervals that received zero probability from all experts 
including S. We choose to modify the supplied expert opinion for all other intervals by 
giving some positive probability to g^j. To do so we add a probability of 0.01 to each 
and normalize the modified vector to sum to one, such that g^j = {g,j + 0.01^/^^ {g,j + 0.01). 
The practice of assigning some positive measure over the entire range of a random variable is 
common in studies of combining probability distributions to avoid sensitive behavior in 
calculations with zero probabilities (Gelfand, Mallick, and Dey). 
Expert data are combined iising equation (5) where is set to equal p*. This 
assumption supposes that ex-ante S expects the experts to supply the same probability vector 
as he himself does, which is a suitable assumption for if all experts supply then the 
posterior will equal the prior. We form 7c{9 \ 9^ = j) numerically and consistent with the 
marginals and using a method proposed by Johnson and Tennenbein. In this 
procedure, two correlated random variates are created by forming a weighted linear 
combination of two independent normal random variables. These variates can be used to 
create random variables of any distribution function using the inverse transform method. 
Johnson and Tennenbein provide the weights that are necessary to reach a given level of 
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Spearman rank correlation between the variates of any distribution and we draw correlated 
variates with Spearman rank correlations SPR = 0.13 and SPR = 0.09.' These two values 
were chosen because the posteriors yield a suitable mix of the collected opinions while 
illustrating how the correlation structure influences the weighting between S's and the 
experts' opinion. 
Using this method, we draw 10,000 variates to niunerically estimate ^(0 (0^ = j)  
where this large number of draws is chosen to ensure stable estimates of the tails of the 
distribution. The posterior is calculated via (5). Since ji(j9 \ 9f — j) is an estimate of all the 
possible 7V{G \ 9f = j) given the marginals and the correlation structure, it is random and we 
reiterate the procedure 1000 times and report the mean posterior interval probabilities along 
with their respective t-values. Standard errors of the estimated posterior distribution suggest 
a stabilization after 1000 draws. 
Using the mean posterior distributions, we draw 1000 realizations of changes in cost, 
yield, and share allocated to the fresh market in each region for each scenario. For each of 
these 1000 realizations, we calculate the change in the marginal cost fimction via (9) and 
compute the changes in economic surplus accordingly via system (7).'° The Monte Carlo 
analysis is repeated for the three different values of r for the demand shift in the case of 
barming all OPs. 
Results 
The mean posterior distributions are shown in tables 16-27 for SPR = 0.13 and tables 28-39 
for SPR = 0.09. As in tables 4-27, the roman numbers I-Vn denote as the intervals for the 
changes in cost, yield, and share of production marketed to the fresh market. To aid the 
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interpretation of the results we repeat the prior and the unweighted arithmetic mean of the 
expert opinion in the row "expert" and present the mean estimate of the posterior together 
with the t-value that was calculated jfrom the 1000 estimates of the posterior. For SPR = 
0.13, tables 16-18 show the posteriors for a ban of APM one year after the ban, tables 19-21 
show the same for a ban on all OPs. Tables 22-24 and 25-27 repeat the same for five-year 
impacts. Tables 28-39 are organized similarly for SPR = 0.09. 
Two important observations can be made. For smaller SPR the correlation is lower, 
and the expert opinions weigh less in the posterior and S has more influence. This is 
consistent with the result we derived for linear mixing distribution jr(010^ = J) that we 
derived in Appendix 3 A. Results also show that the posterior is not a simple linear 
combination between the prior and the experts' opinion. In particular, for each interval the 
experts' opinions over all intervals will enter. Therefore the posterior will not necessarily lie 
between the prior and the mean of the expert estimates. Also as the number of expert opinion 
that enter the posterior gets larger, the opinion of each individual expert becomes less 
important. 
Table 40 and 41 show some summary statistics of the posterior distributions for the 
marginal cost changes in all regions for all scenarios. Marginal cost increases are stronger 
after a ban on all OPs than after a ban of APM. After a ban on APM they grow larger when 
going from the short run to the long run in the East and in the West, but in the Central they 
are smaller in the long run than in the short run. For the OPs marginal cost impacts are less 
severe in the long run. 
Weaker or stronger impacts in the long run are both plausible scenarios. Over time, 
growers might become more flexible to adapt their production system to the loss of the 
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pesticides and learn how to use alternative means. New technologies might become available 
as well. On the other hand, insect pests have their own complex population dynamics. For 
instance, a possible alternative for the OPs are pyrethroids, a class of insecticides that is 
effective against the same pests but that is more toxic to beneficial insects. Switching from 
OPs to pyrethroids could trigger an increase in mite populations that are otherwise partly 
controlled by beneficials. These problems with secondary pests might not be significant in 
the first year after the loss of OPs but could become more severe in later years. Another 
aspect is that the use of pheromones for mating disruption, a tactic that is used to control the 
key pest population of codling moths, seems to be relatively effective in the northwestern 
United States but it does not seem to work as well in some other regions. Furthermore, 
although many substitute OPs are available to replace APM, losing APM could be disruptive 
to integrated pest management systems that rely on switching between different insecticides 
as a resistance management strategy. 
Using 1000 realizations of the marginal cost fimction distributions, we calculate the 
welfare losses for each realization using system (7). For each posterior calculation with SPR 
= 0.13 and SPR = 0.09, we calculate the welfare impacts assimiing r = 0, r = 1.25% and r = 
2.5%. The resulting distributions of economic surplus changes are summarized in table 42 
for SPR = 0.13 and in table 43 for SPR = 0.09. We can see that banning all OPs would have 
much stronger welfare impacts than banning APM only if r =0%. In addition, the variation 
of the estimate increases \^en going from short run to long run. As we increase r, welfare 
losses after a banning OPs become smaller and expected welfare losses of banning APM 
exceed those of banning all OPs if r =2.5%. However, the variance of the estimate for losing 
104 
all OPs is also much larger and a ranking of the welfare impacts will depend on the decision­
maker's utility function. 
Our objective is compare the welfare implications of the two policy options of 
banning APM or all OPs and for a comprehensive comparison of the two distributions in 
their welfare properties a non-parametric test for stochastic dominance of first- and second-
degree as introduced by Anderson is implemented. The Ho of the test is no dominance of one 
distribution over the other and it is tested against the Hi stating that one distribution 
dominates the other. The test arises as a transformation of a Chi-squared goodness of fit test 
that uses a transformation of the total deviations between two distributions.'' In addition to a 
simple Chi-squared test, the Anderson test allows us to see the location and direction of 
disagreement in the distributions. We use the test to compare the distributions of welfare 
impacts of a ban on APM versus the welfare implications of a ban on OPs, both in the short 
run and in the long run. 
We briefly summarize the test procedure. Under the null, both samples are assumed 
to originate from the same population. We form a joint sample from the OPs and APM 
sample each for the short run and long run, and divide it into a partition with equal cell 
probabilities. For our implementation a partition into 10 cells is chosen and the probability 
of being in the cell equals 0.1 under the null. The cell length d is defined by this partitioning, 
i.e. it is defined such that 0.1 observations of the joint sample are assigned to each cell. The 
cell frequencies and using this same partition for the separated samples are calculated 
together with cell probabilities p'^ =x^/ n"^ and p®=x®/n®, n^ and n® being the respective 
sample sizes. Siq)erscript A (6) denotes here the sample of welfare distribution after a ban 
on APM (OPs). 
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The and x® follow a multinomial distribution and a nomial approximation is 
appropriate if n' p' > 5, i = A, B. Then /n"* -x^ Iis asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,mQi) and v'Q"'v is asymptotically distributed as Here, Q"' is the general 
inverse of Q, m = n"' +n^)l , and Q is defined as in Anderson (p. 1185). 
FSD is defined by differences in cumulative distributions and these are approximated 
by forming the cimiulative cell probabilities as 
"1 0 0 • • 0' 
1 1 0 • - 0 
1 1 1 - - 0 
1 1 1 • - 1 
For SSD, the integral of the cumulative distribution is approximated using a trapezoidal rule 
for approximating integrals as 
I pi V = 0.5 
d, 0 






0 / / V  
y,+^2 d^-hd^ ••• d ^Q 
Dividing each entry of these vectors by its standard deviation gives the vector of test 
statistics. 
Because the test gives rise to a vector of test statistics, it requires multiple 
comparisons. We adopt the same convention as Anderson; the hypothesis of dominance of 
distribution APM over OPs requires that no element is significantly larger than 0 whilst at 
least one element is significantly less than 0. Given the symmetry of the test, the dominance 
of OPs over APM is established if no element is significantly smaller than 0 whilst at least 
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one element is significantly larger than 0. Test statistics are compared to the table of the 
studentized maximum modulus distribution and the 1% critical value for a test with 10 cells 
is 3.29 (Stoline and Ury). 
Results for the test statistics are given in tables 44-46 and tables 47-49 for SPR = 0.13 
and SPR = 0.09, respectively. The left four columns summarize the test for the short-nm 
distributions; the right four columns repeat the same for the long run. For each, the first two 
coltimns give the cell probabilities, and the second two columns give the test statistics for 
FSD and SSD. Starting firom the posterior calculation with SPR = 0.13, for r =0, the 
distributions of economic surplus impacts after a ban on APM are preferable to those after a 
ban on OPs in the SSD sense in the short run, but the distribution cannot be ordered in the 
FSD sense. In the long nm the policy of banning APM clearly dominates the one of banning 
all OPs in both the sense of FSD and SSD. Given r =1.25%, the distributions can only be 
order in the SSD sense both in the short run and in the long run, while they cannot be ordered 
in the FSD sense in either case. For r =2.5%, the ordering is reversed for the long-run 
distributions, and banning all OPs would now be the preferred option in the FSD and in the 
SSD sense, while at the same time the short-run distributions cannot be ordered. The results 
for SPR = 0.09 (tables 47-49) are relatively similar, but for the fact that the difference 
between the two distributions is in general smaller. 
Using the vector of test statistics other interesting conclusions can be drawn by noting 
that for our case the vector of test statistics switches sign at only one point if the test is 
inconclusive. Looking for instance at the test for FSD in table 45, the welfare distribution 
after a loss of APM is siqjerior for the first six deciles but inferior for the last four. Therefore 
a policy-maker who is concemed about the probability of large losses but cares less about the 
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ordering of the policies for smaller impacts might still prefer the option of canceling APM. 
Hence the test can be infom^tive for preference that do not adhere to the requirements of 
FSD or SSD, even if the test result itself is inconclusive. 
Conclusion 
The paper discusses issues of impact uncertainty in welfare analysis and shows how impact 
distributions can be derived from expert opinion. Resulting distributions of welfare changes 
can be ordered using a nonparametric test, comparing distributions in the FSD and SSD 
sense. We demonstrate the methods for the topical example of banning OPs in U.S. apple 
production. 
With regard to organophosphate regulation in U.S. apple production, we have seen 
that marginal-cost impacts are considerably larger when banning all OPs versus banning 
APM only. In the case of banning all OPs, short-run unpacts are in general more severe than 
long-run impacts. The order is reversed for banning APM only. When analyzing at the 
welfare impacts, we must not only consider supply flinction shifts but also possible changes 
in the demand ftmction. If the average WTP for ^ples without OPs increases sufficiently, 
welfare will increase. In the long run, we found that a 2.5% increase in average WTP is 
sufBcient to offset additional welfare losses resulting from cost increases due to losing all 
OPs versus APM only. 
Estimates of ex-ante welfare impacts of changes in the legal or natural environment 
are often desired for informed policy decision making. However, in many situations no 
suitable data are available to predict the distributions of the parameters of change. Such 
situations arise frequently in the prediction of complex system responses. Woodward and 
Bishop analyze situations of environmental policy malnng under pure uncertainty. The here 
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proposed method of combining expert opinion can be useful when trying to move from a 
state of pure uncertainty over policy outcomes to a state with known probability distributions, 
so that a welfare analysis under risk becomes feasible. 
Experimental data are by their nature created under well-defined conditions that 
depict a particular situation, but economic studies need information about general behavior. 
The role of the expert is then to arrive at a prediction of system behavior under general 
conditions using her expertise to generalize the experimental data. However, the discrepancy 
between the data needs of natural scientists and economists leads often to tensions in 
interdisciplinary work (Zilberman and Millok). To give experts the opportunity to express 
their difficulty in arriving at impact estimates and to ask them for probability distributions 
rather than for expected values might alleviate the strain on the collaboratioiL 
While the information demand on experts increases, it has been our experience that 
experts feel more comfortable with their assessment if they can express their uncertainty. 
Despite the fact that the survey required a considerable time commitment from the experts, a 
response rate of 58% was achieved for this study. Experts may also be less inclined to factor 
a risk premium into the reported expected impacts. 
The proposed procedure for combining expert opinion is consistent with the laws of 
probability theory. The correlation structure can be used to give different weights to the 
Suprabayesian and the experts. The resulting economic surplus distributions can be 
summarized using different statistical measures depending on the preferences of the policy 
maker. Given the level of risk aversion or the nature of the project, percentiles of extreme 
events might for instance be of interest As shown in this study, outcome distributions can be 
ordered for any increasing or increasing and concave utility fimction using a nonparametric 
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test. An interesting extension would be to find a test that would allow ordering welfare 
measures of higher dimensions for instance the distribution of consumer versus producer 
surpluses. 
Possible other applications that seem immediate are studies of global climate change 
and the assessment of environmental risks. An interesting agricultural application would be 
the prediction of resistance development in response to widespread adoption of pesticide 
resistant plants. In situations where several experimental studies exist, it might be possible to 
estimate impact distributions from the data directly rather than by using expert opinion. 
Methods such as empirical Bayes might be a more suitable approach in these situations 
(Efron). 
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A sufficient condition for existence of Q° is that Z(0 is continuous, Z(0) > 0, and 
Z(oo) < 0. For uniqueness we require that Z{0) is decreasing everywhere. 
By using the expected economic surplus criterion we perform a state-dependent welfare 
comparison. Ready shows that for welfare analysis under uncertainty, state-dependent 
variables are likely to overestimate the value of a project because affected groups can 
coinsure each other in states when the project benefits one group and damages another 
group. In our study however, this coinsurance effect is likely to be small because changes 
in consumer and producer surplus are strongly correlated through market forces. 
The proof of this assertion is a straightforward application of the results by Hadar and 
Russell. 
Roosen et al. found an average WTP of 18% of market value but this value seems rather 
high and we use the more realistic values of up to 2.5%. The choice of standard deviation 
was motivated by the relative standard error of WTP found in the same study. 
In the survey the regions Northwest and Southwest of the economic model were combined 
to region West because of fear that not enough experts would participate in our study if the 
regions were defined to small. The nuunber of experts in the Central is relatively small, 
because the region is small compared to the two other regions and there are basically only 
two states, Michigan and Ohio, where apple production is sufficiently important to have 
extension and industry experts working in apple production. 
Looking at equation (5), it is immediately clear that the posterior 
p '  H f ,  ) = 0 if the prior P j = Q  n o  matter how likely all other experts 
consider the outcome 0^. 
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' Johnson and Tennenbein propose a method of creating correlated random variates using a 
weighted linear combination method by forming a weighted sum of independent random 
variates. They give values for the weights c that result in a given level Spearman rank 
correlation. Because of the discreteness of our distributions, we implement a Monte Carlo 
study of 1000 iteration to estimate the value of Spearman rank correlation for the two 
different values of c that we use in our study, i.e., c = 0.0952 and c = 0.05. For these two 
values of c, we estimate a correlation of0.1308 (0.0160) and 0.0871 (0.0177), respectively, 
where the numbers in parentheses report standard errors. 
The same distribution for marginal cost changes is used for the Northwest and Southwest 
as growing and pest conditions are very similar in both regions. 
'' Tolley and Pope introduced a similar test of stochastic dominance that was formed as an 
exact test, i.e. the critical values of the test statistic were derived from the sample. 
Anderson derives a test statistic that follows a known and tabulated distribution. 
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Table 1. U.S. Apple Prodnction across Regions 
U.S. East Central Northwest Southwest 
Production (mill, lb.) 10,583.2 2,580.6 1,342.9 5,632.4 1,027.3 
Yield (lb.) 23,537.1 17,488.0 14,819.0 33,814.0 22,887.0 
Fresh Share (%) 58.3 40.6 44.0 72.0 36.2 
Fresh Price (0/lb.) 21.1 19.2 20.7 21.0 30.1 
Proc. Price (0b.) 7.9 8.1 8.9 7.7 7.6 
Table 2. Percentage of Acreage Treated with APM and OP 
APM OP 
East 79.3 99.0 
Central 91.5 99.5 
Northwest 88.1 99.4 
Southwest 48.0 88.7 
Table 3. Definition of Interval Ranges for Expert Opinion Collection' 
I 11 111 IV V VI VII 




































" dC denotes the change in cost per acre, dY the change in yield per acre and da denotes the change in share of production 
allocated to the fresh market. 
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Table 4. Loss of APM, Year 1, Expert Assessment for Change in Cost* 
Expert I n m IV V VI VII 
Prior 8.8 11.8 35.3 17.6 11.8 8.8 5.9 
EI 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
E2 1 98 1 0 0 0 0 
E3 0 0 10 60 20 10 0 
E4 0 75 20 5 0 0 0 
E5 0 0 10 10 50 25 5 
E6 0 30 60 10 0 0 0 
E7 0 0 0 0 10 80 10 
E8 5 10 20 20 40 5 0 
E9 0 10 10 10 30 30 10 
ElO 0 20 20 40 20 0 0 
Ell 
E12 
Prior 0.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 10.0 5.0 
CI 0 0 5 40 50 5 0 
C2 0 0 0 0 25 25 50 
C3 0 0 20 40 40 0 0 
C4 0 0 5 5 20 30 40 
Prior 5.9 11.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 14.7 8.8 
W1 0 0 10 50 30 10 0 
W2 0 5 5 5 10 35 40 
W3 0 0 0 0 40 60 0 
W4 0 0 20 60 20 0 0 
W5 0 5 20 60 15 0 0 
W6 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
W7 0 20 30 40 10 0 0 
W8 0 5 10 10 10 15 50 
W9 0 0 10 70 20 0 0 
WIO 0 0 0 0 10 20 70 
Wll 5 10 10 10 10 25 30 
W12 0 0 0 5 10 20 65 
W13 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
W14 10 25 25 25 10 5 0 
^ Rows list the expert estimates for probabilities over intervals I-Vn as defined in table 3. 
El identifies first expert for region East, CI identifies first e}q)ert for region Central, and 
W1 identifies first expert for region West. The row Prior at the top of each category list 
the prior formed by the Suprabayesian. 
Table S. Loss of APM, Year 1, Expert Assessment for Change in Yield 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
Prior 0.0 0-0 6.1 6.1 13.1 61.6 13.1 
El 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
E2 0 0 0 0 1 98 1 
E3 0 0 0 10 20 70 0 
E4 0 0 0 0 20 80 0 
E5 0 0 0 25 50 25 0 
E6 0 0 0 0 25 75 0 
E7 0 0 0 5 5 90 0 
E8 0 0 10 35 30 20 5 
E9 
ElO 0 0 0 0 10 80 10 
Ell 0 0 0 10 80 10 0 
E12 
Prior 5.8 6.4 7.0 7.6 8.3 64.9 0.0 
CI 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
C2 30 25 25 20 0 0 0 
C3 0 0 10 40 40 10 0 
C4 0 0 10 60 20 10 0 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 64.7 5.9 
W1 0 0 0 10 10 70 10 
W2 40 30 10 10 5 5 0 
W3 0 0 0 0 5 95 0 
W4 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W5 0 0 5 5 5 80 5 
W6 
W7 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W8 5 5 10 10 20 50 0 
W9 0 0 0 0 10 80 10 
WIO 0 0 0 0 2.5 95 2.5 
Wll 35 30 10 10 10 5 0 
W12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
WIS 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W14 0 0 0 0 20 60 20 
Table 6. Loss of APM, Year 1, Expert Assessment for Change in Allocation to Fresh 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
Prior 0.0 5.0 15.0 30.0 30.0 15.0 5.0 
El 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
E2 0 0 0 0 1 98 1 
E3 0 0 0 0 20 80 0 
E4 0 0 0 10 10 70 10 
E5 0 0 20 50 30 0 0 
E6 0 0 0 0 10 90 0 
E7 0 0 5 90 5 0 0 
E8 0 0 5 30 30 30 5 
E9 0 10 10 10 20 50 0 
ElO 0 0 0 10 60 20 10 
Ell 0 0 0 10 80 10 0 
E12 
Prior 0.0 6.1 11.7 14.4 47.8 20.0 0.0 
CI 0 0 5 40 40 5 0 
C2 0 25 50 25 0 0 0 
C3 0 0 40 40 20 0 0 
C4 0 0 10 60 20 10 0 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 17.6 41.2 17.6 5.9 
W1 5 10 50 20 15 0 0 
W2 5 5 20 20 15 20 15 
W3 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W4 0 0 0 0 10 80 10 
W5 0 0 0 5 10 85 0 
W6 0 5 10 15 30 40 0 
W7 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W8 0 0 0 0 75 25 0 
W9 0 0 0 0 30 60 10 
WIO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Wll 30 25 10 10 10 10 5 
W12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W13 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W14 5 5 10 10 10 60 0 
Table?. Loss of OP, Year 1, Expert Assessment Change in Cost 
Expert I n m IV V VI VII 
Prior 5.9 5.9 11.8 11.8 29.4 23.5 11.8 
El 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
E2 90 10 0 0 0 0 0 
E3 0 0 0 0 20 60 20 
E4 10 70 5 5 5 5 0 
E5 0 0 0 0 0 20 80 
E6 0 0 0 40 60 0 0 
E7 0 0 0 0 10 40 50 
E8 1 1 1 1 1 5 90 
E9 0 0 10 10 10 20 50 
ElO 0 0 0 20 20 50 10 
Ell 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
E12 0 0 0 0 10 80 10 
Prior 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 10.0 
CI 0 0 5 40 40 10 5 
C2 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
C3 0 0 10 40 40 10 0 
C4 0 0 0 0 0 30 70 
Prior 11.8 23.5 35.3 11.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 
W1 0 0 30 50 20 0 0 
W2 0 0 10 30 30 20 10 
W3 0 0 0 0 20 50 30 
W4 0 0 10 40 40 10 0 
W5 0 0 10 20 50 15 5 
W6 0 5 10 15 30 30 10 
W7 0 10 10 20 20 20 20 
W8 0 0 0 0 20 30 50 
W9 0 0 0 0 0 10 90 
wio 0 0 0 0 0 5 95 
Wll 0 10 10 15 15 25 25 
W12 0 0 0 10 25 50 15 
WIS 0 0 0 20 40 40 0 
W14 20 50 10 10 10 0 0 
Table 8. Loss of OP, Year 1, Expert Assessment for Change in Yield 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
Prior 8.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 14.7 11.8 5.9 
El 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
E2 0 0 0 0 0 20 80 
E3 0 0 10 50 30 10 0 
E4 0 0 0 0 10 80 10 
E5 70 20 10 0 0 0 0 
E6 0 0 0 20 50 30 0 
E7 0 25 50 25 0 0 0 
E8 10 20 25 20 15 5 5 
E9 
ElO 0 10 30 30 20 10 0 
Ell 0 0 50 50 0 0 0 
E12 10 70 10 10 0 0 0 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 11.8 52.9 11.8 
CI 0 0 5 20 50 25 0 
C2 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C3 0 40 40 20 0 0 0 
C4 0 30 60 10 0 0 0 
Prior 2.9 5.9 8.8 11.8 11.8 41.2 17.6 
W1 0 0 20 50 30 0 0 
W2 30 30 20 10 5 5 0 
W3 30 40 30 0 0 0 0 
W4 0 0 20 60 20 0 0 
W5 0 0 0 15 60 25 0 
W6 10 20 10 20 20 20 0 
W7 5 15 20 30 20 10 0 
W8 0 5 10 50 20 15 0 
W9 0 5 15 30 30 20 0 
WIO 0 5 5 5 5 80 0 
Wll 30 30 15 10 10 5 0 
W12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
WIS 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W14 20 20 20 40 0 0 0 
Table 9. Loss of OP, Year 1, Expert Assessment for Change in Allocation to Fresh 
Expert I n m IV V VI VU 
Prior 11.8 23.5 29.4 11.8 8.8 8.8 5.9 
El 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
E2 0 0 0 0 1 98 1 
E3 0 10 50 30 10 0 0 
E4 0 0 0 5 10 80 5 
E5 80 20 0 0 0 0 0 
E6 0 0 0 5 25 70 0 
E7 80 15 5 0 0 0 0 
E8 0 5 30 30 20 10 5 
E9 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ElO 0 0 20 60 20 0 0 
Ell 0 50 50 0 0 0 0 
E12 20 20 30 20 10 0 0 
Prior 10.0 30.0 30.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
CI 5 20 50 20 5 0 0 
C2 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C3 0 60 40 0 0 0 0 
C4 60 30 10 0 0 0 0 
Prior 2.9 8.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 
W1 45 35 10 10 0 0 0 
W2 10 25 30 20 10 5 0 
W3 0 0 20 20 20 40 0 
W4 0 0 0 0 20 20 60 
W5 0 5 20 40 25 10 0 
W6 50 30 10 5 5 0 0 
W7 10 20 30 20 10 10 0 
W8 0 0 10 20 50 10 10 
W9 0 10 30 30 20 10 0 
WIO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Wll 25 25 20 10 10 5 5 
W12 10 60 20 5 5 0 0 
W13 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W14 0 5 25 40 25 5 0 
Table 10. Loss of APM, Year 5, Expert Assessment for Change in Cost 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
Prior 5.9 8.8 11.8 29.4 23.5 11.8 8.8 
El 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
E2 1 98 1 0 0 0 0 
E3 0 0 0 10 40 40 10 
E4 5 70 10 10 5 0 0 
E5 0 80 10 10 0 0 0 
E6 0 25 60 15 0 0 0 
E7 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
E8 10 30 30 20 10 0 0 
E9 0 0 0 10 20 20 50 
ElO 0 10 20 50 20 0 0 
Ell 0 0 30 40 30 0 0 
E12 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
Prior 10.0 50.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0-0 
CI 0 5 40 30 20 5 0 
C2 50 25 25 0 0 0 0 
C3 0 0 0 20 40 40 0 
C4 10 70 10 10 0 0 0 
Prior 10.0 10.0 10.0 30.0 20.0 15.0 5.0 
W1 40 50 10 0 0 0 0 
W2 10 15 20 20 20 10 5 
W3 10 80 10 0 0 0 0 
W4 0 10 50 30 10 0 0 
W5 0 10 10 60 10 10 0 
W6 50 10 10 10 10 10 0 
W7 0 5 30 20 20 20 5 
W8 40 20 10 10 10 5 5 
W9 0 2 40 30 28 0 0 
WIO 40 40 10 5 5 0 0 
Wll 20 50 10 10 5 5 0 
W12 5 40 40 15 0 0 0 
WIS 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W14 50 20 15 15 0 0 0 
Table 11. Loss of APM, Year 5, Expert Assessment for Change in Yield 
Expert I n in IV V VI VH 
Prior 5.9 8.8 17.6 35.3 17.6 8.8 5.9 
El 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
E2 0 0 0 0 1 98 1 
E3 0 0 10 50 30 10 0 
E4 0 0 0 0 20 80 0 
E5 0 0 0 10 10 80 0 
E6 0 0 0 0 30 70 0 
E7 0 5 15 80 0 0 0 
E8 0 0 5 5 20 60 10 
E9 50 20 20 10 0 0 0 
ElO 0 10 60 20 10 0 0 
Ell 0 0 0 10 80 10 0 
E12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Prior 5.7 6.3 6.8 7.4 11.4 51.1 11.4 
CI 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
C2 10 10 20 50 10 0 0 
C3 0 0 0 0 20 40 40 
C4 0 0 10 60 20 10 0 
Prior 5.0 6.0 9.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 20.0 
W1 0 10 50 40 0 0 0 
W2 15 30 20 15 10 5 5 
W3 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W4 0 0 0 10 80 10 0 
W5 0 0 5 10 20 60 5 
W6 0 5 10 15 40 30 0 
W7 0 0 0 10 10 80 0 
W8 5 5 5 15 15 40 15 
W9 0 0 0 0 10 80 10 
WIO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Wll 20 40 10 10 10 5 5 
W12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
WIS 
W14 50 20 10 10 10 0 0 
Table 12. Loss of APM, Year S, Expert Assessment for Change in Allocation to Fresh 
Expert I n m IV V VI VII 
Prior 8.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 8.8 5.9 
El 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
E2 0 0 0 0 1 98 1 
E3 0 10 50 30 10 0 0 
E4 0 0 0 0 5 90 5 
E5 0 0 0 10 10 80 0 
E6 0 0 0 5 10 85 0 
E7 85 10 5 0 0 0 0 
E8 0 0 0 10 15 60 15 
E9 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ElO 0 0 0 10 40 40 10 
Ell 0 0 0 10 80 10 0 
E12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Prior 5.9 11.8 35.3 17.6 11.8 8.8 8.8 
CI 5 40 40 10 5 0 0 
C2 0 5 10 20 60 5 0 
C3 0 0 0 0 20 40 40 
C4 5 10 50 30 5 0 0 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 17.6 47.1 11.8 
W1 40 25 25 10 0 0 0 
W2 5 5 10 30 20 20 10 
W3 0 0 0 0 10 90 0 
W4 0 0 0 0 0 20 80 
W5 0 0 10 10 20 50 10 
W6 0 5 5 5 15 70 0 
W7 0 0 0 10 20 40 30 
W8 0 0 0 10 20 70 0 
W9 0 0 0 0 10 80 10 
WIO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Wll 5 5 15 15 25 25 10 
W12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W13 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
W14 20 40 20 20 0 0 0 
Table 13. Loss of OP, Year 5, Expert Assessment Change in Cost 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
Prior 5.9 8.8 8.8 11.8 11.8 35.3 17.6 
El 0 20 50 30 0 0 0 
E2 20 60 20 0 0 0 0 
E3 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
E4 0 60 10 10 10 10 0 
E5 0 0 0 0 10 20 70 
E6 0 0 0 70 30 0 0 
E7 0 0 0 0 10 30 60 
E8 0 5 5 5 5 5 75 
E9 0 0 0 10 10 10 70 
ElO 0 0 0 30 60 10 0 
Ell 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
E12 0 0 0 10 10 10 70 
Prior 5.9 8.8 8.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 
CI 0 0 0 0 10 30 60 
C2 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
C3 20 60 20 0 0 0 0 
C4 0 0 0 0 10 20 70 
Prior 11.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 11.8 11.8 5.9 
W1 0 0 0 0 10 40 50 
W2 5 10 20 20 20 15 10 
W3 0 0 0 0 0 90 10 
W4 0 0 0 20 60 20 0 
W5 0 5 10 20 50 15 0 
W6 0 0 0 0 10 10 80 
W7 0 5 10 20 20 20 25 
W8 0 0 0 0 0 40 60 
W9 0 0 0 0 0 5 95 
WIO 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
Wll 5 10 10 10 15 20 30 
W12 0 0 0 10 20 50 20 
WIS 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
W14 0 0 0 20 20 20 40 
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Table 14. Loss of OP, Year 5, Expert Assessment for Change in Yield 
Expert I n m rv V VI VII 
Prior 5.9 8.8 17.6 35.3 17.6 8.8 5.9 
El 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
E2 0 0 0 0 20 60 20 
E3 20 60 20 0 0 0 0 
E4 0 0 0 10 10 80 0 
E5 0 20 50 30 0 0 0 
E6 0 0 0 40 50 10 0 
E7 50 40 10 0 0 0 0 
E8 0 0 0 0 15 70 15 
E9 
ElO 0 0 20 60 10 10 0 
Ell 0 0 20 70 10 0 0 
E12 50 30 10 10 0 0 0 
Prior 5.0 10.0 15.0 40.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 
CI 0 5 40 40 15 0 0 
C2 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 
C3 
C4 0 40 60 0 0 0 0 
Prior 5.0 10.0 15.0 40.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 
W1 10 50 20 10 10 0 0 
W2 30 30 20 10 5 5 0 
W3 80 20 0 0 0 0 0 
W4 0 0 0 20 60 20 0 
W5 0 0 0 10 55 35 0 
W6 0 0 0 50 30 20 0 
W7 5 20 30 20 15 10 0 
W8 0 0 10 30 30 30 0 
W9 10 25 20 20 20 5 0 
WIO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Wll 10 35 20 10 10 10 5 
W12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
WIS 
W14 10 40 20 20 10 0 0 
Table IS. Loss of OP, Year 5, Expert Assessment for Change in Allocatioii to Fresh 
Expert I n m rv V VI vn 
Prior 17.6 35.3 14.7 11.8 8.8 5.9 5.9 
El 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
E2 0 0 0 0 20 60 20 
E3 0 50 30 20 0 0 0 
E4 0 0 5 5 5 80 5 
E5 50 30 20 0 0 0 0 
E6 0 0 0 30 50 20 0 
E7 60 40 0 0 0 0 0 
E8 0 0 0 10 40 40 10 
E9 
ElO 0 20 40 20 20 0 0 
Ell 0 30 60 10 0 0 0 
E12 30 30 30 10 0 0 0 
Prior 17.6 35.3 11.8 11.8 8.8 8.8 5.9 
CI 70 20 10 0 0 0 0 
C2 30 40 20 10 0 0 0 
C3 0 0 0 0 0 40 60 
C4 80 20 0 0 0 0 0 
Prior 8.8 8.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 5.9 
W1 30 30 20 10 10 0 0 
W2 5 5 15 30 20 15 10 
W3 0 0 40 20 20 20 0 
W4 0 0 0 0 0 20 80 
W5 0 10 20 40 20 10 0 
W6 0 0 50 30 20 0 0 
W7 10 20 20 20 20 10 0 
W8 0 15 30 20 20 10 5 
W9 0 10 30 25 25 10 0 
WIO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Wll 10 25 25 15 10 10 5 
W12 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
WIS 20 40 40 0 0 0 0 
W14 40 20 20 20 0 0 0 
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Table 16. Loss of APM, Year 1, Change in Cost, SPR = 0.13* 
1 n m IV V VI VII 
East 
Prior 8.8 11.8 35.3 17.6 11.8 8.8 5.9 
Expert 1.5 33.0 15.0 15.4 16.8 15.0 3.3 
Posterior 7.8 11.4 35.6 18.1 12.1 9.1 5.8 
t-value 3.8 4.7 9.2 5.8 4.5 3.7 3.0 
Central 
Prior 0-0 5.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 10.0 5.0 
Expert 0.0 0.9 8.0 21.0 32.8 15.1 22.2 
Posterior 0.0 3.2 7.6 17.2 52.0 12.7 7.3 
t-value 0.0 6.1 8.9 13.9 312 10.9 8.1 
West 
Prior 5.9 11.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 14.7 8.8 
Expert 1.9 12.3 10.3 23.3 14.0 13.6 24.6 
Posterior 2.2 6.5 8.1 14.6 31.5 20.7 16.4 
t-value 2.4 3.5 3.6 5.0 7.5 5.4 4.3 
" Rows show the probability estimates over the intervals I-VII. For convenience, we repeat 
the prior from table 4 and list a simunary statistic of the expert opinion using the arithmetic 
mean of all probabilities supplied by experts in the respective regions. The row "posterior" 
gives the mean estimate of the posterior obtained in a Monte Carlo of 1000 iterations and 
the row "t-value" reports the corresponding t-value. 
Table 17. Loss of APM, Year 1, Change in Yield, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 0.0 0.0 6.1 6.1 13.1 61.6 13.1 
Expert 0.0 0.0 1.9 9.0 23.9 62.7 2.5 
Posterior 0.0 0.0 8.7 8.0 15.8 59.1 8.4 
t-value 0.0 0.0 6.2 6.0 8.9 26.6 7.0 
Central 
Prior 5.8 6.4 7.0 7.6 8.3 64.9 0.0 
Expert 8.0 6.8 11.6 29.2 15.1 29.2 0.0 
Posterior 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.8 9.1 57.1 0.0 
t-value 7.4 7.6 7.9 7.8 8.5 29.2 0.0 
West 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 64.7 5.9 
Expert 6.7 5.6 3.5 42 7.2 68.5 4.3 
Posterior 5.3 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 66.0 5.4 
t-value 9.1 10.5 11.0 11.2 11.1 62.8 11.7 
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Table 18. Loss of APM, Year 1, Change in Allocation to Fresh, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n m IV V VI VII 
East 
Prior 0.0 5.0 15.0 30.0 30.0 15.0 5.0 
Expert 0.0 1.8 4.4 19.0 23.8 39.4 11.7 
Posterior 0.0 0.8 4.8 17.9 32.2 27.7 16.5 
t-value 0.0 2.1 3.9 6.3 7.4 6.0 3.6 
Central 
Prior 0.0 6.1 11.7 14.4 47.8 20.0 0.0 
Expert 0.0 6.9 26.1 41.3 21.0 4.7 0.0 
Posterior 0.0 9.7 15.3 16.9 44.8 13.3 0.0 
t-value 0.0 7.3 10.5 11.5 23.3 11.4 0.0 
West 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 17.6 41.2 17.6 5.9 
Expert 3.9 4.3 7.6 6.3 14.6 59.7 3.6 
Posterior 1.2 2.0 2.6 9.3 36.2 29.9 18.8 
t-value 1.3 1.4 1.3 2.5 4.4 3.6 2.0 
Table 19. Loss of OP, Year 1, Change in Cost, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n in IV V VI VII 
East 
Prior 5.9 5.9 11.8 11.8 29.4 23.5 11.8 
Expert 8.8 15.0 2.2 6.9 11.5 22.7 32.9 
Posterior 2.6 3.5 8.3 9.5 28.3 28.7 19.0 
t-value 2.1 2.2 3.3 3.4 6.0 5.9 4.0 
Central 
Prior 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 10.0 
Expert 0.0 0.9 4.5 19.8 19.8 12.7 42.2 
Posterior 0.0 3.4 3.8 8.3 18.3 53.3 12.9 
t-value 0.0 4.3 4.3 6.5 10.0 23.4 8.0 
West 
Prior 11.8 23.5 35.3 11.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 
Expert 2.3 5.9 7.6 16.3 22.3 21.3 24.3 
Posterior 0.3 2.7 14.4 13.5 12.0 17.2 39.9 
t-value 1.2 1.9 2.4 1.8 1.4 1.6 2.6 
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Table 20. Loss of OP, Year 1, Change in Yield, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n m IV V VI VII 
East 
Prior 8.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 14.7 11.8 5.9 
Expert 8.6 13.3 16.7 18.4 11.6 22.6 9.0 
Posterior 5.7 9.5 16.0 30.4 16.7 14.2 7.4 
t-value 5.4 7.2 9.4 15.2 9.9 9.4 6.4 
Central 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 11.8 52.9 11.8 
Expert 24.3 17.3 25.5 12.6 12.6 6.8 0.9 
Posterior 13.0 10.1 8.8 7.9 13.9 41.6 4.7 
t-value 5.6 5.2 5.0 4.7 6.8 15.2 5.1 
West 
Prior 2-9 5.9 8.8 11.8 11.8 41.2 17.6 
Expert 9.3 12.3 13.3 22.3 15.6 26.3 0.9 
Posterior 15.6 16.9 17.5 15.9 11.6 20.0 2.5 
t-value 2.5 3.2 3.5 3.8 3.6 5.5 3.2 
Table 21. Loss of OP, Year 1, Change in Allocation to Fresh, SPR - 0.13 
Expert I n m IV V VI VII 
East 
Prior 11.8 23.5 29.4 11.8 8.8 8.8 5.9 
Expert 22.7 10.3 15.3 12.6 8.4 28.8 1.8 
Posterior 9.0 21.8 30.1 12.8 9.7 9.9 6.7 
t-value 3.1 5.1 6.8 3.7 3.2 3.3 2.6 
Central 
Prior 10.0 30.0 30.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
Expert 39.9 26.9 24.5 5.7 2.1 0.9 0.0 
Posterior 16.4 36.0 27.7 11.2 6.2 2.4 0.0 
t-value 10.2 18.3 16.2 9.3 6.9 4.5 0.0 
West 
Prior 2.9 8.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 
Expert 10.9 15.3 16.0 15.6 14.3 22.0 5.9 
Posterior 8.5 17.0 17.3 20.2 23.9 9.3 3.7 
t-value 2.3 4.4 4.7 5.7 6.9 4.4 3.3 
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Table 22. Loss of APM, Year 5, Change in Cost, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 5.9 8.8 11.8 29-4 23.5 11.8 8-8 
Expert 2.2 40.9 13.5 13-8 10.7 5.6 13.4 
Posterior 11.9 14.3 15.9 30-1 17.7 6.7 3.5 
t-value 2.1 2.4 2.8 4.6 3.5 2.3 1.8 
Central 
Prior 10.0 50.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 
Expert 15.1 24.5 18.6 15.1 15.1 11.6 0.0 
Posterior 7.6 46.9 21.5 11.5 6.0 6.5 0.0 
t-value 10.4 18.3 13.3 9.9 10.4 0.0 
West 
Prior 10.0 10.0 10.0 30.0 20.0 15.0 5.0 
Expert 2.0 5.2 9.4 17.1 20.0 26.2 20-0 
Posterior 1.5 2.8 4.0 18.6 22.6 29-3 21-3 
t-value 2.5 2.7 2-9 4.9 4.6 4.8 3.0 
Table 23. Loss of APM, Year 5, Change in Yield, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 5.9 8.8 17.6 35.3 17.6 8.8 5.9 
Expert 4.8 3.7 9.5 15.3 16.6 48.3 1.8 
Posterior 1.2 3.1 8.6 28.4 23.6 17.7 17.3 
t-value 1.1 1.5 2.4 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.0 
Central 
Prior 5.7 6.3 6.8 7.4 11.4 51.1 11.4 
Expert 3.3 3.3 7.9 26.6 12.6 36.0 10.3 
Posterior 6.2 6.7 7.2 7.8 11.7 50.4 10.0 
t-value 8.8 9.2 9.6 9.8 12.0 32.5 10.5 
West 
Prior 5.0 6.0 9.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 20.0 
Expert 7.4 8.8 8.8 10.6 15.7 44.8 3.8 
Posterior 8.5 8.9 12.2 12-2 21.5 25.6 11.2 
t-value 4.0 4.4 5-4 5.7 8.1 9.8 6.7 
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Table 24, Loss of APM, Year 5, Change in Allocation to Fresh, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 8.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 8.8 5.9 
Expert 15.3 2.5 5.2 6.8 14.3 52.6 3.3 
Posterior 2.0 7.2 20.1 18.9 17.4 16.9 17.6 
t-value 1.2 1.9 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.7 
Central 
Prior 5.9 11.8 35.3 17.6 11.8 8.8 8.8 
Expert J.J 13.8 24.3 15.0 22.0 11.4 10.3 
Posterior 4.8 10.6 34.4 18.2 12.5 9.6 9.9 
t-value 12.7 20.0 43.9 30.5 25.2 22.5 24.1 
West 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 17.6 47.1 11.8 
Expert 5.6 6.3 6.6 8.3 10.3 52.0 10.9 
Posterior 5.1 5.5 5.7 5.8 17.9 48.7 11.3 
t-value 7.4 7.5 8.2 8.1 14.9 30.4 11.0 
Table 25. Loss of OP, Year 5, Change in Cost, SPR = 0.13 
Expert 1 n in IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 5.9 8.8 8.8 11.8 11.8 35.3 17.6 
Expert 2.5 12.2 7.6 13.8 12.2 8.3 43.4 
Posterior 2.6 5.1 6.1 9.4 10.4 39.0 27.4 
t-value 2.1 2.9 3.0 3.6 3.8 8.3 5.9 
Central 
Prior 5.9 8.8 8.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 
Expert 5.6 15.0 5.6 0.9 5.6 12.6 54.7 
Posterior 3.7 6.6 7.2 10.4 16.8 32.0 23.2 
t-value 5.1 6.7 7.0 8.3 10.7 15.6 12.5 
West 
Prior 11.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 11.8 11.8 5.9 
Expert 1.6 2.9 4.3 8.9 16.0 24.0 42.3 
Posterior 0.2 0.7 2.4 11.3 12.6 26.8 45.9 
t-value 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.9 2.4 
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Table 26. Loss of OP, Year 5, Change in Yield, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 5.9 8.8 17.6 35.3 17.6 8.8 5.9 
Expert 11.1 13.7 12.0 19.6 10.7 29.0 3.9 
Posterior 4.9 8.3 17.3 36.0 18.3 9.3 5.9 
t-value 2-5 3.2 5.1 8.2 5.3 3.6 2.9 
Central 
Prior 5.0 10.0 15.0 40.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 
Expert 16.5 30.5 32.1 13.4 5.6 0.9 0.9 
Posterior 8.4 13.8 18.0 38.9 11.6 6.6 2.6 
t-value 8.5 12.0 13.4 24.4 11-1 8.6 5.7 
West 
Prior 5.0 10.0 15.0 40.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 
Expert 16.5 30.5 32.1 13.4 5.6 0.9 0.9 
Posterior 8.4 13.8 18.0 38.9 11.6 6.6 2.6 
t-value 8.5 12.0 13.4 24.4 11.1 8.6 5.7 
Table 27. Loss of OP, Year 5, Change in Allocation to Fresh, SPR = 0.13 
Expert I n m rv V VI vn 
East 
Prior 17.6 35.3 14.7 11.8 8.8 5.9 5.9 
Expert 12.8 17.9 16.7 9.9 12.4 26.4 3.9 
Posterior 7.8 27.0 15.6 14.6 12.8 9.8 12.4 
t-value 3.6 6.1 4.3 3.9 3.4 2.9 3.1 
Central 
Prior 17.6 35.3 11.8 11.8 8.8 8.8 5.9 
Expert 43.0 19.6 7.9 3.3 0.9 10.3 15.0 
Posterior 20.2 36.7 11.5 11.1 8.1 7.7 4.7 
t-value 13.8 21.4 10.7 10.5 8.9 9.0 7.3 
West 
Prior 8.8 8.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 5.9 
Expert 8.6 12.6 21.6 16.3 11.9 21.3 7.6 
Posterior 7.3 8.0 17.1 30.1 18.7 12.6 6.3 
t-value 4.3 4.9 7.4 10.9 8.3 6.4 4.5 
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Table 28. Loss of APM, Year 1, Change in Cost, SPR = 0.09 
1 n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 8.8 11.8 35.3 17.6 11.8 8-8 5.9 
Experts 1.5 33.0 15.0 15-4 16.8 15-0 J.J 
Posterior 8.5 11.6 35.1 17.8 12.0 9.0 6.1 
t-value 3.9 4.4 9.5 5.9 4.7 3.9 2.9 
Central 
Prior 0.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 10.0 5.0 
Experts 0.0 0.9 8.0 21.0 32.8 15.1 22.2 
Posterior 0.0 4-0 8.7 18.6 51.3 11.3 6.1 
t-value 0.0 6.8 9.4 14.2 30.7 10.5 7.4 
West 
Prior 5.9 11.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 14.7 8.8 
Experts 1.9 12.3 10.3 23.3 14.0 13.6 24.6 
Posterior 3.8 8.8 9.8 16-1 31.0 18.0 12.6 
t-value 2.6 3.8 4.1 5.1 7.4 4.9 3.8 
Table 29. Loss of APM, Year 1, Change in Yield, SPR = 0.09 
1 n ffl IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 0.0 0.0 6.1 6.1 13-1 61.6 13.1 
Experts 0.0 0.0 1.9 9.0 23.9 62.7 2.5 
Posterior 0.0 0.0 7.6 7.1 14.4 60.3 10.6 
t-value 0.0 0.0 5.7 5.7 8-7 26.5 8.0 
Central 
Prior 5.8 6.4 7.0 7.6 8-3 64.9 0.0 
Experts 8.0 6.S 11.6 29.2 15-1 29.2 0.0 
Posterior 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.2 8-7 60.9 0.0 
t-value 7.0 7.4 7.6 7.6 8-0 34.2 0.0 
West 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 64.7 5.9 
Experts 6.7 5.6 3.5 4.2 7.2 68.5 4.3 
Posterior 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 5-9 65.1 5.8 
t-value 11.0 11.5 11.1 11.3 12-0 64.1 12.1 
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Table 30. Loss of APM, Year 1, Change in Allocation to Fresh, SPR — 0.09 
I n in IV V VI VII 
East 
Prior 0.0 5.0 15.0 30-0 30.0 15.0 5.0 
Experts 0.0 1.8 4.4 19.0 23.8 39.4 11.7 
Posterior 0.0 2.3 9.2 24-2 32.6 21.8 9.9 
t-value 0.0 2.3 4.2 7.4 7.7 5.4 3.0 
Central 
Prior 0.0 6.1 11.7 14.4 47.8 20.0 0.0 
Experts 0.0 6.9 26.1 41.3 21.0 4.7 0.0 
Posterior 0.0 7.9 13.6 15.7 46.4 16.4 0.0 
t-value 0.0 6.8 10.0 11.0 24.2 12.0 0.0 
West 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 17.6 41-2 17.6 5.9 
Experts 3.9 4.3 7.6 6.3 14-6 59.7 3.6 
Posterior 3.0 3.8 4.2 13.6 39.6 23.9 11.9 
t-value 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.7 5.0 3.3 1.8 
Table 31. Loss of OP, Year 1, Change in Cost, SPR = 0.09 
I n EQ IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 5.9 5.9 11.8 11.8 29.4 23.5 11.8 
Experts 8.8 15.0 2.2 6.9 11.5 22.7 32.9 
Posterior 4.2 4.6 9.8 10.8 29.1 26.3 15.3 
t-value 2.3 2.4 3.4 3.6 6.1 5.5 3.8 
Central 
Prior 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 10.0 
Experts 0.0 0.9 4.5 19.8 19.8 12.7 42.2 
Posterior 0.0 4.2 4.5 9.1 19.1 51.7 11.5 
t-value 0.0 4.4 4.3 6.8 10.0 21.0 7.3 
West 
Prior 11.8 23.5 35.3 11.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 
Experts 2.3 5.9 7.6 16.3 22.3 21.3 24.3 
Posterior 2.6 10.0 27.0 15.4 10.9 13.5 20.6 
t-value 1.5 2.3 3.1 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.7 
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Table 32. Loss of OP, Year 1, Change in Yield, SPR = 0.09 
I n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 8.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 14.7 11.8 5.9 
Experts 8.6 13.3 16.7 18.4 11.6 22.6 9.0 
Posterior 7.3 10.5 16.8 29.9 15.7 13.1 6.8 
t-value 6.3 7.6 10.0 14.6 9.6 8.5 6.3 
Central 
Prior 4.1 5.3 6.5 7.6 11.8 52.9 11.8 
Experts 24.3 17.3 25.5 12.6 12.6 6.8 0.9 
Posterior 6.7 7.5 8.5 9.3 13.1 47.6 7.4 
t-value 4.0 4.3 4.6 5.1 6.1 15.7 5.0 
West 
Prior 2.9 5.9 8.8 11.8 11.8 41.2 17.6 
Experts 9.3 12.3 13.3 22.3 15.6 26.3 0.9 
Posterior 8.2 11.8 13.7 15.1 12.9 30.9 7.4 
t-value 1.9 2.8 3.3 3.9 3.6 6.9 3.7 
Table 33. Loss of OP, Year 1, Change in Allocation to Fresh, SPR = 0.09 
I n m IV V VI vn 
Prior 11.8 23.5 29.4 11.8 8.8 8.8 5.9 
Experts 22.7 10.3 15.3 12.6 8.4 28.8 1.8 
Posterior 10.5 22.5 29.5 12.1 9.3 9.5 6.5 
t-value 3.5 5.3 6.2 3.7 3.1 3.1 2.6 
Central 
Prior 10.0 30.0 30.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
Experts 39.9 26.9 24.5 5.7 2.1 0.9 0.0 
Posterior 13.2 33.2 29.0 13.1 8.0 3.5 0.0 
t-value 8.7 16.5 15.3 9.5 7.7 4.9 0.0 
West 
Prior 2.9 8.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 
Experts 10.9 15.3 16.0 15.6 14.3 22.0 5.9 
Posterior 5.6 12.9 14.6 19.6 27.0 13.4 6.9 
t-value 2.1 3.8 4.4 5.3 6.9 5.1 3.9 
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Table 34. Loss of APM, Year 5, Change in Cost, SPR = 0.09 
I n m TV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 5.9 8.8 11.8 29.4 23.5 11.8 8.8 
Experts 2.2 40.9 13.5 13.8 10.7 5.6 13.4 
Posterior 9.2 11.7 13.9 29-5 20.7 9.0 6.0 
t-value 2.0 2.4 2.7 4.7 3.9 2.4 2.1 
Central 
Prior 10.0 50.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 
Experts 15.1 24.5 18.6 15.1 15.1 11.6 0.0 
Posterior 8.S 48.5 20.7 10.7 5.5 5.8 0.0 
t-value 11.5 35.2 17.9 12-5 9.1 9.4 0.0 
West 
Prior 10.0 10.0 10.0 30.0 20.0 15.0 5.0 
Experts 2.0 5.2 9.4 17.1 20.0 26.2 20.0 
Posterior 4.2 5.9 6.9 25.6 23.1 22.7 11.6 
t-value 2.7 3.0 3.0 5.6 4.9 4.6 2.5 
Table 35. Loss of APM, Year 5, Change in Yield, SPR = 0.09 
I n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 5.9 8.8 17.6 35.3 17.6 8.8 5.9 
Experts 4.8 3.7 9.5 15.3 16.6 48.3 1.8 
Posterior 3.0 5.5 13.0 32.3 21.2 13.6 11.3 
t-value 1.4 1.7 2.5 4.1 2.8 2.0 1.7 
Central 
Prior 5.7 6.3 6.8 7.4 11.4 51.1 11.4 
Experts 3.3 3.3 7.9 26.6 12.6 36.0 10.3 
Posterior 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.6 11.6 50.6 10.7 
t-value 8.7 8.9 9.3 9.6 12.4 32.5 11.0 
West 
Prior 5.0 6.0 9.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 20.0 
Experts 7.4 8.8 8.8 10.6 15.7 44.8 3.8 
Posterior 6.8 7.5 10.6 11.2 20.7 27.9 15.3 
t-value 3.8 4.2 5.2 5.6 8.1 10.0 7.1 
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Table 36. Loss of APM, Year 5, Change in Allocation to Fresh, SPR = 0.09 
I n m IV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 8.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 8.8 5.9 
Experts 15.3 2.5 5.2 6-8 14.3 52.6 
Posterior 4.6 11.8 24.7 18.5 15.1 13.6 11.6 
t-value 1.4 2.1 3.1 2-4 2.0 1.8 1.4 
Central 
Prior 5.9 11.8 17.6 11.8 8.8 8.8 
Experts 3.3 13.8 24.3 15.0 22.0 11.4 10.3 
Posterior 5.4 11.2 34.8 17.9 12.1 9.2 9.4 
t-value 14.4 20.9 45.8 30.9 24.0 21.5 22.7 
West 
Prior 5.9 5.9 5.9 5-9 17.6 47.1 11.8 
Experts 5.6 6.3 6.6 8.3 10.3 52.0 10.9 
Posterior 5.6 5.8 5-8 5.8 17.7 47.6 11.8 
t-value 7.6 7.8 8.1 8.2 14.6 30.5 11.4 
Table 37. Loss of OP, Year 5, Change in Cost, SPR = 0.09 
I n m rv V VI VII 
East 
Prior 5.9 8.8 8.8 11.8 11.8 35.3 17.6 
Experts 2.5 12.2 7.6 13.8 12.2 8.3 43.4 
Posterior 4.2 6.9 7.5 10-7 11.2 37.1 22.5 
t-value 2.5 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.8 8.1 5.3 
Central 
Prior 5.9 8.8 8.8 11.8 17.6 29-4 17.6 
Experts 5.6 15.0 5.6 0.9 5.6 12-6 54.7 
Posterior 4.7 7.7 8.1 11.1 17.3 30.8 20.4 
t-value 5.6 6.8 7.4 8.6 10.7 16-6 11.9 
West 
Prior 11.8 11.8 17.6 29.4 11.8 11-8 5.9 
Experts 1.6 2.9 4.3 8.9 16.0 24-0 42-3 
Posterior 2.2 3.9 8.4 22.4 15.5 23-3 24-3 
t-value 1.1 1.3 1.7 2.4 1.6 1.9 1.6 
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Table 38. Loss of OP, Year 5, Change in Yield, SPR = 0.09 
I n m TV V VI vn 
East 
Prior 5.9 8.8 17.6 35.3 17.6 8.8 5.9 
Experts 11.1 13.7 12.0 19.6 10.7 29.0 3.9 
Posterior 5.5 8.5 17.4 35.2 17.9 9.3 6.2 
t-value 2.8 3.6 5.3 8.4 5.4 3.6 3.0 
Central 
Prior 5.0 10.0 15.0 40.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 
Experts 16.5 30.5 32.1 13.4 5.6 0.9 0.9 
Posterior 6.6 11.9 16.7 39.7 13.3 8.2 3.7 
t-value 7.6 10.6 13.2 24.8 12.5 9.4 6.1 
West 
Prior 4.0 6.0 20.0 40.0 20.0 6.0 4.0 
Experts 12.1 16.8 11.0 15.3 18.5 25.0 1.3 
Posterior 4.8 6.7 20.1 38.8 19.5 6.1 4.1 
t-value 1.4 1.7 3.6 5.7 3.6 1.8 1.4 
Table 39. Loss of OP, Year 5, Change in Allocation to Fresh, SPR = 0.09 
I n m IV V VI VII 
East 
Prior 17.6 35.3 14.7 11.8 8.8 8.8 2.9 
Experts 12.8 17.9 16.7 9.9 12.4 26.4 3.9 
Posterior 11.8 30.6 15.6 13.4 11.1 12.4 5.1 
t-value 5.4 9.3 5.4 5.0 4.4 4.5 2.8 
Central 
Prior 17.6 35.3 11.8 11.8 8.8 8.8 5.9 
Experts 43.0 19.6 7.9 3.3 0.9 10.3 15.0 
Posterior 19.0 36.0 11.6 11.4 8.5 8.2 5.3 
t-value 13.3 21.6 10.8 10.7 9.0 9.2 7.2 
West 
Prior 8.8 8.8 17.6 29.4 17.6 11.8 5.9 
Experts 8.6 12.6 21.6 16.3 11.9 21.3 7.6 
Posterior 8.2 8.4 17.4 29.5 18.2 12.2 6.2 
t-value 4.7 5.1 7.3 10.9 7.9 6.2 4.4 
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Table 40. Distribution of Marginal Cost Changes in $/lb., SPR — 0.13 
East Central West 
APM Year 1 
Average 0.0024 0.0104 0.0065 
Standard Dev. 0.0020 0.0059 0.0055 
Skewness 1.3766 1.3312 2.0444 
Minimum ' -0.0006 0.0019 0.0000 
l^Quartile 0.0012 0.0067 0.0029 
Median 0.0020 0.0085 0.0045 
3"* Qnartile 0-0034 0.0132 0.0078 
Maximum 0.0141 0.0316 0.0325 
OP Year 1 
Average 0.0119 0.0184 0.0177 
Standard Dev. 0.0053 0.0070 0.0085 
Skewness 1.0511 0.8651 0.8260 
Minimum 0.0032 0.0058 0.0063 
l '^Quartile 0.0077 0.0137 0-0108 
Median 0.0105 0.0175 0.0159 
3"* Quartile 0.0145 0.0222 0.0245 
Maximum 0.0340 0.0409 0-0449 
APM Year 5 
Average 0.0058 0.0089 0-0116 
Standard Dev. 0.0039 0.0058 0-0079 
Skewness 2.0138 1.4677 1-3553 
Minimum 0.0002 0.0011 0-0013 
1" Quartile 0.0032 0.0052 0.0058 
Median 0.0046 0.0073 0.0089 
3"* Quartile 0.0072 0.0110 0.0152 
Maximum 0.0309 0.0344 0.0449 
OP Years 
Average 0.0118 0.0161 0-0140 
Standard Dev. 0.0052 0.0062 0.0066 
Skewness 1.0418 0.8749 1.3680 
Minimum 0.0026 0.0044 0.0040 
1®^ Quartile 0.0077 0.0109 0.0094 
Median 0.0110 0.0150 0.0123 
3"* Quartile 0.0145 0.0193 0.0173 
Maximum 0.0362 0.0409 0.0449 
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Table 41. Distribution of Mai^iaal Cost Changes in $/lb., SPR = 0,09 
East Central West 
APM Year 1 
Average 0.0029 0.0092 0.0085 
Standard Dev. 0.0022 0.0054 0.0070 
Skewness 1.3041 1.5507 1.6471 
Minimum -0.0006 0.0019 0.0006 
l" Quartile 0.0013 0.0052 0.0040 
Median 0.0022 0.0070 0.0058 
3"* Qioartile 0.0036 0.0112 0.0100 
Maximum 0.0141 0.0316 0.0425 
OP Year 1 
Average 0.0127 0.0158 0.0124 
Standard Dev. 0.0060 0.0064 0.0072 
Skewness 1.0510 0.9995 1.0760 
Minimum 0.0032 0.0034 0.0023 
1® Quartile 0.0082 0.0119 0.0070 
Median 0.0114 0.0148 0.0100 
3"* Quartile 0.0168 0.0191 0.0162 
Maximum 0.0340 0.0409 0.0416 
APM Year 5 
Average 0.0082 0.0090 0.0101 
Standard Dev. 0.0045 0.0057 0.0075 
Skewness 1.3534 1.4297 1.6185 
Minimum 0.0012 0.0011 0.0019 
1®* Quartile 0.0048 0.0052 0.0050 
Median 0.0068 0.0069 0.0076 
3"* Quartile 0.0105 0.0105 0.0128 
Maximum 0.0269 0.0336 0.0434 
OP Year 5 
Average 0.0121 0.0153 0.0124 
Standard Dev. 0.0055 0.0062 0.0066 
Skewness 1.1114 0.9466 1.6164 
Minimvun 0.0026 0.0044 0.0037 
1®* Quartile 0.0078 0.0109 0.0080 
Median 0.0114 0.0138 0.0107 
3"* Quartile 0.0148 0.0192 0.0144 
Maximum 0.0340 0.0379 0.0434 
Table 42. Statistics of the Distribution of Economic Surplus Changes in $ mill., SPR = 0.13 
Short Run Long Run 
APM OP OP OP APM OP OP OP 
r=0 r=1.25% r=2.5% r=0 r=1.25% r=2.5% 
Average -8.32 -24.65 -14.30 -2.05 -42.06 -60.62 -44.35 -28.62 
Std. Dev. 5.80 20.22 20.91 20.92 26.16 34.95 36.48 36.65 
Skewness -2.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.17 -1.38 -0.46 -0.27 -0.54 
Minimum -35.46 -85.79 -80.70 -79.02 -155.71 213.85 -180.23 -170.45 
1®' Quartile -9.56 -38.24 -28.23 -16.28 -54.57 -78.96 -67.68 -49.78 
Median -6.45 -24.42 -13.42 -1.22 -33.69 -58.38 -42.82 -25.33 
3"  ^Quartile -4.82 -10.28 -0.61 12.72 -22.85 -37.95 -18.29 -2.94 
Maximum -1.23 35.48 47.84 59.43 -8.45 60.47 55.89 63.72 
Table 43. Statistics of the Distribution of Economic Surplus Changes in $ mill., SPR = 0.09 
Short Run Long Run 
APM OP OP OP APM OP OP OP 
o
 
II r=1.25% t=2.5% o II r=1.25% r=2.5% 
Average -10.39 -18.55 -7.49 3.99 -37.96 -53.97 -38.12 -23.20 
Std. Dev. 7.34 20.44 20.16 20.45 24.78 35.13 37.06 36.68 
Skewness -1.63 -0.07 -0.21 0.10 -1.62 -0.55 -0.53 0.48 
Minimum -46.25 -95.38 -86.51 -67.11 -148.79 180.33 -175.99 -158.12 
1"' Quartile -12.15 -31.78 -21.17 -8.86 -48.05 -74.90 -58.84 -43.70 
Median -7.52 -19.06 -6.36 AAl -29.24 -49.90 -34.53 -20.43 
3"* Quartile -5.43 -4.93 5.57 18.23 -21.17 -30.25 -13.83 0.94 
Maximum -1.85 42.89 56.46 71.26 -9.37 50.16 62.62 72.71 
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Table 44. Change in WTP ~ N(Q,0.0004), SPR = 0.13* 
Year 1 Year 5 
Cell Probabilities Test Statistics Cell Probabilities Test Statistics 
APM OP FSD SSD APM OP FSD SSD 
0.00 0.20 -14.91 -14.91 0.05 0.15 -7.45 -7.45 
0.00 0.20 -22.25 -17.50 0.09 0.11 -7.16 -7.72 
0.05 0.15 -24.50 -20.55 0.05 0.15 -11.32 -8.59 
0.07 0.13 -25.65 -22.90 0.07 0.14 -13.78 -9.68 
0.13 0.08 -22.90 -24.24 0.07 0.13 -16.19 -11.00 
0.15 0.05 -18.58 -24.65 0.11 0.09 -15.24 -12.18 
0.19 0.01 -11.32 -24.73 0.13 0.07 -13.17 -12.80 
0.18 0.02 -3.80 -24.65 0.15 0.05 -9.06 -13.16 
0.18 0.02 7.01 -24.38 0.18 0.03 -0.89 -13.18 
0.05 0.15 0.00 -19.60 0.11 0.09 0.00 -11.84 
" Negative test statistics suggest that the distribution after a ban on APM is preferred over 
the distribution after a ban on OPs in the FSD or SSD sense, respectively. The 0.01 critical 
value for the test is 3.29. 
Table 45. Change in WTP ~ N(1.2S%,0.0004), SPR = 0.13 
Year 1 Year 5 
Cell Probabilities Test Statistics Cell Probabilities Test Statistics 
APM OP FSD SSD APM OP FSD SSD 
0.00 0.20 -14.76 -14.76 0.09 0.12 -2.24 -2.24 
0.05 0.15 -16.88 -15.97 0.08 0.12 -3.91 -2.66 
0.07 0.13 -17.57 -17.32 0.07 0.13 -6.25 -3.51 
0.12 0.09 -15.06 -18.07 0.09 0.11 -6.94 -4.32 
0.15 0.05 -10.46 -18.22 0.11 0.09 -6.17 -4.86 
0.17 0.03 -4.20 -18.11 0.13 0.07 -3.47 -5.05 
0.18 0.02 3.51 -17.84 0.15 0.05 0.78 -4.94 
0.17 0.03 11.74 -17.31 0.16 0.04 7.60 -4.59 
0.10 0.11 14.91 -14.58 0.12 0.08 13.27 -3.74 
0.00 0.20 0.00 -7.03 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.13 
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Table 46. Change in WTP ~ N(2.5%,0.0a04), SPR = 0.13 
Yearl Year 5 
Cell Probabilities Test Statistics Cell Probabilities Test Statistics 
APM OP FSD SSD APM OP FSD SSD 
0.05 0.16 -8.20 -820 0.12 0.08 2.68 2.68 
0.08 0.12 -8.61 -8.69 0.10 0.10 1.68 2.62 
0.13 0.07 -4.59 -8.75 0.10 0.10 1.37 2.51 
0.16 0.04 1.37 -8.43 0.11 0.09 1.83 2.50 
0.17 0.03 7.96 -7.97 0.13 0.07 4.29 2.65 
0.18 0.02 15.43 -7.34 0.14 0.06 8.40 3.10 
0.17 0.03 23.32 -6.31 0.15 0.05 13.57 3.73 
0.06 0.14 22.36 -1.32 0.13 0.07 18.67 4.83 
0.00 0.20 14.91 3.53 0.03 0.17 14.91 7.35 
0.00 0.20 0.00 7.48 0.00 0.20 0.00 9.94 
Table 47. Change in WTP ~ N(0,0.0004), SPR = 0.09 
Year 1 Year 5 
Cell Probabilities Test Statistics Cell Probabilities Test Statistics 
APM OP FSD SSD APM OP FSD SSD 
0.01 0.19 -13.71 -13.71 0.05 0.15 -7.75 -7.75 
0.06 0.14 -14.87 -14.46 0.07 0.13 -9.06 -8.42 
0.05 0.15 -17.66 -15.87 0.06 0.14 -11.81 -9.58 
0.09 0.11 -17.53 -17.08 0.08 0.13 -13.33 -10.71 
0.14 0.06 -13.77 -17.75 0.09 0.11 -14.22 -11.81 
0.15 0.05 -9.31 -17.86 0.12 0.08 -12.60 -12.42 
0.17 0.03 -3.42 -17.77 0.14 0.07 -10.05 -12.81 
0.19 0.02 5.59 -17.52 0.16 0.04 -4.81 -12.88 
0.15 0.05 14.91 -16.62 0.16 0.04 2.61 -12.71 
0.00 0.20 0.00 -9.59 0.08 0.12 0.00 -10.65 
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Table 48. Change in WTP ~ N(1.2S%,0.0004), SPR = 0.09 
Year 1 Year 5 
Cell Probabilities Test Statistics Cell Probabilities Test Statistics 
APM OP FSD SSD APM OP FSD SSD 
0.05 0.15 -7.53 -7.53 0.08 0.12 -2.39 -2.39 
0.07 0.13 -8.50 -8.01 0.08 0.12 -4.02 -2.90 
0.10 0.10 -7.61 -8.47 0.09 0.11 -4.88 -3.41 
0.13 0.07 -4.29 -8.54 0.09 0.12 -5.93 -3.98 
0.17 0.03 1.83 -8.25 0.12 0.08 -4.29 -4.24 
0.17 0.03 8.49 -7.77 0.13 0.07 -2.01 -4.31 
0.18 0.02 16.59 -7.18 0.15 0.05 2.59 -4.17 
0.13 0.07 22.36 -5.13 0.15 0.05 8.61 -3.74 
0.00 0.20 14.91 -0.76 0.12 0.08 14.91 -2.48 
0.00 0.20 0.00 4.33 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.81 
Table 49. Change in WTP ~ N(23%,0.0004), SPR = 0.09 
Year 1 Year 5 
Cell Probabilities Test Statistics Cell Probabilities Test Statistics 
APM OP FSD SSD APM OP FSD SSD 
0.10 0.10 -0.60 -0.60 0.11 0.09 1.34 1.34 
0.12 0.08 1.34 -0.27 0.11 0.09 1.90 1.55 
0.15 0.05 5.76 0.44 0.09 0.11 0.68 1.58 
0.16 0.04 10.86 1.21 0.13 0.07 3.38 1.71 
0.18 0.02 17.71 2.13 0.13 0.07 6.08 2.10 
0.18 0.02 25.01 3.15 0.16 0.05 11.23 2.65 
0.13 0.07 29.28 7.14 0.14 0.06 16.30 3.49 
0.00 0.20 22.36 13.16 0.12 0.08 21.35 5.08 
0.00 0.20 14.91 15.97 0.01 0.19 14.91 8.11 
0.00 0.20 0.00 17.57 0.00 0.20 0.00 10.86 
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Appendix 3A: A Note on the Correlation Structure 
This appendix discusses a particular form of k{6 | = y). Although we use a more general 
form in the calculation of the posterior, we find that this exposition aids in understanding the 
choice of the correlation coefficient. We choose 7c{G | = y) to be a linear combination of 
the S's opinion and the expert's opinion for each interval. 
Suppose S reports his prior in the same form as the experts, i.e., as probabilities over 
the same partition 0^ as 
p" ={(px,p\,-,p\').p] - Vvm" ^  = V,. 
Let =y) = &[^* p\ p* + (1 - 6) I ^ where is a AT x 1 vector of zeros with 
a one in the j-th entry and is a positive constant, h e (0,1). Then the joint distribution of k 
that is consistent with the prior /?* and the expectation of the expert's opinion //* is 
Px 
Pi M.e',e^)=b " \fi; ni -
0  0  • • •  
If we choose = p* for all experts i, then £[(^* ] = e\9  ^] and Var{9'^) = Var(j9f ). The 
//,* 0 0 0 
0  / / *  • 0  
second moment of ,9^ ) can be calculated as 
147 
£[(9*^*]=(i 2 -- A:) 2 
= (1 2 K) 
1 • (1 - 6)//, + bp^ (l//, + 2//, + • • • KMK ) 
2-(l-6)//, +6^,(1^"! +2//^ +-"Kfi^) 
K • (1 + bp^ (l//, + 2//2 + - • • ) 




sothatCov(tf',e,')=£[e'«*]-(£[l9*])' = (1 -6)£^9»)^] + »(£[|9»])' 
= (1—6)Far((9*) and the correlation results as Corr(^*,01^) = l—b. Hence the smaller the 
correlation that we choose, the larger the influence of the prior in the mixture. 
We elaborate fiirther on this last point by explicitly calculating the formula of the 
posterior for this particular case. The posterior for one expert is 
p ; ( 0 '  = j i s , / f , )  =  b p *  - ^ ( i - b ) g ,  
and using the law of conditional probability 
Prob^, I <9* = j) = 
Combining the assessment of several experts 
b + (l-b)^ 
P j )  
Prob(/f,). 
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f S ^ 
PToh(0' =j\S,H„H„...,H^)ozp';Yl bHl-b)^-





+ ( 1 - 3 ) ' 6 - ' 2 1 7  Yls.js,ig„j 
/si j|fs/-^I 
,v-1 .v 
+ • • • +  
/si 
Equation (2A. 1) shows that a larger b leads to a higher weight on S's opinion. It is evident 
that the weighing of experts versus S will depend on the number of experts in the 
assessment. The influence of the correlation coefBcient will hence depend on the number of 
expert opinions to be combined. 
149 
Appendix 3B: Expert Surv  ^Instrument 
Establishing Confidence in Expert Opinion in Pesticide Benefit Assessments 
This questionnaire consists of two parts; one will ask you about the impact of a removal of 
azinphos-methyl (Guthion), and the other will ask you about the impact of a removal of the 
entire group of organophosphorus pesticides. In each part we will ask you about inmiediate 
(short-run) impacts and long-run impacts. 
We are surveying U.S. apple production by region. You have been identified as an expert for 
the region West (CA, OR, WA). We summarized some key facts about apple production in 
the West of the United States. 
3-Year-Averages (1994-1995-1996) for Region West (CA, OR, WA): 
Acreage Yield Total Production Fresh Utilization 
(acres) Ob.) (mill- lb.) (%) 
California 35,367 26,433 933 35 
Oregon 8,600 18,600 160 74 
Washington 152,667 35,400 5,400 72 
West 196,633 33,021 6,493 67 
The following page gives you information about the organophosphorus insecticide use in the 
region. 
We urge you to complete all of the questions since this data will help to improve the 
confidence in expert opinion and help to understand the uncertainty involved for apple 
producers when certain pesticides become imavailable. 
Insecticide Use Data for Apples 
(Summarized from USDA-NASS "Agricultural Clieiiiical Usage; Fruit Summary"; data collected in 1995 and 1993) 
Mean taken from Trade Name %of mean no. of lb a.i. per rate of %of mean no. of lb a.i. per rate of 
1993 & 95 bearing applications acre per formulated bearing applications acre per formulated 
Survey acres treated application Insecticide acres treated application insecticide 
per acre per acre 
WEST California 
Azinphos-methyl Guthion 80.4 2.70 0.96 2.60 48.0 2.25 1.04 2.32 
Chlorpyrifos Lorsban 75.8 1.55 1.58 2.35 45.0 1.95 1.31 2.55 
Diazinon 10.8 1.63 1.50 3.17 47.5 1.75 1.41 2.16 
Dimethoate Cygon 20.1 1.38 1.40 1.02 20.0 1.90 0.53 1.00 
Malathion Malathon 21.3 2.95 0.78 1.52 
Methyl Parathion Penncap-M 19.4 1.53 1.47 2.30 7.5 1.35 1.35 1.82 
Mevinphos Phosdrin 27.7 1.10 0.38 0.43 
Phosmet Imidan 13.1 1.75 2.30 3.44 21.5 1.80 2.22 3.96 
Phosphamidon Dimecron 30.0 1.43 0.54 0.77 
Oregon Washington 
Azinphos-methyl Guthion 88.0 2.5 0.90 2.33 87.5 3.30 0.95 3.16 
Chlorpyrifos Lorsban 83.0 1.4 1.72 2.31 82.5 1.30 1.73 2.19 
Diazinon 6.0 1.95 1.39 5.32 2.5 1.20 1.69 2.03 
Dimethoate Cygon 31.0 1.15 1.82 1.05 19.5 1.10 1.86 1.03 
Malathion Malalhon 16.5 2.3 0.69 1.55 26.5 3.60 0.87 1.50 
Methyl Parathion Penncap-M 31.5 2.05 1.67 3.44 21.5 1.20 1.39 1.65 
Mevinphos Phosdrin 28.0 1.10 0.38 0.43 
Phosmet Imidan 23.5 1.7 2.16 3.75 10.5 1.75 2.53 2.61 
Phosphamidon Dimecron 12.0 1.45 0.51 0.75 38.0 1.40 0.57 0.79 
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Removal of Azinphos-methyl (Guthion) 
SHORT RUN 
Q1-Q40. This section of questions asks you to provide your own probability assessment of 
the short-run impacts of the removal of azinphos-methyl. By short run, we mean the impacts 
on apple production in the first year after a hypothetical removal of azinphos-methyl. Your 
assignment of probabilities will provide information about how confident you are concerning 
changes to the apple industry resulting firom a ban. If you feel very certain about what will 
happen, you will assign a high probability to the interval that contains your expected change 
and low probabilities to the other intervals. However, if you have low confidence in your 
assessment, you might want to assign relatively high probability to several intervals. When 
doing so remember that some intervals are not as wide as others. 
For example, suppose that average sdeld in your state is 25,000 IbVacre. You think that 
following a ban of the pesticide in question, the average yield might possibly increase by 
more than 0.5 %; but, in your view, this has only a 5 percent probability or chance of actually 
occurring. For a change in yield of +/- 0.5 %, you assign a probability of 35%; for a yield 
change between 0.5 % and 1 %, you assign a probability of 40%; for a yield decrease 
between 1 % and 3 % you assign 20 % probability and for a yield decrease of more than 3 %, 
you assign a probability of zero. Your responses are entered in the following way: 
Probabilities 
1. Increase by more than 0.5 % 5% 
2. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % 35% 
3. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % 40% 
4. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % 20% 
5. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % 0% 
100% 
Please note that the sum of the probabilities should equal 100%. Also, probabilities for no 
change are to be included in the increase or decrease by less than 0.5 %. ff^ en answering 
questions concerning short-run impacts, please assume that prices for apples, pesticides etc. 
will stay constant. 
Please remember that economic considerations are important in the pest management 
decisions of a commercial grower. Therefore, he/she will not necessarily choose the same 
level of pest control. 
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Q1. Biidgets of apple production in your region show that the total pre-harvest cost 
of apple production is 1300 S/acre^ear. Insect pest control costs (including insecticides and 
miticides) are given at 170 S/acre^ear. Indicate the average percent change (+/-) of total 
cost in apple production in the next year if azinphos-methyl is no longer available. 
%. 
Q2-Q8. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that in the 
first year average pest control cost of apple production will 
Probabilities 
Q2. Decrease by more than 0.5 % % 
Q3. Decrease or increase by less than 0.5 % % 
Q4. Increase by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q5. Increase by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q6. Increase by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q7. Increase by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q8. Increase by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
Q9. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what change (+/-) in average 
regional apple yield do you expect in the first year? 
%. 
Q10-Q16- If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that in the 
first year average regional apple yield will 
Probabilities 
QIO. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Qll. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q12. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q13. Decrease by between 1 % and 3% % 
Q14. Decrease by between 3 % and 5% % 
Q15. Decreaseby between 5% and 10% % 
Q16. Decreaseby more than 10% % 
100 % 
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Q17. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what change (+/-) in regional apple 
acreage do you expect in the first year? 
%. 
Q18-Q24. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that in the 
first year the regional apple acreage will 
Probabilities 
Q18. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q19. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q20. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q21. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q22. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q23. Decrease by between 5% and 10% % 
Q24. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
Q25. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what change (+/-) in the regional 
total apple production  ^ do you expect in the first year? 
%. 
Q26-Q32. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that in the 
first year the regional total apple production will 
Probabilities 
Q26. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q27. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q28. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q29. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q30. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q31. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q32. Decreaseby more than 10% % 
100 % 
' Total production is defined as yield times acreage in a region. We need to ask this question in addition to die 
two preceeding ones in order to deal with the dependence between yield and acreage changes. 
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Q33. If azmphos-methyl is no longer available, what change (+/-) in the regional 
share of apples marketed as fresh do you expect in the first year? 
Q34-Q40. ' If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that in the 
first year the regional share of apples marketed as fresh will 
Probabilities 
Q34. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q35. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q36. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q37. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q38. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q39. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 




Q41-Q80. Now you will be asked for the impacts in the distant future, five years from 
now, of the removal of azinphos-methyl. It is important to consider long-run changes since 
apples are a pereimial crop. Therefore, the full impact of pesticide regulations might not be 
seen in the first year after the policy is in place, but over time, apple growers might make 
further adjustments to accommodate for the change. We chose the time frame of five years 
because predicting in a longer time fiame may be too diflficulL Again, assume that prices 
stay constant. 
The difference between your assessment here and your response to the short-run questions is 
that at the end of five years apple producers are more flexible in changing their production 
program than in the shorter one-year framework. For instance, an apple producer might 
decide to substitute another pest control means for the baimed pesticide in the short run, but 
might adopt a comprehensive IPM method in the long run. Or a producer who continued 
production in the short run, because the orchards were already planted, might give up some 
apple acreage when it comes to the decision to replant the orchards. 
Also assume in your assessment that technology might change; that is, new pesticides or 
biological control methods might be developed since producers now have the incentive to 
find other methods to control the pest We ask you for the best prediction you can give of 
how production quantity, quahty, and costs change when most of the inputs are variable. 
Although you might think that there is too much imcertainty involved in your assessment and 
that there is no adequate experimental data to support your assessment, we believe that 
experts like you, who have worked in apple production for a long period of time, can give the 
most informed opinion possible. But if you are concerned that you have low confidence in 
your assessment, you can adjust for this by giving the probability distribution of the expected 
change a large spread. 
In summary, in your assessment of the long-run questions: 
(i) List the changes you expect 5 years after the ban. 
(ii) Accommodate for the higher flexibility of the apple producer in production program 
adjustments. 
(iii) Assimie in general that production might become more efficient and that new and better 
methods and varieties might become known. 
(iv) Include also that, if an important pesticide is banned, producers and researchers might 
spend effort to find a suitable substitute, which might decrease the impact on 
production. 
(v) Assume that prices for apples, pesticides etc. stay constant. 
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Q41. List the average change of total cost (^ /-) in apple production in the next 5 
years if azinphos-methyl is no longer available. Remember that we are interested in the cost 
change to the profit-maximizing producer, and not in the cost change for maintaining the 
same level of pest control. 
%. 
Q42-Q48. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that 
average cost of apple production in 5 years will 
Probabilities 
Q42. Decrease by more than 0.5 % % 
Q43. Decrease or increase by less than 0.5 % % 
Q44. Increase by between 0.5 % and I % % 
Q45. Increase by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q46. Increase by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q47. Increase by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q48. Increase by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
Q49. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what change (+/-) in average 
regional apple yield do you expect in 5 years from now? 
%. 
Q50-Q56. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that the 
average regional apple yield in 5 years will 
Probabilities 
Q50. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q51. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q52. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q53. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q54. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q55. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q56. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
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Q57. If azmphos-methyl is no longer available, what change (+/-) in regional apple 
acreage do you expect in 5 years from now? 
%. 
Q58-Q64. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that in 5 
years from now the regional apple acreage will 
Probabilities 
Q58. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q59. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q60. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q61. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q62. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q63. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q64. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100% 
Q65. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what change (+/-) in regional total 
apple production do you expect in 5 years from now? 
%. 
Q66-Q72. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that 5 years 
from now the regional total apple production will 
Probabilities 
Q66. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q67. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q68. Decrease by between 0.5% and 1 % % 
Q69. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q70. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q71. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q72. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
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Q73. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what change (+/-) in the regional 
share of apples marketed as fresh do you expect in 5 years from now? 
%. 
Q74-Q80. If azinphos-methyl is no longer available, what are the probabilities that in 5 
years from now the regional share of apples marketed as fresh will 
Probabilities 
Q74. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q75. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q76. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q77. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q78. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q79. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q80. Decreaseby more than 10% % 
100 % 
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Removal of All Organophosphonis Pesticides 
SHORT RUN 
Q81-Q120. This section of questions asks you to provide your own probability assessment of 
the short-run impacts of the removal of all organophosphonis pesticides. By short nm, we 
mean the impacts on apple production in the first year after a hypothetical removal of all 
organophosphonis pesticides. Your assignment of probabilities will provide information 
about how confident you are concerning changes to the apple industry resulting &om a ban. 
If you feel very certain about what will happen, you will assign a high probability to the 
interval that contains your expected change and low probabilities to the other intervals. 
However, if you have low confidence in your assessment, you might want to assign relatively 
high probability to several intervals. When doing so remember that some intervals are not as 
wide as others. 







Methyl parathion (Pennc^M), and 
Phosmet (Imidan) 
Phosphamidon (Dimecron). 
Please assume also that no new organophosphates will become available in the fiiture. 
The impacts of removing an entire group of pesticides from the market are important to 
consider in pesticide regulations, as this removal will cause growers to lose mutual 
substitutes for pest control at the same instant. 
Please note again that the sum of the probabilities should equal 100%. When answering 
questions concerning short-run impacts, please assume that prices will stay constant. 
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Q81. Budgets of apple production in your region show that the total pre-harvest cost 
of apple production is 1300 S/acre. Pest control costs are given at 170 S/acre. Indicate the 
average percent change (+/-) of total cost in apple production in the next year if the group of 
all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available. 
%. 
Q82-Q88. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that in the first year average cost of apple production will 
Probabilities 
Q82. Decrease by more than 0.5 % % 
Q83. Decrease or increase by less than 0.5 % % 
Q84. Increase by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q85. Increase by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q86. Increase by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q87. Increase by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q88. Increase by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
Q89. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what 
change (+/-) in average regional apple yield do you expect in the first year? 
%. 
Q90-Q96. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that in the first year average regional apple yield will 
Probabilities 
Q90. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q91. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q92. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q93. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q94. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q95. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q96. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
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Q97. If the groiip of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what 
change (+/-) in regional apple acreage do you expect in the first year? 
%. 
Q98-Q104.- If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that in the first year the regional apple acreage will 
Probabilities 
Q98. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q99. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
QIOO. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
QlOl. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q102. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q103. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q104. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
Q105. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what 
change (+/-) in the regional total apple production do you expect in the first year? 
%. 
Q106-Q112. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that in the first year the regional total apple production will 
Probabilities 
Q106. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q107. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q108. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q109. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
QUO. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
QUI. Decreasebybetween5%and 10% % 
Q112. Decreaseby more than 10 % % 
100 % 
162 
Q113. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what 
change (+/-) in regional share of apples marketed as fresh do you expect in the first year? 
%. 
Q114-Q120. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that in the first year the regional share of apples marketed as fresh will 
Probabilities 
Q114. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q115. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q116. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q117 Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q118 Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q119 Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 




Q121-Q160. Now you will again be asked for the impacts in the distant future, five years 
firom now, this time in the case of the removal of all organophosphorus pesticides. The same 
comments as in the last long run section apply. 
In summary, in your assessment of the long-run questions; 
(i) List the changes you expect 5 years after the ban. 
(ii) Accommodate for the higher flexibility of the apple producer in production program 
adjustments. 
(iii) Assume in general that production might become more efficient and that new and 
better methods and varieties might become known. 
(iv) Include also that, if an important pesticide is banned, producers and researchers 
might spend effort to find a suitable substitute, which might decrease the impact on 
production. 
(v) Assume that prices stay constant. 
Q121. List the average change of total cost (+/-) in apple production in the next 5 
years if the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available. Remember that 
we are interested in the cost change to the commercial grower, and not in the cost change for 
maintaining the same level of pest control. 
%. 
Q122-Q128. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, are 
the probabilities that average total cost of apple production in 5 years will 
Probabilities 
Q122. Decrease by more than 0.5 % % 
Q123. Decrease or increase by less than 0.5 % % 
Q124. Increase by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q125. Increase by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q126. Increase by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q127. Increase by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q128. Increase by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
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Q129. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what 
change (+/-) in average regional apple yield do you expect in 5 years from now? 
%. 
Q130-Q136. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that the average regional apple yield in 5 years will 
Probabilities 
Q130. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q131. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q132. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q133. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q134. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q135. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q136. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
Q137. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what 
change (+/-) in regional apple acreage do you expect in 5 years from now? 
Q138-Q144. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that in 5 years from now the regional apple acreage will 
Probabilities 
Q138. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q139. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q140. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q141. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q142. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q143. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q144. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
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Q145. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what 
change (+/-) in regional total apple production do you expect in five years from now? 
%. 
Q146-Q152. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that 5 years from now the regional total apple production will 
Probabilities 
Q146. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q147. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q148. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q149. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q150. Decrease by between 3 % and 5 % % 
Q151. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q152. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
Q153. If the group of all organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what 
change (+/-) in regional share of apples marketed as fresh do you expect in 5 years from 
now? 
%-
Q154-Q160. If the group of ail organophosphorus pesticides is no longer available, what are 
the probabilities that in 5 years from now the regional share of apples marketed as fresh will 
Probabilities 
Q154. Increase by more than 0.5 % % 
Q155. Increase or decrease by less than 0.5 % % 
Q156. Decrease by between 0.5 % and 1 % % 
Q157. Decrease by between 1 % and 3 % % 
Q158. Decrease by between 3% and 5 % % 
Q159. Decrease by between 5 % and 10 % % 
Q160. Decrease by more than 10 % % 
100 % 
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CHAPTER 4. AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF ANTIBIOTICS USE 
AND REPLANTING DECISIONS IN APPLE PRODUCTION 
A paper to be submitted to the American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
Jutta Roosen 
Abstract 
Antibiotics are used in fruit production to control fire blight, a bacterial disease of fruit trees 
that leads to yield losses and eventually to tree death. Because of fears about the 
development of widespread resistance from excessive antibiotics use, scientists and public 
health officials are becoming increasingly concerned about antibiotics use in agriculture. We 
develop a framework that allows estimation of the impacts a ban on antibiotics would have 
on the apple industry, and we formulate a model of investment in orchard replanting as a 
frmction of disease risk. We embed the individual grower's decision to replant into an 
industry equilibrium in order to facilitate a welfare analysis. Welfare impacts of survival 
probability changes after a ban on antibiotics are estimated. 
Introduction 
Antibiotics are used in fruit production to control fire blight, an economically important 
bacterial disease of ^ples, pears, and other plants of the rose family (rosacea) that is caused 
by the bacterium Erwinia amylovora. Fire blight differs from other common plant diseases 
in that it not only affects yield and quality of the current crop, but also leads to significantly 
lower productivity of plants for several years. Severe infections can lead to tree death, 
especially in yoimger trees (van der Zwet and Beer). Outbreaks of fire blight are sporadic, 
but losses can be devastating if the disease becomes epidemic and whole regions are infected. 
Currently 35.8% of U.S. apple acreage is planted to fire blight susceptible varieties 
(Rosenberger). This percentage is increasing as many of the new varieties such as Fuji and 
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Pink Lady are much more susceptible than the common older varieties such as Red or 
Golden Delicious. This development is reinforced by a similar trend towards planting 
rootstocks with high susceptibility to fire blight (van der Zwet and Beer). Plant pathologists 
have consistently reported fire blight as a disease of high importance in apple and pear 
orchards (van der Zwet and Beer). In 1991, a severe fire blight outbreak in Michigan caused 
losses estimated at $3.8 million dollars (van der Zwet and Beer). If antibiotics are lost for 
fire blight control, experts conjecture that apple acreage woizld decrease by 8.7% in the next 
five years and annual yield would decrease by 8% (Rosenberger). The principal antibiotics 
in a fire blight control program are streptomycin and oxytetracycline. Copper compounds are 
available as an alternative means of control; however, copper compounds are much less 
effective and more phytotoxic than antibiotics. 
The possibility of losing access to antibiotics as a means of control arises because 
their use in agriculture is currently debated very controversially due to public health concerns 
over the risk of resistance development (Witte; Grady). By now at least three bacterial 
species capable of causing life-threatening illnesses {Enterococcus faecalis, Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis, and Pseudomonas aeruginosa) have developed resistance to all antibiotics 
available (Levy 1998).^ The increase in antibiotic resistance that Levy calls an "international 
public health nightmare" has triggered entities such as the World Health Organization and 
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention to convene working groups and task forces. 
Bacteria can store their resistance genes in so-called plasmoids, a cell structure that 
can be transferred between bacteria. Especially if bacteria are of common families, it is 
likely that resistance features can be transferred. Erwinia for instance belongs to the family 
of Enterobacteriaceae, the family that includes Escherichia coli. Salmonella^ and Shigella, all 
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of ^^cll are well known causes of foodbome diseases. Bacteria in this family can exchange 
genes among themselves. Although streptomycin, the antibiotic that is most used in fruit 
production, is no longer widely used in himian health treatment, streptomycin resistance is 
often fovmd in conjxmction with other resistance determinants. Some Erwinia amylovora 
displaying multidrug resistance in transferable plasmoids have been isolated, and so the use 
of streptomycin increases the development of multidrug resistance (Levy 1992, p. 163). 
It has been shown that people who are frequently exposed to antibiotics are at a 
higher risk to contract antibiotic resistant bacteria (Levy 1998). When applying antibiotics in 
aerosols to fruit trees, bacteria on the trees are killed, but lingering antibiotic residues can 
encourage the development of resistance. People can then acquire resistant bacteria through 
food consumption. Corpet showed that when humans are restricted to a diet of bacteria free 
foods, the number of resistant bacteria in their feces decreased 1000 fold. Levy (1992, p. 
165) isolated 20,000 to 100,000 antibiotic resistant bacteria per gram of vegetable in a study 
carried out in Boston. The amount of resistant bacteria on food does not appear to be trivial. 
These public health concerns put in question the fiiture use of antibiotics for disease 
control in fruit production, and for instance in Italy antibiotics may no longer be used for fire 
blight control. A study of the implications of losing control over fire blight is fiirthermore of 
interest because of developments in apple production systems themselves because the fire 
blight bacterium has developed resistance to streptomycin in the Pacific Northwest (Smith). 
Growers have to rely on access to oxytetracycline for which an exceptional permission has to 
be obtained from the Environmental Protection Agency, and the industry is continuously at 
risk of not having sufficient means for blight control. This problem is aggravated by the fact 
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that in recent years unusually warm spring weather conditions in the Northwest have led to 
an increase in the fire blight prevalence. 
The objective of this paper is to estimate the importance of antibiotics in apple 
production systems and to this end, a model of orchard replanting that can incorporate the 
changes in orchard survival probabilities is developed. Existing models developed to 
estimate marginal-cost changes resulting from a regulation of pesticide use are not suitable 
for our case because marginal-cost changes in these models result only from changes in cost 
of production or from changes in yield (Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman; Sunding). They 
do not incorporate risk and so do not offer a way to accommodate survival probability 
changes. Furthermore, there does not exist any model that analyzes the decision of orchard 
replanting depending on survival probability. 
We first propose a model that includes the probability of an orchard being destroyed 
in any given year, and we apply it to study the optimal cycle of orchard planting and 
replanting. The analysis uses the concept of industry equilibrium similar to Silberberg or 
Appelbaimi and Katz, and embeds choices of individual investors in a partial equilibrium 
model. This allows us to derive the price changes necessary to keep acreage in apple 
production, so that we can estimate welfare impacts of a change in the risk environment 
We then study the model and its responses to changes in the market and physical 
environment using analytical and numerical tools. We estimate the welfare impacts of a ban 
on antibiotics in U.S. apple production, and the paper is concluded with a brief discussion. 
The Model 
Although several models exist to econometrically estimate the adjustments in orchard 
acreage (Elnagheeb and Florkowski; French, Minami, and King; Hartley, Nerlove, and 
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Peters; Knapp; Knapp and Konyar) or to model the replanting decision as a recursive 
dynamic programming problem (Gimter and Bender), to our knowledge there exists no 
model that analyses explicitly the optimal replanting decision of the individual orchard. We 
develop such a model using building on the existing literature in forestry economics 
(Hartman; Reed). 
Site Value 
In this section, we develop a Faustmann-type model (Clark, chapters 9.1 and 11.2 ) to 
analyze the decision to replant an orchard, where we explicitly model the probability that an 
orchard is destroyed at any given time. An orchard is planted at cost I, and can remain in 
production for several decades. At planting time, the basic orchard technology is chosen, 
including aspects such as variety, rootstock, irrigation, and planting density, and 
subsequently the production fimction has a very low elasticity of substitution with respect to 
variable input choices. To focus on the long-term planting decision, we model production as 
a Leontief technology that changes with orchard age t. The instantaneous revenue function 
can be described by 
r{t) = p{t)y{t) -  c(t) (I) 
where p{t) is the price paid for the crop at time f, y{t) is yield at time t ,  and c(r) presents the 
cost of running the existing orchard.^ 
Times between successive orchard destructions are denoted as X^, X2, - and can 
occur either because the orchard has been destroyed by disease or other adverse events or 
because it has been removed for economic considerations. Each period fix>m planting to 
cutting of the orchard is described as an orchard cycle, and the duration of the n-th orchard 
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cycle is X„. Discounting forwjird the net returns of the orchard over its life cycle, the 
cumulative return is 
R, = j '-r(l) = e"- dt.  (2) 
The occiirrence of destruction by fire blight or any other adverse event is modeled as 
a Poisson process with the intensity rate X, so that the probability distribution of the random 
variables {X„} is 
where (/) is the cimiulative density fimction, i.e., for « = 1,2,..., (/) = ProbCA'^  < /). 
In (3), T is the time of planned replanting so that the planned replanting time T is the upper 
boimd on orchard age. The destruction times are independent of each other and thus form a 
renewal process (Taylor and Karlin).^ 
To calculate the complete site value, we compute the discounted infinite return to the 
land, applying the discount rate 5, so that the expected discounted return is 
J{T) = _ /) (4) 
From Reed's observation, we employ the independence of the identically drawn X^ to write 
J(X) as 
and we can calculate^ 
, , eU-"(R -  /)] 
 ^  ^ {Z + S)  ^
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To develop (R — /)], we have to acknowledge that the orchard yields a return of r{t) at 
each point in time. Using (2), the first part can be derived as 
E[e-'^R] = r(t)e-^'dt 
and the second part as 
(7) 
{X + S) 
Inserting (6), (7), and (8) into (5), the total site value can be calculated as 
(Z + S) A ^  J[ r(t)e-^'dt e'^'dr 





where ^ = J[1 - e-(^*s)T ] ^ expressed in equation (9), the totJil return to the site is 
eqiial to the appropriately weighted expected revenue in the event of involuntary destruction 
plus the survival probability times the appropriately discoimted expected revenue conditional 
on survival until planned replanting less the appropriately discounted cost of replanting in 
either event. 
Impact of X on Site Value 
We can observe that the size of X has two opposing effects on the total site value. This is 
easiest to ascertain from equation (5). One the one hand, the expected lifetime decreases 
with an increase in X which lowers the denominator and increase the annualized cost of 
investment Therefore, E\e~^^l\l^ - as a whole increases. On the other hand, 
expected revenue is likely to decrease. In the case of an increase in A, the expected return 
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for the event X -T decreases, but the probability-weighted return for the case X <T can 
increase or decrease given T. If the overall expected return decreases, then both the 
numerator E\e~^^ r\ and the denominator 1 — E\e~^^ ] decrease, so that the condition of 
decreasing expected lifetime retum is not su£5cient in order to sign J^ (•). If the 
denominator 1 - decreases less than the expected lifetime return E\e~^^ then 
y(-) would decrease as increases. However, this depends on the particular form of r{t) 
and the size of 5 and T'. We derive the partial derivative of (F) formally in appendix 4. 
Replanting Decision 
Differentiating j{r) with respect to T and setting the derivative equal to zero gives 
implicitly the optimal lifetime of an orchard. Note that d<f>ldr = , and so 
— = —[(/I +S)X [Ir(t)e-^'dt e'^'  + S)e-^' 'r{t) e'^'dt 
dT (p 
+ e- '^' + ++ J{T)] (10) 
= K[r(J) + SI-SJ(jr)] 
where k = (A. + ^ 0. Letting T' denote the optimizing value, the first-order 
condition can be written as 
r(T') = SJ(T')-SI. (11) 
The optimal orchard replanting time T* depends on the discount rate 5, on the risk of orchard 
destruction by disease X, on the shape of the price fimction p(t), on the yield flmctionXOs 
and on the cost fimction c(t). The first-order condition states that the incremental retum of 
keeping the orchard, r(T'), has to equal the rent firom starting over S [/(T*) - /], so that the 
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instantaneous return at T', r(T'), must be smaller than the average return JJ(T').  
Revenue at the replanting date must be exactly equal to the average return corrected for the 
cost of replanting. 
The second-order condition requires rj.(T')<0=> pj(T')y(T') + piT'))/•,• (T') 
-  Cj- (T') < 0 where we use the first-order condition to assert that = 0. If r(t) 
increases, peaks and then falls substantially then a global maximum is likely. Henceforth we 
assume such a maximimi. 
Equilibrium 
Equation (11) defines the optimal cycle length for one orchard. For the equilibriimi analysis 
we assume that there exists a large acreage equally fit for apple production and that in the 
long run acres switch to or firom apple production according to the opportimity cost of 
production. Each acre remains in apple production as long as the average return SJ(T') 
meets or exceeds the opportunity cost of land use and management, which is denoted by . 
If SJ(T') decreases below , then growers choose to leave ^ple production and employ 
the land in alternative activities such as cherry or pear production. If prices do not adjust, 
production is reduced to zero. Similarly, if 5J(X') increases, resources fi-om other 
industries enter apple production and supply increases at an infinite rate. All orchards are 
equal and the supply for apples is assumed being perfectly elastic, an assumption that can be 
based on the notion of a long-run equilibrium as in Silberberg. 
However, a supply shift according to changes in average returns or opportunity costs 
affects market prices, and an equilibrium analysis requires us to study the effect on prices and 
r* simultaneously. To do so, we have to further characterize the dynamic structure of the 
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industry. It is assumed that in a steady-state equilibrium an equal number of acres is planted 
each year. The price p{t) is a function of orchard age and it is necessary to precisely define a 
shift in the price functions. 
We develop the price function as p(t) = a + s{t) and let sif) evolve according to 
orchard age. Explicitly, we set 5(0) = 0 so that /7(0) = a. Changes in s(j) reflect decreases 
in quality occurring with orchard age (Funt et al.) and changes in the marketability of a 
variety.  A change in the price schedule is  then defined as a  shift  in the parameter a>0. 
The equilibrium price schedule is thus determined to equalize 
7r,=SJa"). (12) 
and equations (11) and (12) determine jointly the endogenous variables of the market 
equilibrium. The optimal replanting date T' is chosen according to (11) and the parameter a 
adjusts to ensure condition (12). 
To focus in on the risk aspect of the problem, we also restrict the cost function to be a 
step function such that c(r) = c,v if / fo ^nd c(f) = Cg if f > , where is the time at 
which the orchard comes into fiill bearing. The cost of production are smaller in early years 
when orchards are in the nonbearing stage while they are larger when orchards are in full 
production. Our results carry over to more general cost fvmctions; however, the model would 
become more cumbersome without leading to further insights into the problem. 
We are now prepared to analyze the impacts of a change in A, and to conduct a 
welfare analysis of such a change. The welfare analysis will use the change in price a and 
the accompanying changes in quantities produced and consumed in order to calculate 
changes in producer and consumer surpluses. But before we enter the estimation of welfare 
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changes, we investigate the properties of the system with respect to changes in the production 
and market environment. 
Equilibrium Analysis 
We analyze the responses in market price a and replanting time T' with respect to changes 
in the environment and technology using the equilibrium conditions (11) and (12). The 
analysis is simplified by the fact that Jis zero in equilibrium, i.e., the Hessian is 
triangular. Therefore, (12) alone determines the change in a, so that we can always first sign 
an impact on a via totally differentiating (12), and then sign the impact on T' using (11). To 
spare the reader firom unnecessary technical detail, we refer the derivation of the partial 
derivatives of to appendix 4A. 
Investment 
The analysis begins with the smdy of a change in the planting cost /. Totally differentiating 
(12) with respect to a, T', and I, we obtain d Jj- dT' + 5J,dI + SJ^da = 0. The first term 
equals zero by the first-order condition and we write da!dl = ^ 0 since 
J, (-) < 0 and ) > 0. This confirms our intuition that an increase in investment cost 
needs to be compensated for by a price increase. From (11) we obtain dT' jdl 
= \S J, - S + y(X') (•// /•/„ )] /'V (^*) ^^ch is positive, because the denominator is 
negative by the second-order condition. Thus, an increase in planting costs induces a deferral 




We continue with a shift in Tto, a change in the opportunity costs of apple production. 
Ignoring equilibrium impacts, an increase in no encoiu:ages acres to be taken out of apple 
production. However, from (12) we conclude that daldn^ = X/SJ^i-) > 0, and an increase in 
the price schedule for apples restores equilibrium. In order to sign dTldn^ > 0, note that 
(11) is independent of , so that the total differential results as 





The expression SJ^ -  yiT') measures the increase in annualized returns due to an upward 
shift in the price schedule and compares it to the increase in return due to deferring 
harvesting to a later point in time. If returns from delaying replanting exceed those that 
accrue in annualized returns, then T' increases. This, however, depends on the revenue 
function over the entire time horizon and in general, it caimot be signed. 
Cost Function 
To analyze the impact of a change in cost, we have to first define a shift in the cost fimction. 
We parameterize the shift in c{t) by 0 such that c{t) c{t) + G m(t) where m(t) = w > 0 if 
/ e [r,, ^ 2 ] and m{t) = 0 otherwise. Here [r,, t^ ] can be any interval in t. Denoting 
dJ (T) / dd by Jg, it can be shown that Jg =- [(A + S)Z e^' m{t)dt Jr]/^ 
m(t)dt]/^ < 0. This holds true for a constant shift in c(r) over any 
small interval, but the result can be generalized to hold for any inward shift in the cost 
SJ, -  yiT') 





function by decomposing the shift into a sum of small constant shifts. Since Jg <0 for each 
of these small shifts, 7(7) decreases in any upward shift in the cost path. 
Having signed Jg, we can now turn to the effects of a change in c(r) on equilibrium 
/?(/) and f. Note first that (12) implies that J(T') is invariant. Therefore, for a change in 
c o s t ,  d a / d O - - J g j J ^  > 0 .  F r o m  ( 1 1 )  w e  o b t a i n  r g d 9  - ^ - r ^ d T '  y ( J ' ' ) d a - S J g d 9  
-5J„da = 0. The latter two terms simi to zero by the total differential of (12), so that 
dT- ^ -r,(r)-y(r)daldg _ - r.(r)+At')J, ' J. 
de rr{r) 7^ 
the sign of which is ambiguous. It cannot be signed because Jg depends on the particiilar 
form of the shift in c(r). Even if we assume that c(f) increases by a constant for all t, i.e. 
m{t) = 1 Vf, the numerator of (14) has the sign of -SJg-\- y(J'). This cannot be signed as 
discussed in relation to equation (13) where we analyze the instance of a change in . We 
conclude that an increase in costs triggers an increase in prices to prompt producers to remain 
in the apple growing business and that it has an ambiguous effect on the cycle length. 
Output Productivity 
Analogously to a change in cost we can derive the impact of a production fimction shift on 
J{T) by denoting y{t) -> y{t) + ii/k{t) so that > 0. From (12) we obtain da/dy/ 
= -J^l J a < 0 • An increase in yield leads to a downward shift in the eqiiilibrium price 
schedule. From (11), we can derive cCT' jdy/ = -y{j'^da/dy-p(j'^lry^(j'^ and 
the impact on T' is indeterminate. 
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Mortality 
As discussed in the previous section J^ cannot be definitely signed but is quite likely to be 
negative. We differentiate (12) to obtain da!d2. = -J^ / and equation (11) to yield 
dT'ldX = h(T')-5J,]jJJ^+SJ^}fr^{T') = {y(X')JJjMr,{T'). Therefore, both 
effects depend on the sign of . If < 0 then an increase in risk lengthens the orchard 
cycle and causes an upward shift in the equilibrimn price schedule. Our empirical study will 
show that this is true for the revenue functions that we study. 
Table 1 summarizes all analytical comparative statics results. For all changes in the 
market and production enviroiunent but X we can determine the change in at least one of the 
endogenous equilibrium variables. The indeterminacy of the second equilibrium variable 
arises because the response of the optimal cycle length with respect to a change in a cannot 
be determined. This response depends on the particular shape of the revenue function, and 
its entire time path determines the result. Further restrictions on the shape of the revenue 
function would be needed to derive unambiguous results for all shocks.^ 
Simulation Analysis of the Economic Impact of Antibiotics Use Removal 
In order to assess the welfare impacts of a ban on antibiotics, we collect and analyze U.S. 
apple production data. We use yield data firom Funt and from O'Rourke (1997) to estimate 
lifetime yield functions for apple orchards, employ prices from the Washington Growers 
Clearing House Association to derive a price schedule, and implement biological impact 
estimates from a U.S. Department of Agriculture - NAPIAP project that assesses the 
production impacts of pesticide bans in apple production (Rosenberger). Since apple trees 
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yield finit once a year, we conduct the simulation analysis using the discrete analogue of the 
analytical model. 
Yield Function 
Yield patterns over time vary depending on the production system. In traditional systems, a 
relatively low nimiber of trees is planted per acre, but newer high-density systems increase 
yields per acre by planting a high number of trees. Funt reports yield data for plantings of 
four different densities; 66 trees/acre, 181 trees/acre, 605 trees/acre, and 792 trees/acre. His 
data concerns three varieties (York Imperial, Golden Delicious, and Red Delicious) over 36 
years from planting to orchards of age 36 for each system. This gives us a matrix of 3 x 4 
time series, each with a length of 36 years. 
Apple jdeids can fluctuate considerably between years depending on weather and pest 
conditions, and we smooth the data by using a five-year moving average. Zeros are 
• s implemented in the first two moving average, and so 34 years of yield data remain. A 
preliminary study of the data revealed that yield patterns over an orchard's lifetime are quite 
different depending on the planting density, but are rather homogeneous across varieties for 
systems of the same tree density. This impression was confirmed in discussions with experts 
of the apple industry. For this reason, four different yield fimctions for the four different tree 
densities were estimated using the data for all three varieties in each of them. The yield 
function was specified as 
lay, =aQ+a^t+aj^\nt+a^^ + a^^ (15) 
where In y, is the natural logarithm of yield at orchard age t, and Oq ,..., ^4 are the 
parameters to be estimated. The fimction was estimated using a fixed-effect model to 
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account for differences in the slope of In j/, which result in multiplicative differences in y, 
The parameter estimates are given in table 2 together with goodness of fit measures, where 
yield 1 reports the estimates for 66 trees/acre, jdeld 2 the estimates for 181 trees/acre etc. 
The F-test examines the hypothesis of equal intercepts for the different varieties and 
including fixed effects is therefore appropriate. Figure la plots the four different yield 
flmctions that were estimated using Funt's data.'" 
In addition to these yield data for different orchard designs by Funt, we use data by 
O'Rourke (1997) who estimates the yield for an average orchard in the state of 
Washington.'' This yield fimction (yield 5) gives data for 41 years of orchard age and is 
plotted in figure lb. 
For the welfare analysis we normalize the yield fimctions so that the average yield 
will equal the U.S. average jdeld of23,500 lb./acre imder the assumption that an equal 
number of acres of each maturity are in production. This normalization will depend on the 
estimated optimal cycle length that results firom the optimization of J(T) and will therefore 
depend on the cost, investment, and price data. We plot the yield fimctions in figures 1 a and 
lb in a way such that each fimction is normalized to 3deld the same maxima. 
Price Function 
Little data is available to estimate the price fimction. Discussions with many industry 
specialists indicated to us that price decreases for the orchard crop are a major reason for 
replanting an orchard. For a particular variety prices may decrease because of siq)ply 
increases and changes in the demand. In addition to price changes by variety, the value of 
crop firom a particular genetic material may change according to details such as coloring or 
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storage quality of the apples. The data to estimate these effects is sparse and ignores many 
quality and demand effects. 
We obtain price data by variety from the Washington Growers Clearing House 
Bulletin to estimate a price fimction by variety. For the newer varieties Gala, Fuji, Braebum, 
and Jonagold we have data for the production years 1992/93 through 1997/98 and use it to 
estimate price as a fimction of time using an exponential fimction with positive intercept as a 
lower limit for price. This lower limit is chosen to be the average price received for apples in 
the processed sector (7.54 0/lb.) and the restriction on the intercept is imposed in the 
estimation procedure. The function is estimated as 
p, =0.0754+ (0.737 + 0.22ID, -0.183£>2 -O.IO2D3) exp(-0.1340 (16) 
(9.223) (2.535) (-2.112) (-1.189) (-5.230) 
where Di, D2, and D3 represent dxunmy variables to distinguish the multiplicative term for 
the different varieties. The numbers in parenthesis report t-values and the of regression 
equals 0.72. The test statistic on the restriction is F(l,18)=l 1.6 and is F-distributed. 
For the estimation of welfare unpacts, the price function is calibrated to yield the U.S. 
average price of 15.31 0/lb. by adjusting the multiplicative term to the exponential function. 
We refer to this price fimction as price 1. 
An alternative price fimction is specified to c^ture price developments for orchards 
whose crop does not loose value because of demand and supply effects for the particular 
variety but because of changes in the quality of ^ples. The function assianes an s-shaped 
form and is formulated as 
/?,=[! + exp((r - 25) / 5)]"' 
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It is denoted by price 2 and is similarly to price 1 calibrated to yield an average price of 15.31 
^/Ib. and to have a lower bound of 7.54 0/lb. Both price functions are plotted in figxire 2. 
Cost Function 
Two specification for the cost fimction were chosen using evidence from enterprise budgets 
for apple orchards (Bechtel et al.; Carkner, Havens, and MacConnell; Dickrell, Hinman, and 
Tvergyak; Funt et al.; Hinman et al. (1993a, 1993b); Hinman, Williams, and Faubion; 
Marshall et al.; Parker et al.; Seavert and Burkhart). They are specified as a discrete step 
function with low cost (ci = $l,700/acre; $l,200/acre) in early years for r < 5 and higher cost 
(C2 = $2,500; $2,000) in later years for / > 6. The set (ci; C2)=($1.70(); $2,500) will 
henceforth be referred to as cost 1, and the set (ci; C2)=($i^00; $2,000) as cost 2. Evidence 
from these sources also motivated our choice for / to lie between $6,000/acre and 
$8,000/acre. 
Replanting Time and Price Adjustments 
We analyze the impacts of changes in the production environment on the long-run 
equilibrium of the apple industry. Some general production statistics for the U.S. apple 
industry are given in table 3. For the simulation analysis, the base level of X is set at 0.01 
based on tree survival probabilities in O'Rourke (1997) and the discount rate 5 is set 
approximately at the real rate of retum on long-term securities at 0.04. Based on expert 
surveys, Rosenberger estimates that a loss of antibiotics for fire blight management will lead 
to a decrease in yield by 8% and an acreage reduction by 8.7% in the next five years. Under 
the assumption of a Poisson process, the acreage loss is equivalent to a value of X =0.027. 
Cost of production increases are almost negligible at $2.6/acre. 
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We employ these data to estimate the impact of an antibiotics ban nsing the different 
yield, price, cost, and investment fimction specifications. For this estimation, J(X) is 
calculated in discrete form using the annual return data for each of the functional 
specifications. We calculate the optimal replanting time under our baseline assimiptions {Tq) 
together with the base retum (ito)- Increasing A to 0.027 and simultaneously decreasing 
yield by 8%, we vary a and calcidate the new T' = T, such that S J(r, ,a^) = S J(Tq ,Aq).  
Estimates are given in tables 4a and 4b for all combinations of the functional specification, 
where table 4a shows results for price 1 and table 4b for price 2. 
Because experts are often thought to include a risk premium in their impact estimates 
we repeat the simulation for reduced estimates for the change in yield and A., setting the 
reduction in yield to 4% and >1, = 0.0185. The results are recalculated for price 1 and given 
in table 5. 
We can observe that changing from the low-density planting (yield 1 and 2) to high-
density plantings (yield 3 and 4), increases profits, which coincides with the observation of a 
shift towards plantings of high-density orchard in the United States. High-density orchards 
have a lower optimal life length, as can be observed when studying different apple 
production systems (O'Rourke, 1993, p. 35). Using the original expert estimates the change 
in price after losing antibiotics varies between 2.1 and 3.2 ^/Ib. (14-21%) at the farm level 
and the increase in replanting age adjusts by between 2-8 years (table 4a). For price 2, the 
optimal replanting is delayed as prices decrease more slowly. Using the reduced impact 
estimates, adjustments in prices and optimal replanting time are reduced accordingly 
(table 5). 
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To gain a better imderstanding of how different values for A and changes in average 
yield would impact the equilibrium conditions, we study one revenue and investment 
function specification in more detail. For this exercise we choose price 1, Yield 3, /= $6000, 
and cost 2. We vary A from 0.01 to 0.03 and reduce average yields by values between 0 and 
3000 Ibyacre/year. The resulting responses for T, are shown figure 3, and for Aa in figiu-e 4. 
It can be observed that T, and Aa increase as impacts become stronger. This is consistent 
with J, being negative and so as the risk of mortality increases, growers defer replanting as 
the probability of recovering the investment of replanting is lower. 
The figures show an approximately linear response of 7", and Aa to changes in yield 
and A.. This is confirmed when comparing tables 4a and 5, where we observe that the 
reduction of production impacts by 50% imply that adjustments in T' and Aa are 
approximately cut in half. 
We carry our simulation analysis finther and obtain estimates of welfare impacts 
resulting from a ban on antibiotics. Implementing a partial-equilibriimi model, we estimate 
changes in apple supply and demand and use the resulting changes to calculate changes in 
consumer and producer surplus. The partial-equilibrium model for the U.S apple market 
including net imports is described by 
Equation (16.1) describes the demand fimction (0^) as a fiinction of price (P), (16.2) depicts 
the net import equation (A4) as a fimction of price (P) and home production ( Q''), and lastly 
0^(P) = 0^ 






equation (16.3) poses the market clearing condition. O'' is modeled as being invariant to 
prices because we assume a perfecdy elastic supply function for our equilibrivun analysis. 
Given the change in price ( Aa) as calcxilated from the production system of the 
individual orchard [equations (11) and (12)], we can derive the changes in quantities 
demanded and supplied by totally differentiating (16) and so obtain 
System (17) is linear in the changes , AM, and A|2^»^nd thus can easily be solved 
given the appropriate elasticity estimates and data on current quantities and prices. 
Elasticity estimates have been obtained in a study that was conducted to estimate the 
impacts of pesticide losses in apple production (appendix 2A). The demand elasticity is set 
to -0.55, the elasticity of imports with respect to prices is estimated as -0.76, and the 
elasticity of imports with respect to home production is -3.3. Given production and yield 
changes, we can calculate the change in acreage (AAcre) and the change in producer surplus 
as AAcre x  t c q .  Consumer surplus changes are calculated as dCS = -{Q + A012)dui. 
Tables 4a, 4b, and 5 show the estimated changes in quantity demanded and supplied 
together with the estimated welfare changes in the lower part of each cell. The results vary 
given the host of revenue functions that enter our analysis and depend in particular on the 
size of price increase needed to compensate growers for profit losses caused by changes in 
the risk environment. In general for price 1, consumption decreases by about 940 mill. lb. 
(17.1) 
(17.2) 
Ag' +AM=A0^ (17.3) 
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(440 mill, lb.) given (reduced) expert estimates, production decreases by 1.6 bill. lb. (0.7 
bill, lb.) and U.S. apple acreage decreases by between 45,700 and 69,700 (22,300 and 
37,200) acres or by between 10% and 15% (5% and 6%). Welfare losses are in the vicinity 
of $320 mill. ($155 mill.). For price 2, the impacts are slightly larger. 
The variation in the results indicates that the estimates of welfare changes are ball 
part figures, and also, they appear relatively high. We compare the results to simulation 
results obtained in a model of marginal supply function shifts in response to the same yield 
and cost of production changes (chapter 2) and estimate a welfare losses of -$62.2 mill, losing 
long-run (year 5) elasticities. This model here yields a loss of $175 mill, when we include 
only yield and cost changes and ignore the changes in survival probability. So this model 
jdelds higher welfare losses, a result that is in part caused by the fact that the length of run is 
much higher in this analysis and adjustments of the industry will in general be stronger. 
To interpret the results of this simulation, we have to remind ourselves of the 
assumptions that enter the derivation of these estimates. We treat all growers alike and shift 
the perfectly elastic supply curve in a parallel way. Price increases would be smaller if we 
used an increasing supply curve, and in addition some grower groups might be less affected 
by a ban on antibiotics. We ignore any changes in yield in response to an increase in prices 
and in particular our model does not include technological change. If antibiotics are banned, 
it is most likely that the value of fire blight resistance in a variety would increase and 
growers would change the current trend of planting varieties of higher susceptibility. This 
would in turn reduce the change in X. Our overall estimates should be interpreted as an 
upper bound on welfare impacts. 
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Conclusion 
We have developed an equilibrium model of the decision to replant fixiit orchards 
incorporating the risk that an orchard could be destroyed by disease or other adverse events. 
The model facilitates thinking about long-term issues of pest control for perennial crops and 
the decision to replant and it could be used to analyze the impact of changes in the survival 
probabilities of any kind of long-term investment project. Our result is more flexible than 
Reed's who analyzes the decision to cut and replant a forest incorporating the risk of forest 
fire, because in our case revenue is not restricted to accrue at a single point in time. We 
employ the model to simulate losses resulting firom a ban on antibiotics in U.S. apple 
production and we estimate welfare losses of about $320 mill., where the result should be 
interpreted as an upper bound given the limitations of the simulation analysis. 
About 50% of all antibiotics used in the U.S. are used in agriculture, the vast majority 
as growth enhancers in animal production. Still, 30% of U.S. apple acreage are treated with 
antibiotics (U.S. Department of Agriculture) and the most common application of the broad-
spectrum antibiotic streptomycin occurs is the treatment of fire blight in apple and pear 
production. Given the recent critical attention to antibiotics use in agriculture, an analysis of 
the welfare impact following a antibiotic removal in firuit production is urgently needed. 
With this paper we attempt to initiate a discussion of the importance of antibiotics in 
firiit production. A complete analysis of the economic impact would in addition require a 
precise analysis of the risk of antibiotics use on human exposure to resistant pathogens. 
Experts agree that antibiotics use in food production encourages the development of 
antibiotic-resistant himian pathogens. But the importance of this link is currently hotly 
debated. If the link between resistance development in plant and human pathogens is strong. 
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then the impact of increasing the prevalence of antibiotic resistant bacteria on human welfare 
is likely to have a large efifect on himian welfare. The cost of increased antibiotic resistance 
is not negligible. Sawert estimates that treatment cost alone for would increase from $20,000 
to $180,000 for tuberculosis patients with resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis. 
A good place to begin the economic analysis of the human health benefits could be 
Harper and Zilberman, who incorporate worker health risk into the analysis of pesticide 
regulation. A line of research by Foreman, by Sawert, and by Wallace and Wallace that was 
stimulated by the newly observed resurgence of tuberculosis in some subpopulations would 
also be of interest given the epidemic character of diseases that are affected by antibiotic 
resistance. Furthermore, Philipson shows how to acknowledge the cost of disease avoidance 
effort in health economic studies, and it is likely that these costs would increase if the 
probability of effective treatment declines. 
On the producer side of the economic assessments, more data on yield, price and cost 
trajectories are needed for a more precise welfare estimate. In particular, it would be 
desirable to be able to distinguish between different grower groups in the analysis. Further 
research could focus on technological and institutional adjustments, such as insurance 
markets, that could lessen the welfare impacts due to restrictions on antibiotic use. 
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 ^ Enterococcus faecalis is a streptococcus that invades the intestinal tract and can be 
pathogenic in patients with weak immime systems. Mycobacterium tuberculosis causes 
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tuberculosis, and Pseiidomonas aeruginosa is a bacterium that lives in soil or water, but it 
can also be pathogenic and cause urinary-tract infections. 
In this specification, marginal harvest costs can be accommodated by adjusting the price 
function. 
This assumption is not very restrictive for our problem. Disease outbreaks are often 
related spatially for a given year because the bacteria spreads epidemically through a 
region, but little dependence would be expected between replantings across time. 
Employing (3), expression (6) follows from 
£[e-"]= fxe-''e-"dt + e-"e-''^  = + 
* X+S  X+S  
Using results on qualitative comparative statics by Quirk, it can be shown that the system 
is fully sign-solvable only for /. For all the other comparative statics but with respect to 
A, the system is partially sign-solvable. 
Using zeros in the moving average for the first two years seemed to be the best way to 
proceed as in most cases yield is zero in the first three years in any case. 
A random-effect model was also implemented for the estimation of the yield and price 
function. However, the Hausman test rejected the hypothesis that the random effects are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables for some flmctions. Therefore we preferred 
the fixed-effects specification. 
The yield data was collected from growers in Pennsylvania in the early 1970s. It would 
have been preferable to cover a wider geographical range and a higher number of 
varieties. However, to our knowledge there do not exist other data covering orchards over 
so many years. Part of the problem is that we need to estimate the yield trajectory beyond 
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the typical replanting date. We compare our results with European data of Goedebure 
(1980, 1986) and discussed the issue with members of the apple industry. It appears that 
yield trajectories depend mostly on the orchard system planted so that for the four given 
systems our estimates appropriately describe the orchard productivity over time. 
'' O'Rourke (1997) estimates the yield curve by employing available data from fruit censi in 
the state of Washington and additional evidence from the industry. 
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Table 1. Sammary of Comparative Statics Results 
dji^  de" dxi/** dX dl 
da + + - -/+ + 
dT' -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+ + 
^ d0 parameterizes a shift in the cost function. 
** di|f parameterizes a shift in the yield function. 
Table 2. Parameter Values for Yield and Price Function^'' 
Yield 1 Yield 2 Yield 3 Yield 4 
ai 6.857 1.114 -0.763 1.266 
(10.607) (5.751) (-1.666) (5.528) 
a2 -0.259 -0.048 -0.002 -0.066 
(-12.396) (-5.447) (-0.094) (-7.355) 
a3 28.481 -3.447 -15.813 -2.391 
(5.651) (-4.785) (-6.257) (-1.893) 
34 -26.8455 c 8.887 2.067 
(-5.510) (6.204) (2.886) 
F-test** 159.3 134.9 19.1 58.7 
R- 98.6 97.5 95.4 97.9 
® The estimate for the intercept <20 is not listed as the fixed effect model estimates a different 
intercept for each time series. 
'' The values in parentheses report t-values. 
This term was excluded to improve the fit of the estimation according to the adjusted R^. 
** The degrees of freedom for the F-tests are (2,93), (2,93), (2,95), and (2,95) for 5deld 1-4, 
respectively. 
Table 3: U.S. Apple Prodttction Data, 1994-96 
Unit Average 
Acreage thsnd. acres 449.6 
Yield IbVacre 23,500.0 
Production mill. lb. 10,654.1 
Net Imports mill. lb. 1,763.1 
Average Price ^/Ib. 15.31 
Price for Processed Apples 0/lb. 7.54 
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Table 4a. Ban on Antibiotic Use: Original Impacts employing Price 1' 
Yield 1 Yield 2 Yield 3 Yield 4 Yield 5 
TtO $ 694.2 918.8 915.1 964.0 871.8 
To yrs. 28.0 26.0 21.0 22.0 28.0 
T, yrs. 31.0 33.0 25.0 26.0 33.0 
Aa ji/lb. 3.0 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.6 
1=6000 AQ° miU.lb. -1,129.3 -871.3 -804.0 -785.3 -961.0 
AQ'' miU. lb. -1,900.0 -1,465.9 -1,352.6 -1,321.2 -1,616.8 
AAcre thsnd. a -57.8 -66.6 -45.9 -46.3 -60.3 
ACS mill. $ -310.3 -242.4 -224.4 -219.4 -266.2 
APS miU.S -40.1 -61.2 -42.0 -44.7 -52.6 
Cost 1 Jtd $ 671.1 888.1 870.9 922.3 846.6 
To yrs. 29.0 27.0 22.0 23.0 29.0 
T, yrs. 31.0 35.0 26.0 27.0 34.0 
Aa 0/lb. 3.2 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.7 
1=8000 AQ° mill. lb. -1^00.4 -927.4 -848.9 -833.9 -1,024.6 
AQ'' mill. lb. -2,019.5 -1,560.2 -1,428.1 -1,402.9 -1,723.8 
AAcre thsnd. a -58.1 -69.7 -46.3 -46.5 -61.1 
ACS mill. $ -328.7 -257.3 -236.4 -232.4 -283.0 
APS miU.S -39.0 -61.9 -40.3 -42.9 -51.8 
TtO $ 1,186.3 1,410.9 1,407.3 1,456.1 1,363.9 
To yrs. 28.0 26.0 21.0 22.0 28.0 
T, yrs. 31.0 33.0 25.0 25.0 33.0 
Aa 0/lb. 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.6 
1=6000 AQ° mill. lb. -1,121.8 -867.5 -800.2 -781.5 -957.3 
miU. lb. -1,887.4 -1,459.6 -1,346.3 -1,314.9 -1,610.6 
AAcre thsnd. a -57.2 -66.4 -45.7 -40.8 -60.0 
ACS miU.S -308.4 -241.4 -223.4 -218.4 -265.2 
APS mill. $ -67.9 -93.7 -64.3 -59.4 -81.9 
Cost 2 Jto $ 1,163.2 1,380.3 1,363.1 1,414.4 1,338.7 
To yrs. 29.0 27.0 22.0 23.0 29.0 
Ti yrs. 31.0 35.0 26.0 27.0 34.0 
Aa 0/lb. 3.2 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.7 
1=8000 AQ° mill. lb. -1,196.6 -923.6 -845.1 -830.2 -1,020.9 
AQ'' mill. lb. -2,013.2 -1,553.9 -1,421.8 -1,396.7 -1,717.5 
AAcre thsnd. a -57.8 -69.4 -46.0 -46.2 -60.9 
ACS mill. $ -327.7 -256.3 -235.4 -231.4 -282.0 
APS mill. $ -67.2 -95.8 -62.7 -65.3 -81.5 
* To, Ti, and Aa are calculated according to eqiiations (11) and (12). AQ° and AQ*^ follow 
firom the partial equilibrium model (17). 
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Table 4b. Ban on Antibiotic Use: Original Impacts employing Price 2* 
Yield 1 Yield 2 Yield 3 Yield 4 Yield 5 
Tib S 473.3 693.4 762.6 758.7 617.8 
To yrs. 31.0 32.0 28.0 29.0 33.0 
T, yrs. 33.0 37.0 31.0 31.0 36.0 
Aa 0/lb. 3.4 2.9 2.5 2.6 3.1 
1=6000 AQ° mill. lb. -1,275.1 -1,071.4 -938.6 -957.3 -1,166.7 
AQ'' mill. lb. -2,145.3 -1,802.4 -1,579.1 -1,610.6 -L962.9 
AAcre thsnd. a -59.3 -53.7 -39.2 -37.6 -56.1 
ACS mill. $ -347.9 -299.9 -260.3 -265.2 -320.0 
APS mill. $ -28.1 -37.2 -29.9 -28.5 -34.7 
Cost 1 TCO $ 426.4 649.4 731.0 708.0 574.0 
To yrs. 31.0 33.0 29.0 29.0 33.0 
T, yrs. 33.0 39.0 32.0 32.0 37.0 
Aa 0/lb. 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.7 JO 
1=8000 AQ^ mill. lb. -1,331.2 -1,136.8 -994.7 -1,005.9 -1,222.8 
AQ' mill. lb. -2,239.7 -1,912.5 -1,673.5 -1,692.3 -2,057.2 
AAcre thsnd. a -63.6 -62.3 -42.5 -42.9 -61.7 
ACS mill. $ -362.2 -312.3 -275.1 -278.1 -334.5 
APS mill. $ -27.1 -40.5 -31.1 -30.4 -35.4 
TtO $ 965.4 1,185.5 1,254.7 1,250.8 1,109.8 
To yrs. 31.0 32.0 28.0 29.0 33.0 
Ti yrs. 33.0 37.0 31.0 31.0 36.0 
Aa 0/lb. 3.4 2.9 2.5 2.6 3.1 
1=6000 AQ° mill. lb. -1,267.7 -1,067.7 -934.9 -953.6 -1,163.0 
AQ' mill, lb. -2,132.7 -1,796.3 -1,572.8 -1,604.3 -1,956.6 
AAcre thsnd. a -58.7 -53.4 -39.0 -37.3 -55.9 
ACS mill.$ -346.0 -298.9 -259.3 -264.3 -319.0 
APS mill. $ -56.7 -63.3 -48.9 -46.7 -62.0 
Cost 2 JCO $ 918.5 1,141.4 1,223.1 1,200.1 1,066.1 
To yrs. 31.0 33.0 29.0 29.0 33.0 
T, yrs. 33.0 39.0 32.0 32.0 37.0 
Aa 0/lb. 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.3 
1=8000 AQ^ mill, lb. -U27.5 -1,136.8 -990.9 -1,002.2 -1,219.1 
AQ' mill. lb. -2,233.4 -1,912.5 -1,667.2 -1,686.0 -2,050.9 
AAcre thsnd. a -63.3 -62.3 -42.2 -42.7 -61.5 
ACS mill.$ -361.3 -312.3 -274.1 -277.1 -333.5 
APS mill $ -58.2 -71.1 -51.6 -51.2 -65.5 
^ To, Ti, and Aa are calculated according to equations (11) and (12). AQ'' and AQ** follow 
from the partial equilibrium model (17). 
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Table 5. Ban on Antibiotic Use: Redaced Impacts employing Price 1* 
Yield 1 Yield 2 Yield 3 Yield 4 Yield 5 
itb $ 694.2 918.8 915.1 964.0 871.8 
To yrs. 28.0 26.0 21.0 22.0 28.0 
T, yrs. 30.0 29.0 23.0 24.0 31.0 
Aa 0/lb. 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 
1=6000 AQ° mill, lb. -527.3 -415.1 -385.2 -373.9 -452.5 
AQ' mill, lb. -887.1 -698.3 -648.0 -629.1 -761.2 
AAcre thsnd. a -28.2 -32.5 -22.7 -23.0 -32.7 
ACS mill. $ -149.1 -118.0 -109.7 -106.5 -128.4 
APS mill. $ -19.6 -29.9 -20.8 -22.2 -28.5 
Cost 1 ^ Tto S 671.1 888.1 870.9 922.3 846.6 
To yrs. 29.0 27.0 22.0 23.0 29.0 
T, yrs. 30.0 31.0 24.0 25.0 31.0 
Aa 0/lb. 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 
1=8000 AQ° mill. lb. -557.2 -437.5 -407.6 -396.4 -478.6 
AQ' mill. lb. -937.4 -736.1 -685.7 -666.9 -805.3 
AAcre thsnd. a -24.9 -37.2 -22.5 -22.7 -27.3 
ACS mill. $ -157.4 -124.3 -115.9 -112.8 -135.7 
APS mill. $ -16.7 -33.1 -19.6 -20.9 -23.1 
$ 1,186.3 1,410.9 1,407.3 1,456.1 1,363.9 
To yrs. 28.0 26.0 21.0 22.0 28.0 
Ti yrs. 30.0 29.0 23.0 24.0 31.0 
Aa 0/lb. 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 
1=6000 AQ° mill. lb. -523.5 -411.3 -381.4 -373.9 -448.7 
AQ  ^ mill. lb. -880.8 -692.0 -641.7 -629.1 -754.9 
AAcre thsnd. a -27.9 -32.3 -22.4 -23.0 -32.5 
ACS mill.$ -148.1 -117.0 -108.6 -106.5 -127.4 
APS mill. $ -33.2 -45.5 -31.5 -33.6 -44.3 
Cost 2 ^ $ 1,163.2 1,380.3 1,363.1 1,414.4 1,338.7 
To jns. 29.0 27.0 22.0 23.0 29.0 
T, yrs. 30.0 31.0 24.0 25.0 31.0 
Aa 0/lb. 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 
1=8000 AQ° mill. lb. -553.4 -437.5 -403.9 -396.4 -478.6 
AQ' mill, lb. -931.1 -736.1 -679.5 -666.9 -805.3 
AAcre thsnd. a -24.6 -37.2 -22.3 -22.7 -27.3 
ACS mill.$ -156.3 -124.3 -114.9 -112.8 -135.7 
APS mill. $ -28.6 -51.4 -30.4 -32.1 -36.6 
' To, T1, and Aa are calculated according to equations (11) and (12). and AQ** follow 
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Appendix 4A: Partial Derivatives 
Partial Derivatives of J(T) 
• with respect to X -. 
We can develop (5) as 
E [ e - ^ R  I X  <  T ] P T i X  < T )  +  E j e ' ^  R  |  X  =  T ] V X { X  =  T )  I  £ [ e - ^  ]  
\ -E[e - ^ ]  \ -E[e - ^ ]  
H { T )  I E [ e - ^ ]  
~  \ -E[e - ^ ]  \ -E[e - ^ ]  
An increase in increases E\e~^\, because e~^ is a strictly decreasing function and 
Fj( it) increases for each t  < T .  Therefore the term involving / will increase. 
If we can show that H(X) decreases, we have furthermore to establish that it 
decreases more than 1 - E\e~^ ]. Taking the derivative of H(J) with respect to 2. yields 
= Te'"' {E[e- ^ R  \ X  < t \ -  E[e-^ R  | ^  = r]}+ (l - e'"' —R \ X  < t ]  
dk 
Carrying out the derivatives and expectations and canceling terms results in 
= -Te-'-'^  e-^ r^it)dt + J[ rit)e-^'dt e'^^dr J[ rify"dtXx e''-'dx 
_aPr(X = D ^ a4-e - ' ' ) e - "R \x<T]  
5/1 ^ dX 
The first term will be negative, but the second term will be positive and their relative size 
will depend on the size of X,T, and the entire time path of r(t). Therefore (T) cannot be 
signed. 
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• with respect to I: 
J, = < 0. 
• with respect to a: 
(A+  S )  A,  y ( t )  e ' ^ ' d t  e - "d t / ( (>  +(A  +  S )  y ( t ) e - ^ ' d t /< f>  >  0 .  
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CHAPTERS. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This dissertation is devoted to the economic analysis of pesticide regulation in U.S. 
apple production. Starting from a partial-equilibriiun model for the multiproduct firm, it is 
shown how quality and market allocation effects can be incorporated into a regional 
assessment of pesticide regulation. In this model estimates of supply and demand elasticities 
in the markets to be considered are needed to assess the welfare impacts caused by pesticide 
use cancellations. Regional supply elasticities, U.S. level demand elasticities, and net import 
elasticities are estimated using a regional econometric model. 
The assessment shows that it is important to consider the close links between the 
market for fresh and processed apples. In general, welfare losses are larger in the high-value 
fresh market, where consumer experience large surplus losses because of price increases and 
supply decreases. The EBI ftmgicides and captan are the economically most important 
fiingicides. Total surplus losses due to a ban on these pesticides are estimated $5.8 mill, and 
$2.6 mill., respectively. Mancozeb is another fimgicides of significant economic importance 
and the two most important herbicides are glyphosate and simazine, a ban on which would 
imply losses of $9.6 mill, and $8.0 mill. Regional distribution impacts of pesticide bans are 
also significant Following a ban on captan, growers in the western United States would 
benefit, while growers in other regions would lose. In addition, it is shown that long-run 
impacts can be considerably larger than short-run impacts because supply responses become 
more elastic and orchards leave production. 
Economic assessments of regulatory actions such as a ban on pesticide use rely 
frequently on expert opinion to derive impact estimates. Ch^ter 3 shows how impact 
distributions can be derived from a dispersed collection of expert opinion arising in form of 
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probability estimates over a finite number of intervals. A method of deriving distributions of 
economic-surplus changes is proposed, and the distributions of welfare changes are ordered 
using a nonparametric test that compares distributions in the FSD and SSD sense. 
This procedure is implemented in the topical study of banning organophosphates 
(OPs) in U.S. apple production. Results show that marginal-cost impacts are considerably 
larger when banning all OPs versus banning one OP only, namely azinphos-methyl (APM). 
When analysing welfare impacts of technology restrictions, one must not only consider 
supply function shifts but also changes in the demand fimction. It is foimd that if the average 
willingness to pay for apples not treated with OPs increases sufficiently, the distribution of 
welfare impacts after banning all OPs will be superior to the one after banning APM only. 
Apple production systems are characterized by the long-term investment decision of 
orchard planting. Chapter 4 turns to the issue of how pesticide regulation can influence this 
decision and hence the long-run equilibrium of the industry. It introduces a model that 
permits deriving the optimal orchard age for orchard replacement, acknowledging explicitly 
the orchard survival probability that can be affected by pesticide regulation. This firamework 
is applied in the analysis of impacts resulting from a ban on antibiotics use. Changes in the 
decision to replant are derived, and the model is embedded in an industry equilibrium to 
facilitate the estimation of welfare impacts. In the case of banning antibiotics in apple 
production, welfare losses are estimated at about $320 mill. 
This dissertation addresses several important issues that arise in the assessment of 
economic impacts of pesticide regulation in apple production. Several other topics remain to 
future research. A more explicitly dynamic model would be desirable to endogenize changes 
in agro-ecosystems and to estimate long-term effects of changes in pest management. Also, 
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assessments should pay greater attention to consumers and changes in the product demand. 
In regard to the study of welfare changes under uncertainty, it would be interesting to extend 
the framework of combining expert opinion over impact parameters in a way that allows 
deriving multivariate impact distributions. 
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